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primary agent of the expanding British Empire. Using letters, diaries, contemporary military manuals, and
especially the army’s court-martial records, it focuses particularly on the masculine culture of the officer class.
Due to their high social position and the lack of other authorities in the imperial areas where the army
operated, members of this group held disproportionate power over both their military subordinates and the
civilians with which the army interacted. Officers’ presentation of themselves emphasized traditional
understandings of martial masculinity and class dynamics; their privileges as men were inseparable from their
privileges as members of the upper class. Officers were determined to preserve these privileges as they came
under threat from the development of increasingly technical forms of warfare, imperial administrators anxious
to uphold centralized authority, enlisted soldiers demanding authority and autonomy based on their own
claims to masculine privilege, and imperial civilian populations whose social hierarchies were often perceived
to have a dangerous lack of resemblance to those of the army.
Officers developed a culture in which men’s fragile honor needed to be defended with deadly violence, and in
which fighting wars and advancing the national interest were frequently perceived to be of lesser importance
than deciding questions of personal honor and individual reputation. This culture, in turn, affected the army’s
imperial role. Violent masculinity and honor culture negatively affected the army’s military capabilities, and
army administrators and government officials attempted to control rogue officers through laws and regulations
meant to curb their violent and dangerous behavior. Yet the vast distances of empire made such attempts at
centralized control ineffective, and they found it necessary to cede to the officers themselves the task of
regulating officers’ problematic behavior. So long as officers retained their power, imperial rule would be
shaped by these men who insisted that violent domination was the necessary and essential foundation of their
masculinity, military authority, status, and power.
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ABSTRACT
JUDGING EMPIRE: MASCULINITY AND THE MAKING OF THE BRITISH IMPERIAL
ARMY, 1754-1783
Emily Merrill
Kathleen Brown
“Judging Empire” examines the culture of the British Army during its 
transformation from a national army to a primary agent of the expanding British 
Empire.  Using letters, diaries, contemporary military manuals, and especially the 
army’s court-martial records, it focuses particularly on the masculine culture of the 
officer class.  Due to their high social position and the lack of other authorities in the 
imperial areas where the army operated, members of this group held 
disproportionate power over both their military subordinates and the civilians with 
which the army interacted.  Officers’ presentation of themselves emphasized 
traditional understandings of martial masculinity and class dynamics; their privileges 
as men were inseparable from their privileges as members of the upper class.  
Officers were determined to preserve these privileges as they came under threat 
from the development of increasingly technical forms of warfare, imperial 
administrators anxious to uphold centralized authority, enlisted soldiers demanding 
authority and autonomy based on their own claims to masculine privilege, and 
imperial civilian populations whose social hierarchies were often perceived to have a 
dangerous lack of resemblance to those of the army.  
Officers developed a culture in which men’s fragile honor needed to be defended 
with deadly violence, and in which fighting wars and advancing the national interest 
were frequently perceived to be of lesser importance than deciding questions of 
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personal honor and individual reputation.  This culture, in turn, affected the army’s 
imperial role.  Violent masculinity and honor culture negatively affected the army’s 
military capabilities, and army administrators and government officials attempted to 
control rogue officers through laws and regulations meant to curb their violent and 
dangerous behavior.  Yet the vast distances of empire made such attempts at 
centralized control ineffective, and they found it necessary to cede to the officers 
themselves the task of regulating officers’ problematic behavior.  So long as officers 
retained their power, imperial rule would be shaped by these men who insisted that 
violent domination was the necessary and essential foundation of their masculinity, 
military authority, status, and power.  
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Introduction
Major General Lord Charles Hay was unhappy.  He had arrived in Halifax in July 
1757 to join the Earl of Loudoun, the British Army’s Commander-in-Chief in North 
America, who was to lead a summer attack on territory held by Britain’s ancient 
enemy, France.  The skirmishes between British and French troops in the interior of 
North America in 1754 had escalated into a general European war, but North 
America remained an important theater of war for the British, who sought to 
neutralize the threat that the French colonial presence in Canada, the Great Lakes, 
and along the Mississippi River presented to their own colonies on the eastern coast 
of North America.  
To that end, orders had crossed the Atlantic instructing Loudoun to attack either 
Quebec, at the heart of French Canada, or Louisbourg, the great Atlantic fortress 
that protected the approach to the St. Lawrence River.  The choice of target was left 
to Loudoun to determine, as the weather and the need to coordinate with naval 
forces would have to be taken into consideration.  Loudoun called a council of war to 
debate the question.  Lord Charles Hay, a member of the council, found the meetings
interminable.  An attack on Quebec was soon dismissed as unfeasible, but the 
council spent several weeks debating whether or not it was too late in the year to 
mount an expedition to attack Louisbourg, calling on various people to testify to 
Louisbourg’s fortifications, winds, tides, weather, anchorages, and so on.  Hay soon 
took to making impatient remarks that the army ought to sail to Louisbourg and 
begin fighting immediately—and not only in meetings of the council of war but also in
public.  Loudoun reported in his diary that another council member had “told us that 
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Ld Charles Hay this day at the Head of the Line declared that he could take 
Louisburg in ten dayes.”1  
But Hay’s dissatisfaction was not confined to the delays of the council.  Upon 
arriving in Halifax, Loudoun had started making arrangements to prepare his army 
for operations in North America, ordering the engineers to construct a sample fort, 
for the purpose of “instructing both Officers and Men in making Approaches towards 
a fortified Place,” so that the troops would be prepared to attack heavily fortified 
positions at Louisbourg.2  Furthermore, he had ordered the soldiers to clear ground 
for a garden, “in order to Sow Turnips and other Greens for themselves,” this being 
“the only thing that either prevents, or recovers them out of, those inveterate 
Scurvies we are infested with in this Country, from the Salt Provisions.”3  Hay 
publicly denounced these activities as well.  One officer reported that Hay had 
declared that the soldiers ought to be concerned with fighting, not with gardening 
and “building Sham Forts, and making approaches to them, when we should be 
employ'd in real Attacks.”4   Another officer claimed that Hay, having collected “a 
great Number of People of all Ranks about him,” had reflected on the soldiers’ 
exercises at the fake fort, saying that “it was a very fine Farce, that we were now 
carrying on, to cost Poor Old England three Millions of Money; but that, by God, it 
would cost us very little Blood this Campaign, which would cut a very pretty figure in
History.”5  
1. Loudoun Diary, 27 July 1757, Huntington Library, Loudoun Notebooks, HM 1717 (v. 7).
2. Relation of Major Francis Halkett, Halifax, 7 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO
6175.
3. Earl of Loudoun to the Duke of Cumberland, Halifax, 6 Aug 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library,
LO 4088. This letter has also been published in S. M. Pargellis, ed., Military Aﬀairs in North America,
1748-1765, (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 391.
4. Relation of Captain Christopher French, Halifax, 8 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library,
Box 129, LO 6175.
5. Declaration of Captain Robert Ross, Halifax, 8 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO
4151.
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Hay made a particular connection between the lack of bloodshed and the 
humiliation of the nation, saying “that the most agreeable Part of it wou'd be, that 
there wou'd be no Blood Split; that it would be a very pretty Amusement for the 
town of Halifax, but the People that wou'd be the most diverted, by God, wou'd be 
the French.”6  For Hay, the proper action of a soldier was to display bravery on the 
battlefield, not a concern for drills, logistics, and vegetable gardens.  An army gained
renown because it fought together and shed blood together, and Loudoun’s careful 
preparations appeared to Hay too timid and cautious, and unlikely to enhance the 
military reputation and national honor of the British.  
Loudoun, alarmed by Hay’s public criticisms, ordered him under arrest, claiming 
that Hay had made remarks “tending to discredit me with the officers and soldiers, 
and to rais [sic] mutiny among the troops.”7  But Hay was a member of the 
aristocracy, held the exalted rank of major general, and had been appointed by the 
king himself.  Loudoun had no authority to sanction him for his behavior.   Ideally, 
then, Hay ought to have been sent back to London for the matter to be settled by 
men of higher rank—perhaps even by the indisputable authority of King George II.  
But Loudoun was assailed by scruples on this matter as well, writing an anguished 
letter to the Duke of Cumberland (the youngest son of the king and Loudoun’s 
patron) begging for instructions: Hay had been sent out to America by the king; was 
Loudoun overstepping if he sent him back on his own authority?8  And the exigencies
of war interceded; before either man had received a reply from London, Hay was 
forced to travel with Loudoun’s army as it embarked for a sea voyage.  It was a year 
before Hay finally returned to London, and his court-martial occurred only in 1760, 
6. Declaration of Captain Robert Ross, 8 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 4151.
7. Loudoun Diary, 14 August 1757, Loudoun Notebooks, Huntington Library, HM 1717 (v. 7).
8. Loudoun to the Duke of Cumberland, 7 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 4109.
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three years after the events in question occurred, and this only after numerous 
delays caused by the war (and many complaints from Loudoun that several key 
witnesses had died during the interval, significantly weakening his case).  And even 
then the matter was not settled satisfactorily: Hay faced accusations that he had 
“publickly, in the hearing of Officers and Soldiers,” used “Language tending to bring 
into Contempt, the Conduct and Authority, of the Commanders” and exhibited 
behavior “tending to excite mutiny and sedition among the troops,” but due to Hay’s 
exalted social position the court-martial board chose to refer the matter directly to 
the king rather than coming to any verdict themselves.  And before any judgment 
had been made by the king, Lord Charles Hay suddenly died.9  
This dispute between Loudoun and Hay speaks to the central themes of this 
dissertation: how ideas about masculinity shaped army culture and the nature of 
military authority, and how these ideas ultimately constrained the ways the army 
could use the law to operate in its new imperial role. 
Their initial altercation reflected the complicated workings of masculinity and 
authority in an imperial army and was a symptom of a larger national concern: how 
to retain traditions of martial masculinity in a world where the practices of war were 
becoming increasingly technical.  And as with every war that did not deliver crowd-
pleasing British victories on a regular schedule, anxieties over martial masculinity 
soon bled into the public sphere; the civilian public faced recurring fears that the 
British troops had lost the manly vigor that would allow them to triumph in the art of
war.10  
9. Loudoun to Charles Gould, 10 February 1760, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 6812; Charles
Gould to Loudoun, 3 May 1760, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 6421.
10. Stephen Conway, War, State, and Society in Mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 120.
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Furthermore, the case reveals the close links between masculinity, military 
authority, and personal honor.  By virtue of being Commander-in-Chief for North 
America, Loudoun could plausibly conflate the maintenance of his individual 
reputation with the national interest.  Loudon perceived Hay’s remarks as a threat 
not only to his authority as a military commander, but also as a threat to his 
personal honor.  “Reports injurious to me,” Loudoun wrote to officials at the War 
Office in 1759, were being “spread all over the Kingdom in relation to that Affair.”  
By this point, the dispute between the two men was well over a year in the past, Hay
was back in Britain, and Loudoun had returned as well, having been relieved as 
Commander-in-Chief.  But Loudoun persisted, claiming that until Hay was tried, his 
personal reputation was in tatters and that Hay’s court-martial must occur as soon 
as possible to clear his character.  The interminable postponements of the trial date 
(because several of the key witnesses were still fighting the war in America) were, 
he insisted, “cruel and unjust” to him.11  
The dispute also reveals the difficulty of maintaing authority far from the 
metropole.  In North America, Loudoun was fighting an imperial war—and for an 
empire uncomfortable with the loss of centralized control that such a war required.  
Loudoun, as commander-in-chief, had already developed concerns about the 
difficulties he faced in carrying out (or justifying his departure from) orders that were
often no longer relevant by the time they crossed the Atlantic and reached him.  
Hay’s remarks then highlighted the danger of challenging command in an imperial 
space—especially when the challenger was also of high rank.  In his diary, Loudoun 
described a visit from one of Hay's sympathizers, Mr. Saul, who had gone to see Hay
about a week after he had been arrested, and reported that Hay "was now got cool 
11. Loudoun to Viscount Barrington, 11 April 1759, Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, LO 6175.
5
again" and "lived on Small Broth and Rice and Milk and drank no wine."  According to
Saul, Hay protested his arrested, now claiming that he did not do "any more than 
talkt up and around the Expedition."  But Loudoun told Saul that "a man must be 
very unfitt for any command who would permitt any Man under him to Raise Mutinys
and Desertions in the Army.”  Loudoun insisted that “the Command must rest where 
the King had put it till he was pleasd to change it, and that attempts to do such 
things were very criminal in all Armys, but much more so at so great a distance from
where the King could applie a proper remedy."12  
Loudoun’s arrest of Hay and his demands for Hay’s court-martial were attempts 
to use the law both as a way of projecting centralized power into imperial space, and
as a way to defend his individual honor.  But the extensive delay—the three years 
between the incidents and the trial—demonstrates how difficult and impractical it 
was to attempt to control an imperial army’s exercise of military justice from the 
metropole.  Justice from London—even justice three years delayed—was often a 
luxury reserved for military officers of the very highest ranks.  The needs of war, 
combined with the vast distances of empire, meant that members of the military who
lacked Hay’s lordly title and aristocratic connections were tried on location.  
However, this necessarily had the effect of removing these trials from central 
oversight.  
The expansion of Britain’s colonial empire in the second half of the eighteenth 
century made officials ever more anxious to maintain centralized control, but also 
made this goal impossible; military autonomy flourished in imperial space.  Thus, 
these years emerge as a time of transition for the British Army as an agent of 
empire.  Earlier in the century, the army fought wars primarily on the European 
12. Loudoun Diary, 14 August 1757, Loudoun Notebooks, Huntington Library, HM 1717 (v. 7).
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continent, close to home.  But in the period covered by this study, 1754-1783, 
Britain’s involvement in warfare became increasingly imperial, with substantial 
numbers of troops deployed throughout the Atlantic world, in garrisons located far 
afield in North America and the Caribbean.  
These circumstances might have led to a fracturing of army culture, as each 
regiment adopted the norms of the local community in which it was stationed.  
However, what actually occurred was precisely the opposite.   Regiments were 
regularly rotated between various stations abroad and at home according to a 
schedule, and individual officers were constantly exchanging between regiments, 
seeking opportunities for promotion to a higher rank, a posting closer to friends and 
family, or from a desire to gain martial glory in a regiment that was likely to see 
military action.  Enlisted soldiers, too, frequently moved between regiments, though 
not in so voluntary a fashion as the officers: groups of soldiers were routinely 
“drafted” from a full-strength regiment to make up the numbers of one that had 
recently suffered losses.  Thus, the regular rotation of regiments between postings 
abroad and at home, combined with the geographical movements of individual 
officers and soldiers, served to facilitate the development of the British Army as an 
Atlantic institution with a shared military culture despite the dispersion of its 
troops.13  
The army’s propensity to be stationed far from other sources of authority, in 
distant and foreign lands, determined the degree to which military culture could be 
influenced by metropolitan authority.  The commander of a regiment that was 
stationed far from London had far greater autonomy than one that was stationed 
within the British Isles.  Operating in imperial space allowed the army to develop and
13. William P Tatum, "Civilian Intervention and Military Justice in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic,"
Transnational Subjects 1, no. 1 (2011): 65-71.
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champion its own norms away from civilian oversight, and also allowed it to enforce 
those norms through the use of military law.  In Britain, the army (in theory, at 
least) was only permitted to try and punish soldiers who were accused of purely 
military crimes—mutiny, desertion, disobedience to superiors, and so on.  A soldier 
who was accused of other crimes, such as theft, murder, rape, or robbery, was 
supposed to be turned over the the civil authorities to be tried by them.  However, 
the Articles of War established that in areas where there were no civilian courts 
under British authority, the army was to use its own system of military courts.14  
These military courts produced the records on which much of this study relies: 
the British Army’s court-martial proceedings—the official records of trials, which were
sent to the Judge Advocate General in London and are now archived in the War 
Office.15  They had some resemblance to a civilian court, but the outcome was 
determined by the court-martial board, a group of thirteen officers selected from all 
the regiments present on the spot, who acted as both judge and jury.  Officers were 
not expected to have any formal legal training, so the task of advising them on 
points of military law fell to the officer appointed as Deputy Judge Advocate, who 
was expected to organize and administer the trial.  In addition to his advisory role to 
the court-martial board, he was also responsible for collecting and assembling 
witnesses, acting as the prosecutor, keeping the official record of the trial, and 
providing legal assistance to the defendant.  
14. An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion (London, 1771), 205. A situation requiring the replacement
of local civilian courts with military courts occurred in the colony of Massachusetts Bay after martial
law was declared in 1775: not only military crimes, but also crimes in which civilians were both the
accused and the victims, were now to be tried by court-martial, necessitating the expansion of the
military court system to cope with the expanded case load (Stephen Payne Adye to Sir Charles Gould,
4 October 1775, Stephen Payne Adye Papers, American Philosophical Society).  
15. The number of cases transmitted to London by regiments stationed abroad varied widely from year to
year, increasing substantially in wartime.  About 500 individual cases were examined for this study.  
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Although these court-martial proceedings have much value as a record of the 
formal, legal uses of power, the testimony within also contains even more valuable 
information on the informal and extralegal contests between military officers, 
enlisted soldiers, and civilians.  In the courtroom, opponents described and disputed 
the various events that led up to the commission of the crime, and thus the 
proceedings often record in minute detail the social interactions between members of
the army community, as well as the participants’ and witnesses’ interpretations of 
these interactions.  
In this way, these sources offer far more information about the precise nature of 
interpersonal actions and the creation of social relationships of deference and power 
than other commonly-used sources.  During this period, officers produced military 
manuals and treatises to instruct their fellow officers about their duties or to 
advocate for proposed reforms.16  While the prescriptive nature of these works 
provides intriguing insight on what the authors considered the greatest problems 
facing the army (for example, the numerous paeans to the virtue of obedience 
suggest that insubordination was a serious concern), they ultimately describe the 
army as it ought to be, rather than the army as it actually was.  Officers also 
produced letters and diaries that reveal their personal feelings as victims or 
witnesses to interpersonal disputes, as well as providing information on disputes that
never escalated to the point of a court-martial.  These are often a helpful supplement
to the court-martial records, but usually do not provide a similar level of detail.  
However, these records also have some limitations.  They were preserved because 
they dealt with accusations of very serious crimes; many more minor offenses were 
resolved on the spot and never recorded in written form.  Heated exchanges 
16. Ira B. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2014) describes the most common of these works, and which ones were most
popular and circulated among army oﬃcers.  
9
between witnesses sometimes resulted in language vulgar enough that the Deputy 
Judge Advocate refused to preserve it in an official record.  And because the 
potential participants in a court-martial knew that the proceedings would become an 
official and fairly public record, officers who wanted to avoid the publicity and shame 
that followed a conviction often tried to resign quietly rather than be tried formally. 
However, these records have the irreplaceable advantage of preserving a range 
of voices.  Few people were absolutely excluded from the court, including 
marginalized people who normally would not be allowed to testify in colonial civilian 
courts because of their religion, ethnicity, or slave status.17  And because the court-
martial was a forum for self-presentation—where witnesses did not naively testify to 
the unvarnished facts as they knew them without any idea of self-interest, but with 
specific goals (such as gaining conviction or acquittal, defending reputations, 
presenting themselves in a good light to the court-martial board or the audience)—
these records also provide information about how these witnesses wished to be 
perceived, and what they valued.  Thus, they illuminate the thoughts and principles 
of individuals connected with the army during a time of transition for the army itself. 
European norms of warfare in this period were becoming increasingly technical, 
and armies themselves were becoming unified, national militaries controlled by the 
state rather than the semi-private forces that evolved from the mercenary bands of 
previous centuries.  Yet although the British army by this period had largely shed the
vestigial remains of Tudor proprietary soldiering and organized itself under more 
centralized royal control, its cultural ideals lagged behind, remnants of an earlier 
17. The court-martial records are also the most important source that preserve the voices of the majority
of the army community; unlike oﬃcers, who produced numerous memoirs about their wartime
experiences, first-person accounts of the Revolutionary War by enlisted soldiers were extremely rare.
Most of them have been collected in Don Hagist’s British Soldiers, American War: Voices of the
American Revolution (Yardley: Westholme, 2012).  
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age.18  Its officers were concerned with honor, individual reputation, and personal 
glory, and, in fact, the transition away from mercenary custom had rendered the 
position of army officer so unprofitable that officer ranks were dominated by the 
upper-class men with an amateur’s love of things military; few other men could 
easily afford the expenses of a military career.19  Thus, the British army was in the 
position of trying to fight increasingly technical wars with an increasingly 
unprofessional officer corps.  
In the long view of British imperial warfare, the late eighteenth century was the 
last high tide of amateur soldiering.  The key component of officers’ understanding of
themselves was as gentlemen motivated by honor, eager to demonstrate individual 
courage and proper martial masculinity in public displays of battlefield bravery.  
However, they were uninterested in mastering the more technical elements of 
warfare, and far less concerned with the good of the nation than their government 
might have wished.  For them, personal honor, the maintenance of their upper-class 
position and the privileges they accrued from it, and upholding their masculine 
reputation naturally trumped their desire to provide selfless service to their country—
especially if such service would undermine their carefully-guarded class and gender 
privileges.  
The examination of the effects of this culture of privilege have been neglected in 
most military histories of this period in favor of the traditional emphasis on tactics, 
strategy, and supply.  In others, the social culture of the army has been explored in 
almost purely military terms, with little acknowledgment that the power that officers 
had over other officers, soldiers and civilians did not come solely from their military 
18. For more on the transition to centralized, royal control of the army, see Alan J Guy, Oeconomy and
Discipline: Oﬃcership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-63 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1985).
19. Guy, 80.
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rank, but also from the positions they occupied in civilian social hierarchies as adult 
men and as upper-class gentlemen—and from the value that their society placed on 
these positions.20  
Officers’ understanding and presentation of themselves strongly emphasized the 
importance of manliness and masculinity.  However, their conception of manhood 
was inseparable from class; their masculinity was defined not in opposition to 
women, but in opposition to men of other classes.  Thus, it departs from the 
tendency of histories of gender to emphasize difference and to examine how 
masculinity was constructed in opposition to femininity, and how these constructions 
allowed men to dominate women.21  It was far more common for the army to use 
ideas about gender to sustain the power of men to dominate other men; enforcing 
the subordination of women was not a particularly important goal, and it was often 
more profitable for officers to consolidate their own power over enlisted men by 
allowing women to threaten the masculine power and authority of lower-class men.22
20. As noted previously, Guy’s Oeconomy and Discipline suggests that changes to the military culture and
the composition of the oﬃcer class were due to the unintended consequences of attempts at
economic reform, while J. A. Houlding’s Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) attributes the Army’s culture and methods of training to the
nation’s need for the army to police and subdue its own population as well as to fight wars. Two
doctoral dissertations, Glenn Steppler’s “The Common Soldier in the Age of George III” (Oxford, 1984)
and Mark Odintz’s “The British Oﬃcer Corps, 1754-1783” (Michigan, 1988) examine the military
cultures of enlisted soldiers and of oﬃcers more generally; the latter also reveals the tensions that the
oﬃcers’ culture of personal honor created for commanders who desired a stricter observance of the
military hierarchy. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy’s The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership,
the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013) notes
the importance of cultural experiences to military eﬀectiveness, but, as the title suggests, confines his
analysis to the men at the highest ranks of the military and government.  
21. R.W. Connell’s Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) complicates this dynamic
and promotes the idea of multiple masculinities, formed largely by the interaction of men with other
men, but still sees the subordination of women as a fundamental goal of these masculinities.  
22. Similar strategies have been studied by Ann Farnsworth-Alvear, “Women, Men(?), and a Strike in
Colombian Mills,” which examines elite men’s defense of striking female workers in gendered terms as
a strategy for upholding the existing hierarchy and neutralizing their potential political role as workers
engaged in class politics; and Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the
'Eﬀeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995),
who notes that defending the “rights” of women (often construed solely as the protection of their
chastity) was a way for men to contest or undermine the patriarchal power of other men.  
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Complications of the simple male/female gender dynamic, especially from the 
standpoint of colonial and imperial history, tend to be dominated by arguments for 
the crucial importance of race and ethnicity in creating social hierarchies.23  However,
this customary focus on difference would obscure the internal dynamics of power 
within the army.  The army itself operated with very different demographics from a 
civilian society, and consequently its hierarchy was one that could not establish its 
right to coercive power on a simple appeal to gender or racial privilege.  
Furthermore, favoring the study of interaction between imperial forces and colonial 
civilians over the internal structure of those imperial forces can result in a misleading
understanding of the motivations and goals of these imperial actors.  The most 
fundamental need of the army was to preserve order among its own members.  
Before the army could subdue colonial populations, it had to subdue dissenters 
within its own ranks.  Its social structure was, first and foremost, designed to 
accomplish this goal, and the effects that its decisions might have on its imperial 
interactions were a decidedly secondary priority.  
The juxtaposition of an army whose administration was centralized and state-
based, but whose culture was steeped in more traditional ideals of martial 
masculinity, combined with an expanding empire that allowed army officers an 
unprecedented autonomy when they operated in imperial space, provides a unique 
opportunity to study the gender history of the early imperial British army, and sheds 
light on how gender and masculinity complicated the larger imperial project.  
The first part of this work (chapters 1 through 5) examines the role of gender in 
the army, focusing on the subculture of the British Army as it sought to implement 
23. Kathleen Brown, in Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996), suggests that the emergence of the patriarchal social structure of colonial
Virginia came from ideas of diﬀerence between sexes and races and the interconnected comparisons
and diﬀerentiations between them, and subsequent studies have followed it in seeing race and gender
as two of the most essential categories in constructing the lived experiences of empire.  
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the necessary structures for linear warfare within its ranks, and the consequences of 
that implementation—most notably, the creation of an officer culture in which 
gentlemen’s fragile honor needed to be defended with deadly violence, and in which 
fighting wars and advancing the national interest were frequently perceived to be of 
lesser importance than deciding questions of personal honor and individual 
reputation.  
The first chapter, “Linear Warfare and the Politics of the Body,” examines the 
military tactics of the eighteenth century and military writers’ assessment of the 
social organization necessary for an army that wished to use those tactics effectively.
In particular, one idea gained especial credence in Britain: that an army could not 
excel at the linear tactics necessary to fight successfully with muskets unless it 
adopted and vigorously enforced extreme differences between the perceived status 
and rights of officers and of enlisted soldiers.  
Chapter 2, “Paternalism and Symbolic Patriarchy,” describes the ways that the 
British Army sought to implement these status differences by borrowing the 
frameworks of already-established class and gender hierarchies.  Officers justified 
their control over enlisted soldiers by suggesting that the latter were akin to 
irresponsible children who needed to be subordinate to their paternalistic officers, 
thereby negating the privileges these enlisted soldiers would otherwise enjoy as 
adult men.  
But once subordination had been linked so strongly with being childlike and 
unmasculine, military commanders then found it difficult to extract obedience from 
members of the officer class.  This is the focus of the third chapter, “Above the Law,”
as officers insisted that their high status and high position in the social hierarchy 
rendered them rightfully immune to the rules and regulations that restricted lower-
class men.  
14
Chapter 4, “The Cult of Courage,” tracks officers’ growing dissatisfaction with the 
army’s attempts at modernization.  The fundamental tactics of linear warfare, which 
emphasized order, discipline, practice, precision, and training, did not suit 
aristocratic officers’ conceptions of proper military masculinity.  Preferring dashing 
displays of battlefield courage to endless drills and maneuvers, they asserted that 
these new systems of military discipline were sapping the nation’s soldiers of the 
masculine vigor necessary to win wars.  
Chapter 5, “No Retreat,” examines the growth of honor culture among army 
officers, along with the belief that a reputation for manhood and courage could only 
be established and upheld through the use of violence.  Disagreements between 
officers frequently led to deadly quarrels and duels, because the masculine culture of
the army allowed them no honorable way to retreat from conflict.  
Part II (chapters 6-8) looks at how these workings of gender in the army, 
examined in Part I, affected the army’s imperial role.  Violent masculinity and honor 
culture negatively affected the army’s military capabilities, and army administrators 
and government officials attempted to control rogue officers through laws and 
regulations meant to curb their violent and dangerous behavior.  Yet the vast 
distances of the empire made such attempts at centralized control ineffective, and 
the army found it necessary to cede to the officers themselves the task of regulating 
officers’ problematic behavior.  
This, too, created its own challenges; Chapter 6, “A Government of Men, not of 
Laws,” examines officers’ perception of military law—and, indeed, the very concept 
of the principle of impartial law—as a pernicious force that needed to be subverted in
order to uphold officers’ personal honor.  
Chapter 7, “The Supremacy of Honor,” reveals how honor culture posed many 
threats to military discipline and to the proper functioning of the army.  Yet the 
15
government capitulated to the demands of officers insistent on upholding their 
reputations as honorable gentlemen, thus conceding that officers’ personal honor 
must necessarily trump military and imperial interests.  
The final chapter, “Imperial Protectors?” looks at officers’ actions in the American
War of Independence.  Their understandings of masculinity, status, and the law 
affected their interpretation of their imperial role and how they believed they should 
treat civilians.  Certain civilians were believed to be deserving of protection as loyal 
imperial subjects; others they considered rebels against the class and gender 
hierarchies officers sought to uphold.  Thus, the role of gender in the army had 
significant consequences for the operation of the army in its increasingly imperial 
role, as well as for the empire itself.  
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Chapter 1: Linear Warfare and the Politics of the Body
On December 10, 1777, Private John Rowland of the British Army’s 7th Regiment 
of Foot was sentenced to death.  Unlike the other soldiers brought before the 
General Court Martial that convened in Philadelphia that month, Rowland had not 
plundered the houses of the inhabitants of that city, or robbed stores, or taken the 
British occupation of Philadelphia as an opportunity to desert to what the British 
authorities termed “the Rebel Army.”  Rather, Rowland stood before the court 
“Accused by Lieut. Span of having Struck him, been insolent to him and disobeyed 
his Orders.”24  
That Rowland was sentenced to death for this becomes even more extraordinary 
considering how the charge came about.  Rowland’s accuser, Lieutenant George 
Frederick Augustus Span of the 28th Regiment of Foot, testified that he had been in 
his quarters when his servant came in and informed him that three soldiers were 
tearing down a house that was Span’s property.  Span claimed that when he went 
out and demanded that they leave, “they did not pay the least attention to him.”  
While alcohol-fueled disrespect to officers and their property was nearly endemic 
in the eighteenth-century British army (“Was the Prisoner in Liquor at the time?” was
a perennial question of the court), here this emphatically was not the case.25  In his 
testimony Span “beg’d [the Court] that they would take notice that the Prisoner was 
perfectly Sober,” and that Rowland’s behavior was not due to any drunken lack of 
24. The National Archives of the United Kingdom, War Oﬃce (hereafter WO) 71/85, pp. 137-141.
25. Paul Kopperman, “‘The Cheapest Pay’: Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army." Journal
of Military History 60 (1996): 445-470; Rabin, Dana. "Drunkenness and responsibility for crime in the
Eighteenth Century." Journal of British Studies 44.3 (2005): 457-477. Crimes committed by intoxicated
soldiers made up substantial portion of the British Army’s courts-martial (e.g. WO 71/83, pp. 41-48);
Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge ;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 105, suggests that the exception was rather the trial in
which no soldier claimed to be drunk.
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control over his actions but that his disobedience to Span’s wishes proceeded from a 
deliberate and obstinate denial of Span’s authority. 
Span disputed their right to take the wood: “taking up a lath,” he reported, and 
striking the soldiers, he had driven off the two men.  Rowland, however, proved 
more intractable.  At Span’s demand that he “not touch a log of that wood,” Rowland
replied “that he had as much right to it as [Lt. Span] had, and that he would take as 
much of it as he had torn down.”  Span, still holding the lath, testified that he then 
told Rowland that “he had better go off & not attempt to touch the wood, or that he 
would strike him with the lath, incase [sic] he was in the least impertinent.”
But this threat failed to persuade Rowland of the dangers of impertinence.  He 
advanced towards the lieutenant in what Span characterized as “a very daring 
insolent manner,” and “standing upon the wood swore, he would be damned, if he 
would leave it.”  If Span dared to strike him, he declared, Rowland would strike him 
back.  Span, soon convinced that “he had nothing left but to drive the Man off 
himself,” found a stick and told Rowland “that if he did not leave the Wood, he would
lay that Stick about his shoulders, as long as it would last.”  Rowland reiterated his 
assertion that if Span “offered to touch him,” he would be assaulted in return.  Span 
hit him with the stick.  Rowland proceeded to grab him by the hair, drag him to the 
ground, and strike him several times.  According to Span’s testimony, the altercation
continued in this pattern until Span found the stick unserviceable, and went away in 
search of more effective weapons.  On the way, however, he encountered three 
officers of the 7th Regiment, Rowland’s own, who upon hearing his account confined 
Rowland and brought him before the court martial.  
Rowland, called upon to defend himself from the charge, told a slightly different 
story.  According to him, Lieutenant Span took the lath and “broke it over his head &
then took up another and struck him again.”  Rowland claimed that he responded not
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with a “daring insolent manner,” but rather “beg’d [Span] repeatedly not to strike 
him, but to confine him, if he was in fault.”  But Span had “a great Stick, and struck 
him very severely,” and Rowland feared that the assault “would have taken away his
Life.”  Yet even then, Rowland claimed that “he still beg'd him not to strike him, and 
lifted up his Arm, to save the blows from his head, which with that stick, he might 
have been cloven in two, but Lt. Span continued to follow him.”  Only then did 
Rowland strike him back, with “three blows in his own defence.”  Here Rowland laid 
out the fundamental elements of his defense: that he responded to the lieutenant’s 
assaults not with defiance but with submission, and that he only struck the officer 
because he feared that Span’s beating would kill him.  
Remarkable in this case is how much Lieutenant Span’s testimony concurs with 
Rowland’s—not, perhaps, in the question of whether Rowland’s manner was 
unacceptably insolent or properly deferential, but in whether or not Rowland had 
cause to fear for his life.  Span openly claimed before the court that he had had the 
intention of killing Rowland, and that Rowland knew it: after “finding the Stick could 
be of no Service,” Span testified, “he threw it at the Prisoner, and was going towards
his house, to get his bayonet or Sword, telling him that he certainly would put him to
death.”  When Span encountered the officers from the 7th while going to his house, 
upon being asked what was the matter, “he answered that he had been most 
scandalously treated by a Soldier of the 7th Regiment & that he was going to get a 
Sword or bayonet, or something to put him to Death with.”  He was only dissuaded 
from this murderous course by the other officers, who convinced him that he “would 
get more satisfaction by bringing him to a Court Martial.”26  
26. WO 71/85, pp. 137-141.
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And yet, the court martial board found Span’s assaults on Rowland and even his 
homicidal intentions to be excusable, even unremarkable, while Rowland’s far milder 
response, made under severe provocation and in self-defense, was deemed a crime 
punishable by death.  Here, then, is an indication of the vast gulf between the status 
of officers and enlisted in men in military law.  
The case of John Rowland reveals the extreme differences between the treatment
of the bodies of officers and enlisted men, and helps us understand the role of class 
in determining which bodies were subject to violence and coercion.  Furthermore, the
case highlights the expectation of enlisted men’s obedience, even in the face of 
extreme and unjustified violence perpetrated by officers.  These personal interactions
between officers and the enlisted reflected contemporary military theories concerning
the tactics of linear warfare.  Far from being confined solely to the battlefield, the 
exigencies of linear warfare demanded the strict regulation of the bodies of enlisted 
men in everyday life.  These class-based hierarchies, which demanded the absolute 
subordination of enlisted soldiers to their officers, were perceived to be the 
necessary foundations of every effective army in the age of linear warfare.  
These status differences were reflected in the army’s rules about who could touch
whom.  By the standards of today, we make distinctions between a mere touch and 
other, more violent forms of assault.  But in the culture of the late eighteenth 
century army, a “mere touch” was part of a continuum of assault on the integrity of 
the body, and military law made no distinction between an enlisted soldier tapping 
his commanding officer on the shoulder and the soldier punching him in the face; 
both were considered assault and a severe enough violation of the officer’s bodily 
integrity (and thereby his status as a gentleman) that the soldier could be tried and 
executed for either.  
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On the other hand, an officer could touch anyone but another officer with 
impunity.  Officers could also authorize the use of touch by one enlisted soldier on 
another, in the case of flogging, generally carried out by the drummers, the most 
junior members of the army.  This, then, was another assertion of their power over 
the bodies of their men: not only could officers exercise direct authority over their 
men by hitting them themselves, but they could also order others to do the work of 
assault for them.  (Sergeants and other non-commissioned officers were immune to 
this level of physical punishment, but they were differentiated from officers in that 
this immunity was not inherent to them as people, only to their rank and office, 
which could be revoked at will by their officers.  Officers’ concern for maintaining the
military hierarchy made them careful to remove NCO status before ordering a 
sergeant or corporal to be flogged: in every case, the man was formally demoted 
from his rank and made a mere private again, and then flogged. 27) 
Cases of enlisted men being charged with assaulting officers were not infrequent,
but officers were charged with assaulting enlisted soldiers far more rarely, though it 
is apparent that such assaults, even severe ones, were a regular part of army life.  
Officers asserted their right to informally discipline the soldiers under their command
through this “manual correction,” and officers’ outrage when this treatment met with
resistance indicates that these casual beatings were not exceptional occurrences—
the exceptional occurrence was when the men they beat resisted.28  Yet officers were
only prosecuted if an assault went so far as to cause death.29  
27. See John Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement; Comprehending the Tactick, Exercise,
Manoevres, and Discipline of the British Infantry (London: Printed for Thomas Egerton, 1782), 206-207:
“Corporal punishment must not be inflicted on a non-commission oﬃcer; but when simple reduction
may appear too light a penalty for any oﬀence committed by a non-commission oﬃcer, he may be
ordered in the sentence to be reduced to the ranks, and then to receive such corporal punishment as
may be adjudged by the court.”
28. Brumwell, 102.
29. See, for example, WO 71/80, pp. 336-350, in which Captain Richard Symes was tried for “Wounding a
Marine, of which wound said Marine is Supposed to have died.” Symes convinced the court that he
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The army enforced these extreme differences in status and in the right to bodily 
integrity in order to create and sustain a social structure for effectively wielding 
violence with the military weapons of the eighteenth century.  The problem that the 
British army faced, stripped to its barest foundations, was essentially this: to make it
possible for one group of people (the officers) to completely subordinate another 
group of people (the enlisted), such that the latter will both kill and be killed on 
command—and only on command.  
The tactics of every age of warfare are dependent on its weaponry.  In European 
warfare in the late eighteenth century, the most common weapon was the musket—a
firearm of limited range that had to be reloaded after each shot—and the tactic that 
maximized its effectiveness was the linear formation: the standard deployment of 
troops on the field was in a formation that might be over a mile long, but only two or
three ranks deep.  This formation was adopted because it allowed every soldier to 
fire at the enemy without obstruction.30  However, this lack of depth made the 
formation very vulnerable; any gap in the line might be exploited by enemy cavalry 
or infantry, who could then break through and attack the line from the rear.  Thus, 
contemporary military treatises emphasized the danger that even a single 
disobedient soldier presented in battle if he panicked and left his place in the 
formation.31  
In order to present an unbroken front to the enemy as it approached, an army 
deployed in the line had to move very slowly across the terrain, pausing constantly 
wounded the marine while attempted to prevent them from breaking into a house, and since violence
under those circumstances was justifiable, he was acquitted of the charge despite the court’s
determination that the marine had died because of Symes’s actions.
30. Christopher Duﬀy, The Military Experience in the Age of the Reason (London ; New York: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1987), 200-201; Lynn, 119-120.  
31. Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline; In Which Is Laid Down and Explained the Duty of the
Oﬃcer and Soldier, Thro' the Several Branches of the Service (London, 1753), 134-135. Duﬀy,
215-216.
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to re-form after navigating obstacles.32  Therefore it was usual for armies seeking to 
rapidly change position to march in columns, which was quicker but made the troops 
more vulnerable if they came under attack before they could move back into linear 
formation.  However, an army that could perform this difficult maneuver well had an 
enormous tactical advantage, and the proficiency of the Prussian army in quickly 
redeploying from column to line was instrumental in gaining several victories for 
Frederick the Great.33  
The short effective range of muskets required an army to advance (extremely 
slowly, as defensive necessity meant that they had to remain in line so long as they 
were within sight of the enemy) close to the opposing side before they could hope to 
do any significant damage to enemy forces with their shots.  The most devastating 
damage occurred when the troops fired from a distance of less than fifty yards.34  
Furthermore, the time it took to reload the weapon, especially on the decidedly 
compromised setting of the battlefield, meant that the tactical advantage in a battle 
generally went to the army whose soldiers fired second.35  Unlike all subsequent 
rounds, the first bullet was loaded before the fighting began—in the best possible 
conditions—and commanders tried to preserve that first shot as long as possible, 
ideally using it for devastating close-range fire at an enemy who had fired first at too
great a distance and was now facing them with unloaded weapons.36
Thus, one of the fundamental concerns of military commanders was to restrain 
their soldiers from firing; the primary problem when commanding inexperienced 
32. Duﬀy, 201-203.
33. Duﬀy, 113.
34. Duﬀy, 208.
35. A Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781", War & Society 8, no. 1 (1990): 1-28. In his influential military treatise, Humphrey
Bland claimed that it was “a received Maxim, that those who preserve their Fire the longest, will be
sure to Conquer” (Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 134).
36. Duﬀy, 211.
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troops was preventing them from firing too early.37  Firing as soon as the enemy was
seen was the natural instinct of the soldier, and one of the most essential parts of 
military training was to teach him not to fire his loaded musket in the face of an 
approaching enemy.  As the influential military strategist and British general 
Humphrey Bland noted, an infantry battalion that had “that Perfection of Discipline, 
as to recover their Arms, after they are Presented, without Firing, in the Face of the 
Enemy,” was invulnerable to the threat of a cavalry charge, but “if they throw away 
their Fire too soon,” the enemy would “take Advantage of it, and be upon them in an
Instant.”  And the results would be devastating: “if they can once penetrate but with 
one Squadron, it will throw a Battalion of six hundred Men into Confusion; after 
which, their Conquest will be easy.”38
However, as Bland suggests, this restraint was the hallmark of a well-trained, 
highly-disciplined battalion.  In normal practice, it was dangerously foolhardy to 
allow soldiers to move towards the enemy with their weapons leveled; the 
temptation to shoot too soon would become irresistible.39  Thus, the general practice 
was to command the soldiers to march with their muskets shouldered, under the 
threat of immediate death should they point their weapon at the enemy without 
instruction.40
Preventing men from firing was not the only part of linear warfare that went 
against human instinct; the entire process was thought to be utterly unnatural.  The 
formation itself, the line, went against the natural human instinct to crowd together 
37. Matthew H Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 226-228.
38. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 94.
39. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 80.
40. See, for example, James Wolfe, General Wolfe's Instructions to Young Oﬃcers (London: Printed for J.
Millan, 1768), 48, for General Wolfe’s order that “A soldier that takes his musket oﬀ his shoulder, and
pretends to begin the battle without order, will be put to death that instant.”
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in the face of danger, and the tactical need to preserve the formation at all costs 
went against both the impulse to flee danger and the impulse to fight and engage 
the enemy.41
Officers’ role in battle, as they understood it, was to curb men’s natural instincts 
to seek safety.  Only by “the force of discipline men are kept in order and obedience 
to command, in opposition to the strongest immediate impulse of their passions,” 
officers believed.  Without it, “every man consults his own personal safety, at the 
instigation of the predominant passion, fear, or the desire of self-preservation.”42  
Only the fear of certain death for disobedience could keep this in check: “Soldiers 
should be more afraid of their own officers than the enemy,” one military author 
advised.  “If a man lies down, or offers to run away, you must without hesitation, put
him to death.”43 Similarly, General Wolfe ordered that “A soldier that quits his rank, 
or offers to fly, is to be instantly put to death by the officer that commands that 
platoon...a soldier does not deserve to live who won't fight for his king and 
country.”44  
But officers intent on preserving the line had to contend not only with the threat 
of its disintegration as men seeking safety fled to the rear, but also with the equal 
danger presented by belligerent aggression.  The soldiers had to be kept from firing 
and engaging the enemy too soon, and also had to be discouraged from pursuing a 
fleeing enemy.  Once the opposing army’s line had been broken and the soldiers put 
to flight, “great Care must be taken by the Officers to prevent their Men from 
Breaking after them; neither must they pursue them faster than the Line advances.” 
If, Bland continued, the “Battalion advances out of the Line, it may be attacked on 
41. Duﬀy, The Military Experience in the Age of the Reason, 199.
42. John Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement (London, 1791), 2-3.
43. James Callandar, Military Maxims, Illustrated by Examples (London, 1782), 28.
44. Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 48.
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the Flanks by the Enemy's Horse....if they should separate in pursuing those they 
beat, the Enemy may destroy them one after the other, with such an inconsiderable 
Number of Troops, that were they in a Body would fly at their Appearance.”45
Some explanation for the system of savage punishments for disobedience to 
officers is suggested by the behavior of the ideal infantry battalion: One that 
arranged itself in a neat and vulnerable line; that remained in that formation as it 
marched towards an enemy army that was shooting at them, without returning fire 
or having any soldier break away to flee in fear or eager to attack prematurely; a 
battalion that marched, orderly and inexorable, into close and deadly range of the 
enemy before firing only at the command of their officers—a battalion, in short, 
whose officers had successfully convinced its soldiers to line up neatly and wait to be
shot by the enemy.
This was fundamentally a problem in regulating violence; the need of the army 
was to both restrain and compel violence, to train men to kill the enemy if and only if
they were commanded to do so by their officers.  Military manuals emphasized the 
need to keep discipline in the ranks at all costs, because undisciplined men who had 
not been trained in the precise tactics of linear warfare were an active danger in 
battle.46  Military author Stephen Payne Adye claimed that “discipline is more 
conducive to victory than numbers,” while an army that lacked it was “no better than
so many contemptible heaps of rabble, which are more dangerous to the very state 
that maintains them, than even its declared enemies.”47
45. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 134-135.
46. J A Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981), 273.
47. Stephen Payne Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial ... To Which Is Added, I. An Essay on Military
Punishments and Rewards. II. Considerations on the Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and the
Rules and Articles for the Government of His Majesty's Land Forces (London: Printed for J. Murray,
1778), 139-140.
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Officers’ duty, then, was preserving discipline at all costs, and against the 
opposition of every natural instinct of their men.  Officers had to gain the obedience 
of their men by any means necessary, and any and all means were acceptable to 
enforce discipline, from brutal floggings to summary execution.  Gentler means 
would not suffice; men (especially, officers thought, the uneducated, lower-class 
men who comprised the majority of enlisted soldiers) could not be persuaded by 
reason to act in so unnatural a fashion.  “There is an absolute necessity of 
sometimes inflicting punishments for the good of society,” Adye wrote.  “[I]t is 
essential in order to keep up good order, and military discipline in any army”48
Extreme control over bodies was not only justified by tactics; it was also the 
method for achieving the requisite level of military discipline.  Basic training in the 
British army consisted of continual repetition of the basics of musket-drill, which 
served to mold soldiers in the proper soldierly character—the purpose of training was
to discipline soldiers so that their responses to commands in battle would be 
automatic and unquestioned; to create automatons rather than spirited, 
individualistic men.49  This was a deliberate decision to favor control rather than 
soldiers who could take advantage of fortuitous chance on the battlefield—to 
decouple violence from individual initiative, to remove all autonomy from the 
exercise of violence, to use soldiers as instruments of violence without allowing them
any choices about when to exercise it.  
Naturally, then, it was necessary to establish obedience as the first duty of the 
soldier.  Military writer Thomas Simes wrote that the soldier was “to be sober and 
orderly in his behavior, respectful to his superiors, and obedient to all officers.” 
Simes emphasized that the soldier’s subordination was to be unquestioning (“He is 
48. Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial, 139.
49. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795, 268-269.
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ever to be alert, and observe his orders; ask no reasons for them, or dare to think 
them of little consequence”50) and was to persist even in the face of perceived 
injustice: “If a private soldier should think himself aggrieved, or ill used, by any 
Serjeant or Corporal, he must not only refrain from abusing him; but, on the 
contrary, in the first place obey, and then lay his complaint before the Commander of
his company,” adding a warning that “the greatest care is to be taken for preventing 
all frivolous and ill-grounded complaints; for misplaced indulgence will retort upon 
himself.”51  Officers’ highest praise for soldiers was for their cheerful obedience to 
orders.52
Rowland was not the only soldier to be brought before a court martial charged 
with the capital crime of assaulting an officer.  There were many other cases of 
enlisted men who struck officers and a common thread through the majority of them
is the fact that they did so only after the officer had assaulted them.  Corporal 
William McSkimming was hit with a switch and punched in the head before he 
resorted to knocking down the ensign who had treated him so.53  Private Jeremiah 
Nicholas testified that he was in bed with his comrades when Captain James 
Hamilton of the Coldstream Guards suddenly “burst into the Room, and immediately 
Struck him (the Prisoner) as he was sitting up in Bed, with a large Cane,” and “might
have fractur'd his Skull.”  Hamilton “then dragg'd him out of Bed, and said you 
50. Thomas Simes, The Military Instructor, for the Non-commissioned Oﬃcers and Private Men of the
Infantry Containing Every Thing Necessary to Be Understood by the Independent Companies of
Volunteers Now Raised, or Raising, in Great-Britain and Ireland: Such As the Manual Exercise, Use of
Arms, Manuvres, &c. &c. (London; 1779), 32-33.
51. Thomas Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers : Containing a System of the Art of War (London:
printed for J. Millan, 1781), 165.
52. E.g., Wolfe: “the soldiers did behave themselves on that occasion with all the steadiness chearfulness,
and obedience that may be expected from brave men and good subjects; not a man declined the
service, and all marched oﬀ with a resolution never to dishonor the corps they served in, and to do
their utmost for his Majesty's service and the good of their country; such troops as these, men that
may be depended upon in all changes and circumstances, deserve to be considered as real soldiers,
and to be valued and esteemed accordingly.” Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 38.
53. WO 71/84, p. 401-410.
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Rascal, I'll hang you, and Struck him again Several times.”  Other witnesses for the 
defendant claimed that upon discovering that the nighttime assailant was the 
possibly-intoxicated Captain Hamilton, a sergeant “came in and said, my dear 
Captain Hamilton, you had better go Home,” but that Hamilton “answer'd that he 
would not quit the Room till he sought that Villain's Life,” and the blows with the 
cane continued.54  
But similar to John Rowland’s case, the court did not accept these provocations 
as legitimate justifications for assaulting officers.  Rowland “beg'd to show the Court 
the bruises he had received from Lt. Span, which were the Cause of his returning the
blows,” and McSkimming told the court that the blow to the head that he had 
received from Ensign Bathe was so severe that he still felt its effects at his trial, but 
to no avail.  Just as Rowland was sentenced to death, so too was McSkimming.  
Nicholas, too, was found guilty of assaulting Captain Hamilton and might have 
shared their fate, but had the fortune to have on his court martial board an officer 
who knew him and could attest to his good behavior, and was sentenced instead to a
thousand lashes for his crime.  These cases make the principle clear: an enlisted 
soldier who struck back at an officer, no matter how severe the provocation, was 
guilty; there was no possible circumstance that could excuse or justify such 
behavior.  Consequently, most soldiers brought before a General Court Martial for 
striking an officer were convicted and punished harshly.55  
It is also important to note that in none of these cases was there any dispute 
about the officer having struck them first.  In the officers’ own testimony, they 
54. WO 71/86, p. 239-250.
55. The one defense a soldier might make was that of mistaken identity—claiming that he was not the
soldier who hit the oﬃcer; for example, WO 71/85, p. 34-40: Along with Samuel Webb, William Collins
was brought before the court accused of striking their captain, but after doubts arose about whether
Collins had actually taken part or had been mistaken for another man in the dark and crowded room,
he was acquitted.
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revealed to the court their commission of brutal assaults on enlisted men for 
relatively trivial matters without any fear of prosecution or even censure.  Ensign 
John Bathe testified that he had given Corporal McSkimming “two or three strokes, 
with a small switch,” not because of anything McSkimming had said or did to him, 
but because he had, in response to the Ensign’s order to parade the men of his 
company, “put on an insolent gloomy look.”  McSkimming was not the only soldier to
feel the ensign’s wrath that day; the defendant and another soldier of his company 
testified that Bathe had “Struck two other Corporals, and almost every Man in the 
Company that he (the Prisoner) belonged to,” and when asked to give a reason, said 
it was “for not having their hair tied.”56   Captain Colin Campbell of the Royal Artillery
claimed that the altercation between him and his men (which resulted in a black eye 
that he exhibited to the court as proof of the defendants’ dangerous insubordination)
started when he observed that “there was nothing but noise & Rioting among the 
Artillery men in their Room,” though he “frequently desired them to be quiet.”  
Finally resolving to settle matters himself, he entered the room and saw Samuel 
Webb,“standing behind the door, in a most Insolent Posture.”  After Campbell had 
ordered the men to go to bed and be silent and left the room, Webb closed the door 
behind him in a way that Campbell found unacceptable.  Therefore he re-entered the
room, he testified, where “he found the Prisoner Webb in the same situation, 
standing behind the door, & having ask'd him how he dare to continue there (at the 
same time giving him a slap on the Cheek) ordered him then to Obey & go to bed 
with the rest.”  Webb told him that he was not in bed because he was a sentry.  
Campbell declared that this information had been conveyed “in an Insolent Tone,” 
and seized Webb by the ear with the intention of arresting him.57  
56. WO 71/84, p. 401-410.
57. WO 71/85, p. 34-40. See Richard Holmes, Redcoat: the British Soldier in the age of Horse and Musket
(London: HarperCollins UK, 2011), p. 34, for oﬃcers reacting to perceived insolence or disrespect from
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It was the clear expectation of the court that enlisted soldiers accept such 
assaults from officers without resistance.  Corporal McSkimming told the court that 
he had only assaulted Ensign Bathe because the ensign had given him “a 
blow…which rendered him so insensible that he did not know what he did,” and “had 
he had his Senses,” the ensign “might have beat him till this time and he would not 
have returned it.”  Another witness called by McSkimming testified that when the 
ensign had “said that he would knock him down, the Prisoner answered that he 
might do it at his pleasure.”58  Nicholas claimed that although he had first responded 
to Captain Hamilton’s beating by scuffling with him for control of the cane that the 
officer had used to strike him, this was only because he did not know that he was 
being beaten by an officer: “as soon as [the man] said that he was Captain 
Hamilton,” Nicholas testified, he “gave him his Cane again”—presumably so that 
Captain Hamilton, his identity as an officer and therefore a legitimate source of 
beatings now established, could resume his chastisement of Nicholas armed with the 
proper instrument for it and without any fear of further objections from him.59   
When Sergeant George Smith was beaten by Captain Benjamin Charnock Payne, 
Smith testified that he reacted not with rage but with continued expressions of 
loyalty and acceptance, telling Payne “that if he beat and kicked him from one end of
the Parade to the other, and reduced him to live on two pence a day, yet he should 
never oblige him to desert his Colours.”60 
These sharp differences in the official response to assaults on the bodies of 
officers compared to those of enlisted men reveal a larger military practice of 
enlisted soldiers with physical violence. Holmes cites an oﬃcer’s recollection of seeing an ensign “get
a poor man flogged because he had passed him without taking oﬀ his hat.”
58. WO 71/84, p. 401-410.
59. WO 71/86, p. 239-250.
60. WO 71/81, p. 43.
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complete control over the bodies of the enlisted; officers were not censured for 
assaulting the men under their command because those men were not recognized to 
have any particular rights over their own bodies.  Once they joined the army, the 
army controlled the food, location, dress, posture, grooming, and even the domestic 
relations of enlisted men.61  A favored method of establishing discipline was by 
asserting extreme control over every aspect of the soldier’s life.  The regulation of 
the body was a way of establishing control.  Military manuals contained careful 
instructions specifying exactly how soldiers were to salute, 62 and orders detailing 
how the men's hair was to be cut, styled, and tied.63  Some of this regulation was 
justified using claims of military necessity, such as instructions about sentries’ 
behavior.  Ordering that they were not to “sing, smoke Tobacco, nor to suffer and 
Noise to be made near them,” or “to sit down, lay their Arms out of their Hands, or 
sleep; but to keep moving about their Posts if the Weather will allow of it” could 
easily be linked to the clear military need for sentries to preserve the proper 
vigilance.64    
Claims of military need could also be understood in a more expansive sense: the 
body of the soldier was not his own—it was essentially the property of his officers 
and his regiment; he therefore had no right to unfit his body for service.  In this way
officers argued that soldiers should be punished for contracting a venereal disease, 
or for being drunk, or for failing to keep themselves healthy.  General Burgoyne 
61. Don N. Hagist, British Soldiers, American War: Voices of the American Revolution, pp. 282-287; also
J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: the training of the British Army, 1715-1795. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981.
62. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 61-62.
63. Stephen Gilbert, "The Long and Short of It: Military Hairstyles During the American Revolution Part 1
(of 3): British Army Hairstyles", The Brigade Dispatch XXXV, no. 1 (2005): 10-19. Also: "Any Man that
presumes to cut oﬀ his Hair...shall be sent to the Black Hole for fourteen days" Thomas Simes, The
Military Medley Containing the Most Necessary Rules and Directions for Attaining a Competent
Knowledge of the Art: To Which Is Added An Explication of Military Terms, Alphabetically Digested
(Dublin: S. Powell, 1767), 17.
64. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 162.
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suggested the prevailing view on the rights of the soldier to any personal autonomy 
when he declared that "The life of the Soldier is the property of the King.65  
However, this understanding of the enlisted soldier as a being without rights 
conflicted with Britons’ ideas about national identity.  In the British public 
imagination the soldier upon enlistment had deprived himself of the rights and the 
liberties that were the birthright of all Britons, but while most were content to look 
upon the redcoat with scorn for having relinquished his rights, others reacted with 
pity, and determination to ameliorate his wretched condition.  Too many interfering 
civilians were willing to act as “the soldier’s friend” and interest themselves in his 
sufferings when the army was thought to have taken things too far.66  
By positing the obedience of the enlisted as an unnatural state that was 
nevertheless an absolute requirement on the battlefield, officers justified using 
savage punishments to enforce order, by suggesting that they necessarily underlay 
the structure of every victorious army.67  “[T]hose armies which have been subject to
the severest discipline, have always performed the greatest things,” Simes claimed.68
Particularly singled out for both its savage disciplinary regime and for its numerous 
battlefield victories was the Prussian army.  British admirers sought to follow 
65. “General Order,” Sept. 18, 1777, in E. B. O’Callaghan, ed., Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne,
from his entry into the State of New York until his Surrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct., 1777 (Albany, N.Y.,
1860), 113-14, quoted in John A. Ruddiman, “’A Record in the Hands of Thousands’: Power and
Negotiation in the Orderly Books of the Continental Army.” The William and Mary Quarterly 67, no. 4
(2010): 757.
66. For example, civilian objections to a captain’s attempt to separate an enlisted husband from his
‘unsuitable’ wife, by claiming that the oﬃcer’s behavior was contrary to “the Natural Rights of
Mankind,” and was giving the army “the Air and appearance of Abject Slavery”: PRO WO 1/987, pp.
645-647, Freeman to Secretary at War, 14 January 1764, cited in G A Steppler, "The common soldier
in the reign of George III, 1760-1793" (Ph. D. dissertation, Oxford, 1984), 110. Also, civilian
intervention in military punishment: Tatum, "Civilian Intervention and Military Justice in the Eighteenth-
Century British Atlantic," 68; Ala Alryyes, "War at a Distance: Court-Martial Narratives in the Eighteenth
Century", Eighteenth-Century Studies 41, no. 4 (2008): pp. 525-542.
67. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers, 180.  
68. Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers : Containing a System of the Art of War, 1.
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Frederick’s example, but there were limitations on the extent to which it could be 
implemented in the British Army and in the British empire.  
The political realities of British society, whose long-standing distrust of standing 
armies meant that no plan for systematic conscription was tenable, required both 
officers and enlisted soldiers to be recruited as adults; therefore, the extreme 
subordination necessary for effective linear warfare had to be implemented within 
the constraints of the existing social structure, which provided further obstacles.  The
enduring strength of men’s claims to marital rights and privileges, and a conception 
of masculinity that linked courageous insolence with true British manhood 
(contrasted with the unmanly submission of foreigners) were all resilient cultural 
values that made difficulties for military authorities who tried to implement in the 
British army a method of social organization that would allow them to triumph in art 
of linear war.  
Perhaps even more importantly, by the 1770s, harshness was going out of 
fashion (but certainly not out of practice) in the army, especially among the 
uppermost classes who filled the highest ranks of the officer corps.69  The rise of 
sensibility in the late eighteenth century emphasized the importance of feelings.  
One’s social status as a refined gentleman was asserted by displaying the ability to 
be emotionally hurt and wounded by insults, and refinement was also implied by the 
ability to recognize the sensitivity and emotions of others.70  Traces of the new 
emphasis on sensibility showed in the questioning of the traditional savage 
69. Mark Urban, Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution (New York:
Walker & Co, 2007), 51.
70. Sarah Knott on the shared transatlantic culture of sensibility among British and American oﬃcers, even
when on opposite sides of a war, in Sensibility and the American Revolution, (UNC Press, 2008), pp.
157-160. However, Knott suggests a considerable divide between the enlisted soldiers and oﬃcers of
the Continental Army, as oﬃcers aspired to the gentility and sensibility displayed by their British and
French counterparts, while enlisted soldiers cared little for displaying refinement and concern for their
enemies. Also, Nicole Eustace, Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American
Revolution (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2011).
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punishments inflicted by the army and an increased recognition of the humanity of 
the common soldier.71  The courts-martial assembled under General Gage might still 
have handed down sentences of hundred of lashes, but added the proviso that the 
flogging would be administered “at such a time and place that the Commander in 
Chief shall think proper,” and Gage frequently would not think of such a proper 
occasion and pardoned the offender instead.  He was similarly unwilling to actually 
carry out the executions ordered by the court-martial board, often to the dismay of 
more junior officers.72  Lieutenant Colonel Bernard, who commanded the 23rd 
Regiment (Royal Welch Fusiliers), and Earl Percy, heir to the Dukedom of 
Northumberland and Colonel of the 5th Regiment, were known to disapprove of 
flogging.  Percy even went so far as to completely disallow flogging as a punishment 
in his regiment, seeking instead “to win [the enlisted men] to their duty by generous
treatment, and by his own excellent example.”73 
The majority of officers were not willing to go that far. Though many of them 
deplored the indiscriminate use of flogging as a punishment, conceding that many 
soldiers could be led without it, they continued to believe that flogging, though 
extremely distasteful to them personally, was absolutely necessary to preserve 
discipline.74  Simes suggested that officers ought to "gain the love and affection of 
the soldiers" by seeing to their interests and treating them fairly, but also thought 
that some men could not be governed without the threat of the lash.75  
71. Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781," 21.
72. Urban, 18; Urban also notes Gage’s judge advocate disapproved of frequent floggings and executions,
preferring to reserve such punishments only for the most egregious oﬀenses, and worried that “Too
frequent a use of the gallows” would actually undermine order and discipline because it would “lead to
oﬃcers conceal crimes in order to save both lives and regimental reputation.”
73. Urban, 18, 72-73; also Holmes, 34, 53, on some oﬃcers’ belief that British men couldn’t “bear patiently
corporal chastisement”.
74. Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge
University Press, 2006), p. 101.
75. Thomas Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers (London, 1772), 1: 168, quoted in John A
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However, officers’ concerns on this point suggest that this military system, which 
demanded extreme obedience and extracted it through brutal punishment, needed to
be justified not only to the British public—which already had some unfavorable 
opinions on militarism as a threat to national liberty—but also to the officers 
themselves.  They needed to understand their control over and coercive interference 
with enlisted lives not merely as the necessary but morally-repugnant domination of 
a less powerful group, but as just and proper actions.  Therefore, they sought to 
make rhetorical links with already-existing systems of social control that justified one
group’s subordination to another by entangling military, social, and gender 
hierarchies.  
Ruddiman, "'A Record in the Hands of Thousands': Power and Negotiation in the Orderly Books of the
Continental Army", The William and Mary Quarterly 67, no. 4 (2010): 747-774. Ruddiman also traces
the use of sensibility in military orders in the Continental Army, noting the use of emotional language to
persuade soldiers to reform their behavior: Washington portrayed himself as "Disappointed" and
"much Aﬀected" by the poor behavior of the troops under his command.
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Chapter 2: Paternalism and Symbolic Patriarchy
The 18th Regiment of Foot had had an unhappy experience in North America.  
After its arrival in Philadelphia in 1767, parts of the regiment had been stationed at 
various western forts in the Illinois country, as well as the eastern cities of Boston 
and New York.  It had endured Indian attacks in the west and increasing tensions 
with the colonists in the east, but most damaging of all were the various internal 
disputes of the 18th Regiment’s officers.  By 1774, these disputes had devolved into a
series of courts-martial as officers sought to have their personal enemies convicted 
of unbecoming behavior and dismissed from the army.76  
The court-martial of Captain Benjamin Charnock Payne stemmed from his dispute
with another officer of the 18th, Lieutenant Alexander Fowler.  Fowler accused Payne 
of being unfit to hold an officer’s commission because he had been “Guilty of 
tyrannical, cruel, and oppressive treatment both of the Non-Commissioned Officers 
and private soldiers, in consequence of which conduct … one or more of the former 
and several of the latter have been compelled to desert His Majesty’s Service.”  In 
support of his charge, Fowler exhibited as witnesses several enlisted soldiers and 
officers in Payne’s company, who testified to Payne’s temper, his severe beatings of 
enlisted men, and the petty cruelties he had inflicted on the common soldiers of his 
company and their families, such as refusing to allow soldiers’ wives to see their 
husbands or to live with them, and throwing overboard the petticoats and other 
baggage of the women of the company. 
76. For a history of the 18th Regiment during this period, see Steven M. Baule, Protecting the Empire’s
Frontiers: Oﬃcers of the 18th (Royal Irish) Regiment of Foot during Its North American Service, 1767–
1776, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014).  
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Fowler’s accusations may have stemmed from a personal dislike of Payne rather 
than any idea of championing enlisted men’s rights, but the enlisted soldiers used 
Payne’s court-martial to air their own grievances and to protest their ill-treatment by
appealing to two powerful and related cultural ideals: sensibility, and traditional 
understandings of the rights and privileges of adult men.  
The ideals of sensibility gave enlisted soldiers a new—and safer—option for 
responding to the assaults from officers.  Instead of reacting with retaliatory 
violence, they might react with tears.  These men failed to accept the prevailing 
military view that they could be encouraged, taught, or corrected with physical 
chastisement, but instead suggested that they must be led with concern and 
kindness.77  The prosecution’s discussion of the cases of some soldiers, Sergeant 
Brogden, and Private Thomas Maddison, who had deserted the regiment while it was 
in New York, due to—according to Lieutenant Fowler—Captain Payne’s cruel 
treatment of them, explicitly expressed their plight in the language of emotion and 
sentiment: Lieutenant Triste claimed that Sergeant Brogden had “frequently come 
[to him] in tears.” 
In fact,Triste claimed, Brodgen and other non-commissioned officer, Sergeant 
Smith had both told him that “Capt. Payne treated them so cruelly that their lives 
were become a burthen to them; and that it was not possible that they could 
withstand such cruelty and oppression long, as their hearts were broke.”78  Smith 
himself testified that Brogden had told him “he had a heart like a Lyon to withstand 
Captain Payne’s bad treatment, that he had began the same usage with him some 
77. Eustace’s Passion is the Gale especially focuses on the transition from sensibility as an emotion
reserved for the upper classes to one claimed as a universal human attribute among American
colonists, but a similar appropriation of the language of sentiment by British enlisted soldiers seems to
have occurred during this period.
78. WO 71/81, pp. 27-28.
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months before, but that it was not in his power to put up with it.”79  Brogden, lacking
Smith’s leonine resilience, had deserted the regiment, but remained in the city, and 
Triste recalled meeting him some time later “on a Common near New York.”  There, 
Brogden, once again in tears, “began a long story relating how Capt. Payne had used
him, and that he would never have deserted, had it not been for that usage.”  The 
erstwhile sergeant claimed he was completely willing to rejoin the regiment if he 
would no longer be subject to Payne’s poor treatment, and looked forward to the 
arrival of the regiment’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkins.  The moment that 
he heard that Wilkins was once again in command, Brogden asserted, “he would 
walk even bare foot to join the Regiment again.”  
Triste heard similar sentiments from Thomas Maddison, a deserter from Payne’s 
company whom he had met in the streets of New York.  Maddison, too, claimed to 
have “deserted from the Regiment owing to the ill usage received from Capt. Payne.”
And Maddison characterized his willingness to return in similar melodramatic terms: 
should the possibility of pleading his case before Lieutenant Colonel Wilkins arise, 
“he would immediately [re-]join the Regiment, although obliged to creep on his 
hands and knees three or four hundred miles.”80  But the other soldiers of the 
regiment believed that Maddison had deserted not because of Payne’s physical ill-
treatment of him, but because the captain would not allow his wife to live with him in
the barracks.  This, and Payne’s numerous other violations of traditional marital 
privilege by interfering in the relationships between enlisted men and their wives, 
were exhibited to the court by Payne’s enlisted accusers as an unjust lack of 
recognition for their position as adult men.  
79. WO 71/81, p. 44.
80. WO 71/81, pp. 26-27.
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Payne’s case suggests the ideological difficulties officers experienced.  They 
sought an uneasy balance between theories of military government that emphasized 
the necessity of controlling soldiers at any cost (and the harsh treatment that such a 
theory implied), and the ascendant theory of sentiment, which insisted on 
recognizing the humanity of the enlisted soldiers and their capacity to be moved by 
feeling and emotion.  And the enlisted men who denounced Payne not only made 
claims that they, too, were capable of refined feelings and sensibility, but also claims
that they were being denied the rights traditionally bestowed on every adult male 
upon his marriage.  To suggest that enlisted soldiers lacked the rights traditionally 
enjoyed by other men of their same age, class, and race was, in some sense, an 
attack on the more universal principle of masculine privilege.  
But Payne’s (successful) defense of his behavior suggested a way of reconciling 
patriarchal ideals with the practice of denying enlisted soldiers male privileges.  He 
put the enlisted soldiers under his command in the role of subordinate children—
irrational, and unable to manage their own affairs—rather than acknowledging their 
status as adult men, with the right to autonomy over themselves and the control of 
their wives and other dependents.  Concurrently, he presented himself to the court 
as a patriarchal figure, with the right to discipline childlike subordinates, but also as 
a kind paternal figure who provided his men with provisions and cared for them in 
illness.  
By modeling his rights on the traditional rights of a father, Payne asserted that 
he had the legitimate authority to supervise various aspects of his subordinates’ 
lives.  Just as a biological father had the right to control many aspects of their 
children’s lives, so Payne had the right to determine where the soldiers under his 
command lived, what work they were to do and when, what food and drink they 
were permitted to have, whether they were dressed correctly, with whom they were 
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permitted to associate and what houses they were allowed to visit, to make rules for 
their behavior and to determine whether those rules had been broken, and to 
discipline them for those infractions.  
This symbolic patriarchy allowed pre-existing frameworks of power and authority 
to be applied to the military relationship.  Ultimately, officers attempted to 
implement the principles of military discipline and subordination by grafting them on 
to existing social hierarchies and exercising control within the established framework 
of patriarchy.  The gendered language of patriarchy and paternalism allowed military
commanders to mobilize existing class and gender hierarchies in order to support the
military hierarchy.
Paternalism was the most powerful rhetorical tool officers had for justifying their 
extreme authority over the enlisted.  By characterizing the relationship between an 
officer and the enlisted men under his command as analogous to that of a father and
his children, officers justified keeping enlisted soldiers in economic and social 
relationships of subordination by claiming that, like children, enlisted soldiers lacked 
the financial and moral competence to regulate their own lives.  And by asserting 
control of enlisted men’s wives and marital relations, officers also denied enlisted 
soldiers’ the privileges they might otherwise enjoy as adult men and characterized 
them as children, rather than as husbands and fathers.  
Payne’s ideas on his fatherly role and patriarchal privileges had a prestigious 
provenance.  Military manuals of the eighteenth century often emphasized the 
desirability of maintaining a paternal control over one’s soldiers for a well-run 
battalion.  Bennett Cuthbertson’s influential instructional treatise on the 
management of a regiment emphasized the need to supervise soldiers’ every move 
and attributed to them a childlike inability to operate without simple and constant 
instruction.  Both Cuthbertson’s treatise and officers’ private writings frequently 
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characterized the lower ranks as “ignorant” and “clownish.”81  But writers 
emphasized that officers’ relations with them should be characterized by paternalism 
rather than unmitigated contempt for their ignorance.  If the enlisted ranks were 
simple and childlike, it was the officer’s duty to act as a father to them, to be an 
authority and to impose discipline, but also to care for them and see to their 
welfare.82 
Officers’ remarks about the paternalistic relationship between them and the men 
they commanded testify to the rhetorical power of paternalism as an ideal.83  In his 
81. Bennett Cuthbertson, A System of the Compleat Interior Management and Economy of a Battalion of
Infantry, 182.  
82. Brumwell, 70-71.
83. Oﬃcers asserted paternal claims of being patrons and protectors: Captain Fitzwilliam claimed that he
looked upon himself ”as a Father and protector of my Company” (WO 71/55, p. 322). Similarly,
Captain Whitely “thought the Men of my Company under my especial care and protection, that it was
my duty to represent their wants, and get them redressed,” (WO 71/58, p. 371) and Captain Gray of
the Queen’s Royal Regiment remarked, "I have ever look'd upon it as the indispensable duty of a
Captain or any other Oﬃcer having the care of a Company, to prevent as far as they are able, any
Iǌustice or hardship being done to any of the Men who are their particular Charge” (WO 71/82, p. 270).
However, historians have often uncritically accepted these statements as evidence for the actual
nature of these relationships across class and rank. Their failure to note that claims of enlisted
incompetence exist primarily in sources produced by or for the dominant class is particularly
problematic. Steppler writes that “Regimental orders could read like so many iǌunctions against the
behaviour of delinquent children....It was made clear that soldiers were always to be supervised, were
never trusted to keep a clean shirt, do their duty, spend their money wisely, or even to look after their
own health” and from this concludes that “The behaviour of the soldier could be simple and child-like
in the extreme.” Similarly, Spring claims that “One factor that lends some weight to the idea that a
paternalistic relationship existed between at least some oﬃcers and their men was that the proclivity of
eighteenth-century common soldiers for amazingly irrational and irresponsible acts necessitated
constant supervision.” But Steppler is basing his estimations of the common soldier’s childishness on
the regimental orders of oﬃcers seeking to establish or justify their authority over enlisted men, and
Spring’s quotations of many touching scenes of paternal aﬀection and filial attachment between
enlisted soldiers and their oﬃcers are selected exclusively from oﬃcers’ correspondence and other
writings. Both have unquestioningly accepted oﬃcers’ self-interested claims of enlisted men’s
financial, intellectual and moral incompetence. Steppler supplements his understanding of the enlisted
with their own defense statements given during courts-martial (“Court-martial proceedings in particular
reveal an often simple minded attitude, lacking in an appreciation of the seriousness of walking oﬀ
guard duty, abandoning a sentry post, or disobeying any number of other regulations. 'I thought no
harm' was a frequent plea...there were others whose acts of petty crime, disobedience and
misbehaviour were committed in so clumsy and stupid a fashion as to defy belief”) but fails to consider
the venue in which these statements were produced; the fact that enlisted men defended themselves
in military courts by presenting themselves as children who lacked understanding is evidence only that
they believed such self-presentation might benefit them during the trial, not evidence of their actual
character. Similarly, Spring’s sources are not evidence for enlisted and oﬃcers seeing themselves in a
paternalistic relationship, but rather only evidence that some oﬃcers saw their relationship to their men
in this way. Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 123-124. Spring,
With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783,
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defense, Payne indignantly refuted charges that he had treated the men of his 
company with “Tyranny and oppression,” claiming that “there was more indulgence 
and attention given by him to his Company than any of the other five Companies at 
New York enjoyed.”  Payne himself attempted to portray himself as a humanitarian 
commander and a provider, frequently inquiring of the witnesses in his trial whether 
he had not provided the men of his company with fresh meat and grog.84  
Furthermore, Payne claimed he was capable of providing individual attention to 
soldiers in need.  When “Serjeant Smith was ill at Amboy,” Payne inquired, did he 
not “receive many favours from Capt. Payne; such as having a Physician sent to 
attend him, and being supplyed with wine, spices” to hasten his recovery?  Did he 
not provide all this care from his own purse?85   
Payne also claimed to have shown “particular kindness” to the men of all the 
companies stationed with his own, and to have a special interest for their welfare 
when the vagaries of military life interfered with their ability to provide for their 
families.  When the companies were ordered to embark a transport ship, Payne, 
concerned “that as the married men could not then work at their different trades, to 
help their families as they used to do, he supposed that many of them must want 
provisions,” and asked the regiment’s sergeant major “to enquire and let him (Capt. 
Payne) know if there were an in want, and he would give them some.”  Payne 
elicited heartwarming tales of his spending almost six pounds to purchase beef and 
mutton for sick soldiers and their families, and more “to buy milk for the Children.”86 
107-110.
84. WO 71/81, p. 52-53. Other British military oﬃcers also used their generous treatment of the enlisted
soldiers under their command to support their reputations as men of sensibility. Mark Urban, Fusiliers,
describes Earl Percy as an exemplar, who chartered a ship at his own expense to convey home to
Britain the widows and children of the soldiers of his regiment who had died at Bunker Hill (p. 72).
85. WO 71/81, pp. 59-60, 54, 38.
86. WO 71/81, p. 149.
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Thus, Payne portrayed himself in the role of fatherly provider: the men in his 
regiment were cared for when they were sick and were given extra food and other 
indulgences.  And, Payne implied, enlisted men were not entirely capable of 
supporting their dependents; Payne was paying for the food their families needed.
But Payne and other officers did not justify their paternalism merely by 
portraying themselves as humanitarian-minded gentlemen who used their lofty social
position to protect those less fortunate and more vulnerable.  They also claimed that 
it was an absolutely necessary part of maintaining a well-run army, for the enlisted 
soldiers were like untutored children, who constantly sought pleasures that the wiser
mind of the officer could clearly see would lead to no good end.  Unless these 
disordered desires were regulated by an officer, they would ultimately harm both 
themselves and the army.  
By asserting both the moral and economic incompetence of the enlisted, officers 
could claim it was militarily necessary to regulate otherwise unrelated aspects of 
enlisted lives, and thereby deny them the autonomy they would otherwise have had 
as adult men, consolidating their power over them in both the military and social 
realm.  
This thinking was behind many of the regulations promoted by officers: enlisted 
men must be kept from ale houses and taverns because they would get drunk and 
behave disgracefully; they must be prevented from associating with prostitutes 
because they would become infected with venereal disease; they must not be simply 
given their pay when they were owed it, because they would spend it all on drink or 
lose it gambling and would not have enough money to feed themselves and to 
purchase clothing when they were in need of it.87  
87. See Dana Rabin, "Drunkenness and Responsibility for Crime in the Eighteenth Century", The Journal of
British Studies 44, no. 3 (2005): 457-477, on the eighteenth-century conception that “the poor had less
of an ability to control the eﬀects of alcohol on their emotions and their behavior,” as well as seeing
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For these reasons, officers claimed, it was only the act of a prudent and humane 
officer to ban soldiers from entering certain houses where liquor was known to be 
sold, to violently turn out from the camp women suspected of being prostitutes, and 
to keep men’s pay for them and dispense it only when a soldier wanted to purchase 
an item that the officer thought necessary or beneficial.  Cuthbertson claimed that it 
was necessary to have enlisted men’s clothing entirely under their officers’ control 
because of soldiers' inability to choose clothing correctly: for instance, if an officer 
allowed his soldiers to choose their own shoes, “every Soldier will certainly indulge 
his own particular taste, in the fashion of shoes, without considering any other 
advantage,” and end up with shoes unsuitable for long marches and other military 
needs.88  Similarly, it was necessary to regulate soldiers’ absences from the 
regiment.  With their captain’s permission, Cuthbertson explained, soldiers might 
occasionally be allowed a leave of absence, but never for more than three months; if
they were gone for a longer time, he warned, “they might form connections very 
prejudicial to that sort of spirit, which should actuate the conduct of every good 
Soldier.”89 
Any respite from the regime of control was dangerous, in Cuthbertson’s view—
not only travel, but illness might challenge the army’s authority.  Therefore, “Soldiers
should never be sent to an Hospital for trifles, nor detained in it longer than is 
absolutely necessary for their cure, as they are too often apt to contract a habit of 
idleness, and a dislike for returning to their Duty,” and “every method must be used,
drunkenness by the rich as a private vice, while drunkenness by the poor was a threat to the social
order.
88. Bennett Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of
Infantry (Dublin, 1768), 98.
89. Cuthbertson, 167-169.
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to detect their pretending sickness, merely for the sake of avoiding Duty or 
exercise.”90 
This insistence on control went to the point of insisting on their right to regulate 
soldiers’ bedtime: Cuthbertson recommended that the orderly Serjeant of each 
company be sent around "after Tattoo-beating" (the signal for the soldiers to retire 
to their quarters, and for “The Publick Houses…to shut their Doors, and sell no more 
Liquor that Night,”91 generally 8 p.m. in the winter and 10 p.m. in the summer) to 
"insist on all fire and candle being extinguished," because "late hours must be 
discouraged, else the morals of a Regiment will soon be destroyed."92
 Soldiers’ supposed inability to manage their financial affairs also justified officers’
need to regulate enlisted travel.  It was entirely for their own benefit, Cuthbertson 
claimed: “[F]rom an eagerness to see their friends,” soldiers might “inconsiderately 
request a leave of absence,” without taking into account “whether they are in 
circumstances, sufficient to maintain them, during their absence, without becoming a
burthen” to their hosts.  Therefore, to avoid the journey turning into “a distress to 
both parties,” officers ought to refuse soldiers permission to travel unless they were 
convinced that it was financially feasible.  If the wise and kindly officer made sure to 
explain his reasoning, and did not do so “in a harsh or austere manner,” Cuthbertson
assured the reader, the soldier would perceive “that his interest and advantage are 
the only causes of the denial,” and “instead of being discontented, he will be rather 
thankful to his Officer.”93
In the case of their clothing, enlisted men were actually dependent on their 
officers.  The government paid each regimental colonel a sum of money with which 
90. Cuthbertson, 60-61.
91. Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 173.
92. Cuthbertson, 45.
93. Cuthbertson, 168.
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to clothe his regiment as he saw fit.  While some colonels prided themselves on 
losing significant amounts of money on this transaction as they outfitted their troops 
with extravagant uniforms, others saw it as a handy source of profit and chose to 
clothe their troops as economically as possible, or, sometimes entirely neglected to 
provide them with any the clothing they were owed.94
This economic control could easily be connected with moral regulation.  Captain 
Neil McLeane of the 84th was tried for neglecting his duty as an officer by failing to 
provide the soldiers in his company with “necessaries.”  This term referred to the 
smaller items of clothing—shirts, shoes, stockings—that made up a soldier’s uniform,
which were to be supplied as needed by the soldier’s company officer.  (This was in 
contrast to “regimentals”—the red coat, breeches, and waistcoat, and hat, which 
were supplied by the colonel.)  The regiment’s major reported that he had given 
orders that the 84th was to be properly provided with clothing, as it might be sent on
march at short notice, but that he had seen several examples of soldiers in 
McLeane’s company who did not have the proper clothing.  In particular, the major 
cited a soldier who "came to him to complain that he had no Shoes to March in, and 
that one of the Shoes he had was tied to his Foot by a bit of Packthread.”  When the 
major ordered Captain McLeane to provide the man shoes, he had refused, telling 
him that “he was not oblig'd to furnish every Vagabond with Necessaries.”95  
McLeane’s defense rested on his right to judge whether the clothing his men had 
was sufficient or not, and which of his men were deserving of being clothed by him.  
He claimed that the soldier’s shoes were sufficient for the march, as “the Roads were
94. Lord Percy and Lord Cornwallis were known for outfitting their regiments splendidly out of their own
pockets, while other colonels fought with their successors over who had the right to profit from
clothing the regiment. Soldiers were also often subject to pay deductions for ornamental clothing, or
unique regimental accessories ordered by the colonel, but paid for from soldiers' pay. Steppler, "The
Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 82-83, 50. 
95. WO 71/56, pp. 255-259.
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very good” and that he had “known Soldiers March further in worse Shoes than those
he then wore.”96  McLeane dismissed his men’s claims against him by asserting that 
they owed him money.  Roberts, the soldier who applied to him for shoes, “was 
nineteen Shillings in debt to him” and furthermore, McLeane “knew him generally to 
sufficiently stock’d with necessaries.”  Taken together, these made a moral 
judgment: Roberts was constantly draining his purse with unnecessary demands for 
clothing and shoes.  In the case of Private Higgins, who also applied to McLeane for 
necessaries, McLeane was even more explicit: Higgins was known to be "a bad Man 
in many respects particularly as a Thief.” Moreover, Higgins was “considerably in 
debt,” especially because McLeane had recently been forced to pay “Five and twenty 
or Thirty Shillings to an Inhabitant of the Parish of St. Genevieve for a Sheep and a 
number of Fowls that he had Stolen there.”  Given this unpromising history, McLeane
claimed, he “therefore was very unwilling to furnish him with any more necessaries 
than barely to keep him clean.”97  
 These disputes about clothing, in which officers asserted their right to control the
economic and material lives of the the soldiers under their command as part of their 
‘natural’ moral authority over them, were part of a larger system for controlling 
behavior by using economic dependence to enforce deference and obedience to 
officers.  A private's pay, with which he was to buy his food and other equipment, 
and pay for his washing, was 8d. per day, but 6d. was the amount actually paid to 
soldiers.  2d. was withheld for "off-reckonings,” the primary financial perquisite of 
the regiment’s proprietary colonel; supposedly it was the money given by the soldier 
to his colonel in return for the colonel supplying him with clothing and weapons.98   
96. WO 71/56, p. 266.
97. WO 71/56, pp. 266-267.
98. Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 42-45, 52. 
48
And even the 6d. per day was paid at the discretion of his officers, and could be 
stopped to pay any debts he might have incurred to his officers, or simply if his 
officers thought he would not spend it wisely. 
Officers stopped pay from their men in custom amounts, according to their 
opinion of the character of each soldier.99  This was supposed to be a class-based 
right: Cuthbertson warned officers that sergeants (who often had the actual charge 
of disbursing enlisted men’s pay, it being considered too tedious a task for the 
officers) were not to have any economic power in the regiment: “a Serjeant, who on 
any pretence, advances a farthing to a Soldier, without an order for it, should be 
reduced, as they are not to be the judges, when such a thing is proper.”100
Thomas Thompson of the Royal Artillery was sentenced to 500 lashes for his 
“insolent behaviour” in asking for his own pay.  Upon asking his commanding officer, 
Captain John Stewart, for the prize money due him for his role in capturing a frigate,
Stewart noted that Thompson lacked the full complement of shirts and stockings, 
and told him that his money would instead be used to make up new clothing for him.
Any leftover funds, he added, would be given "to his Pay Master Serjeant, to be laid 
out in Necessaries as he might want them.”  And he made it clear that this was a 
particular judgment on Thompson: “foreseeing from the Prisoner's Character and 
usual Conduct, he would very soon be in want of Necessaries, and he not fit to be 
trusted with buying them himself...he stopt what would have remained of the Prize 
Money."101
Claims that soldiers used any money they were given as an opportunity to get 
drunk provided many justifications for officers to prevent soldiers from having much 
99. Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 66-67.
100.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
27.
101.WO 71/88, p. 227
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money and sabotaging any attempts to gain financial independence.  Wolfe claimed 
that “The shameful drunkenness observed among the men, on pay-days in 
particular, is thought in a great measure to proceed from their not putting in a 
proportion of their pay regularly into their messes,” suggesting that not only did 
soldiers spend all their pay on liquor, but that they neglected to buy food for 
themselves in order to get drunk.102  Thus, officers claimed that it was necessary to 
insist that their pay was used for provisions.103
 “[E]very Pay-Day,” Bland advised, “each Man should be oblig'd to appropriate 
such a Part of his Pay to buy Provisions.” Were this not done, “the Soldiers will be 
apt to spend their Pay on Liquors, which will not only occasion their Neglect of Duty, 
but, in all Probability, the Loss of a great many Men by Sickness for Want of proper 
Victuals to support them.”104  Bland was suggesting that the enlisted men were not 
competent to feed themselves, and would fall sick and die from malnutrition without 
officers supervising them.  
However, a greater obstacle for a private seeking to keep himself adequately fed 
was the fact that his pay was not actually sufficient for the task.105  And officers were
often not particularly concerned with providing adequate provisions when it would 
result in the soldier contracting debts that the officer would ultimately be liable for.  
When three soldiers were tried for stealing an ox and slaughtering it for food, they 
defended themselves by claiming that they did it because they had not been 
provided with enough food by their officer, Captain Charles McClean of the 43rd 
102.Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 20.
103.Food was supposed to be purchased for enlisted soldiers by sergeants or oﬃcers when they were on
march, or billeted in a public house. Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III,
1760-1793," 62.
104.Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 189.
105.Steppler estimated that the average soldier needed 1s. 6d. more than his weekly pay in order to feed
himself adequately. Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 90.
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Regiment of Foot.  McClean responded that he had supplied the men with vegetables
“till they became scarce and too Expensive for a Soldier, when this was the case I 
saw no use in giving Men, much in Debt more Money than was necessary to keep 
them Clean.”106 
 The problem of soldiers’ inadequate pay could be mitigated to some extent by 
their ability to supplement their earnings with additional labor.  Some were employed
within the regiment as tailors, shoemakers, and officers' servants, while others took 
on outside employment as laborers when they were off duty.107  However, 
opportunities for additional labor were also ways for officers to assert economic 
control.  Cuthbertson recommended that “When a Soldier is permitted to work, the 
whole of his pay should remain in his Captain's hands, to supply the extraordinary 
consumption of linen, etc. which his working must occasion.” He then tried to frame 
the confiscation of the entirety of a soldier’s wages as “a regulation, so 
advantageous for his own interest” and claimed that any soldier who refused to 
comply made it obvious that “drink alone, is the object, for which he labours, and 
therefore he should be struck off, from any further indulgence of that kind.”108 This 
blithe assumption that a soldier unwilling to surrender the whole of his pay to his 
supervisors must be using the money for drink, and thus rendered himself unworthy 
of being allowed to work, neatly provided officers a way to negate any financial 
advantage to be gained from independent work.  
Paternalism served as a moral justification for the subordination of the enlisted, 
but also provided a justification for domination through physical violence and gave it 
an aura of righteousness.  It was Captain Payne’s standard defense to the numerous 
106.WO 71/88, p. 227.
107.Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 79-81.
108.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
186.
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complaints of soldiers under his command, who complained that he had unjustly 
confined them, or had struck them or committed other physical assaults on them.  
Payne never denied that he had done so.  However, he did not justify his behavior by
appealing to military manuals and treatises that emphasized the necessity of this 
treatment due to the hardened and unrepentant nature of some enlisted soldiers.  
Instead, he claimed it as his paternal right.  His defense rested on two points: first, 
that every man he punished had deserved it due to “Disobedience & Mis-conduct,” 
and—just as a father must chastise a misbehaving child—to strike them was not just 
his right but also his duty.  Second, not only was he acting in the role of a paternal 
disciplinarian, he was also acting as a wise and humane patriarch, far-seeing enough
to realized that if his charges were not punished for their crimes, it would merely 
lead them into worse behavior and more dangerous consequences: “The Truth is, 
any Strokes I may have given were intended more to frighten than to hurt, and have
been the means of saving them from more severe and disgraceful Punishment,” 
Payne explained, claiming that his casual blows were done for the men’s own good, 
to prevent their unwise behavior from leading to a court-martial and flogging.109  The
author of one satirical military manual advised colonels that “You are to consider 
yourself as the father of your corps, and must take care to exercise a paternal 
authority over it: as a good father does not spare the rod, so should not a 
commanding officer spare the cat-of-nine tails.”110 
And not only did Payne defend his striking of the soldiers under his command by 
claiming it was fatherly chastisement done for the soldier’s own good, he also 
appealed to the soldiers themselves to uphold Payne’s judgment in choosing to strike
109.WO 71/81, pp. 207-213.
110.John Williamson, Advice to the Oﬃcers of the British Army with Some Hints to the Drummer and
Private Soldier (London: G. Kearsley, 1787), 23.
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them.  Payne called upon the enlisted men of his company (that is, those of them 
who had not yet deserted or already been called by the prosecution to tearfully 
testify to his cruelty) and demanded to know whether they had been struck by him 
and, if so, the circumstances under which it had occurred.  Private John Lambton 
obligingly deposed that “Capt. Payne once struck him, but however he does not 
know but that he might deserve it as he might give him some provoking language.” 
Corporal Graham, too, admitted he had been struck by Captain Payne, and, upon 
Lieutenant Fowler pointedly asking him if he “look[ed] upon that as good usage?” 
answered that “He could not look upon it as bad usage, as he told Capt. Payne a lie 
to his face, and when he argued with him that he was in the right, the Deponent 
persisted that he himself was in the right, although he know that he was wrong.”  
Isaac Hotson, a private who also acted as Payne’s servant, was asked if Payne had 
not “often struck and cruelly beat him,” but replied that he was “struck by Capt. 
Payne, when he deserved it.”111  Thus, in contrast to officers, who were independent 
adult males who could never “deserve” to be struck, for whom every blow was an 
insult punishable by death, enlisted soldiers were given the status of children, who 
could legitimately be assaulted in retribution for their misdeeds.  
One part of ensuring that enlisted men remained in the subordinate role of 
symbolic children was to negate the traditional cultural and social power that soldiers
enjoyed because they were men.  If soldiers were looking back to older models of 
masculinity, asserting male privilege over their wives and defending the rights 
associated with marriage against the interference of other men would be a key 
component in upholding their conception of masculinity.112  Attacking these 
111.WO 71/81, pp. 79-80, 60.
112.Karen Harvey, "The History of Masculinity, Circa 1650–1800", Journal of British Studies 44, no. 2
(2005): 296-311, argues that men's concerns about retaining household power, so prevalent in the
historiography of the seventeenth century, were not actually distinct to the period and remained
powerful concerns for eighteenth century men as well. John Tosh, Manliness and Masculinities in
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marriage-based rights, on the other hand, would help higher-status men (officers) 
assert their dominance.
Officers undermined the older code of patriarchy by discouraging marriage for 
enlisted soldiers, thus barring them from one of the traditional social markers of 
patriarchal status,  but also by interfering with the marital relations of the soldiers 
who did manage to marry by controlling their wives’ labor, food, and ability to live 
with their spouses.  Officers also made no effort to uphold the traditional marital 
privileges of enlisted men by recognizing their exclusive right to sexual access to 
their wives.  
 Simes’ Military Guide advised commanders to prevent “the inconveniencies and 
ill consequences produced” by soldiers’ marriages, “for their wives are in general so 
abandoned, as frequently to occasion quarrels, drunkenness, diseases, and 
desertions; they involve their husbands in debt; and too oft are the ruin and 
destruction of a soldier.”113 It was quite common for officers to forbid the men under 
their command from marrying, or introducing barriers to marriage, with the 
justification that enlisted men were not capable of judging the character of a 
potential wife properly.  Wolfe insisted that enlisted men receive permission to marry
from their officers so that "the Woman's Character may be enquired into" first.  He 
claimed that "many women in the regiment are very inconvenient, especially as 
some of them are not so industrious, nor so useful to their husbands, as a soldier's 
wife ought to be."114  They wrapped their control of soldiers’ marriages in the 
Nineteenth-century Britain: Essays on Gender, Family, and Empire (Harlow, England; New York:
Pearson Longman, 2005), 66-67, writes that “Adult gender identity for men involved forming a
household, maintaining it, protecting it and controlling it” well into the nineteenth century, and endured
as a “fundamental requirement” even as the context in which it was exercised changed to middle-class
domesticity.
113.Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers: Containing a System of the Art of War, 164.
114.Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 30.
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language of paternal concern.  Officers were "incontestably" better judges of 
marriages than their men, Cuthbertson claimed, and they, “being a sort of Guardians
to the Men in their respective Companies, should use every means, that prudence 
can suggest, to prevent the distress and ruin, which so often attends their 
contracting Marriages with women, in every respect unfit for them.”115  
He added that soldiers who failed to heed the advice of their officers and were 
“imprudent enough to marry” unapproved women justly deserved to be punished for 
their “folly and disobedience.”116  Wolfe promised that any soldier who presumed “to 
marry clandestinely,” or neglected to “consult his officer before his marriage” would 
be “punished with rigour.”117  Cuthbertson also advised that officers should attempt 
to break up unsuitable marriages, and suggested several methods that might serve: 
he, who contrary to all advice and order, will engage in a
dishonourable connection, exclusive of any punishment he may
receive, for such contempt and insolence, should as much as
possible be discouraged, by obliging him, not only to mess, but lie
in the Quarters of the Company he belongs to, at the same time,
that his wife is prevented, from partaking of any advantage either
from his Pay or Quarters: this severity, of course, must soon expell
her from the Regiment, and be the certain means, of making other
Soldiers cautious, how they attempt such acts of disobedience.118
Historians have primarily seen the discouragement of marriage by commanders 
as stemming from military needs.  Although they recognized the need to allow wives 
to accompany the army to nurse and wash for the men, and to recruit married men 
and to keep them from deserting, officers were not enthusiastic about the presence 
of women and treated them, at best, with resignation, considering them a necessary 
115.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
192-194.
116.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
192-193.
117.Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 15.
118.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
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evil.  Officers didn't like women accompanying the army, claiming that they spread 
venereal disease, illicitly sold liquor to soldiers, and cost both the army and the 
individual soldier too much in rations for themselves and their children.119  Examining
the treatment of soldiers’ wives through this purely military lens leads historians to 
question the inability of the British high command to value women for the labor they 
provided to the army as nurses and laundresses, and to be somewhat puzzled by 
commanders’ recurring characterizations of all women who accompanied the army as
an undifferentiated mass of diseased prostitutes despite the historians’ conclusion 
that the majority of them were “respectable wives.”120 
But when one considers the historic role of marriage as a necessary marker for 
establishing a man’s status as a patriarch, the interest of officers wishing to 
undermine the male privileges of the soldiers under their command by denying 
enlisted men the ability to marry or by de-legitimizing enlisted men’s marital 
relationships becomes apparent.  By classifying the soldier as a bachelor, his 
employers could justify lower pay (because he did not need to support a family) and 
increased control (because of the historic link between independent manhood and 
marriage/house-holding).121  Marriage often meant economic gain for the newlywed 
soldier if his wife had the means to earn an income from washing or nursing, or, 
119.P Kopperman, "The British High Command and Soldiers’ Wives in America, 1755-1783", Journal of
Army Historical Research 60 (1982): 14-34; Elizabeth S Peña and Erik R Seeman, "Desire and Distrust:
The Paradox of Women at Old Fort Niagara", New York History 85, no. 1 (2004): 5-21.
120.Sarah Fatherly, "Tending the Army: Women and the British General Hospital in North America,
1754-1763", Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 10, no. 3 (2012): 566-599;
Kopperman, "The British High Command and Soldiers Wives in America, 1755-1783," 20, expresses
confusion at British claims that women were liabilities, despite their ability to do useful work for the
army. Kopperman, writing in 1982, seems to have been one of the first to conclude that the older
assumptions that “soldier’s wife” was a mere euphemism was incorrect, and that most of the women
described by that term actually were “legally married…or eǌoyed fairly stable common-law
relationships.”
121.Jennine Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century:'The Girl I Left
Behind Me' (Oxford University Press, 2014), 29. The author also examines the social advantages men
gained from marriage, “one of the main indicators of maturity, dependability, and respectability” in the
eighteenth century. Married soldiers often gained special privileges, such as separate apartments for
themselves and their wives (pp. 115-116).
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most lucrative of all, a suttling license permitting her to sell goods to the men of the 
regiment.122  More importantly, marriage gave men patriarchal authority in the form 
of dependents to rule, support, control, and protect.  By denying soldiers this marker
of adulthood and authority, officers prevented them from accessing the cultural and 
social power that would otherwise accrue to them as adult men.123  
Officers failed adequately distinguish between legitimately-married women and 
prostitutes, because this very ability to conflate these two groups gave officers 
considerable power.  When Private Elijah Reeves protested his officers’ interference 
with his visits to his own wife’s house, Captain Mawby denied that Reeves was 
actually married to her, describing how Reeves had written improper pleas to be 
allowed to “go to his Wife (as he call’d her).”  When Reeves produced a marriage 
certificate, he called into question its legitimacy.  He also pointed out that Reeves 
never sought permission to marry his wife, and that an order was given “that women
who were married to Soldiers of the Regiment without Leave, should not be regarded
as wives but only as followers of the Regiment.”   
By asserting the right to determine whether a woman was a wife or not contrary 
to the opinion of civil and religious authorities, officers gave themselves the option of
122.Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century, 115; Simes, The Military
Instructor, 44, permitted sergeants to profit from their duty to supply their men with linen clothing,
which could be “made by his wife or daughter.” Peter Way, "Venus and Mars: Women and the British-
American Army in the Seven Years' War," in Britain and America Go to War: The Impact of War and
Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754-1815, ed. Julie Flavell and Stephen Conway (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2004), 53, notes another way for men to profit from their wives’ labor: expanding their
suttling activities to include dealing in stolen goods.
123.Way, "Venus and Mars: Women and the British-American Army in the Seven Years' War," 47-48, notes
that the army kept soldiers in “a status akin to children under the authority of their oﬃcers, which
prevented the full assertion of manhood as husbands and fathers” by denying them the rights and
responsibilities of married men: “the army usurped the role of paterfamilias by providing food and often
shelter and by intervening in family and sexual life as a matter of discipline, even to the extreme of
causing de facto divorces by ordering women from camps for infractions.” Douglas M Peers, "Privates
Oﬀ Parade: Regimenting Sexuality in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Empire", The International History
Review 20, no. 4 (1998): pp. 823-854, writes similarly about the discouragement of marriage among
common soldiers by the British army in 19th century India, because of their cost of transport and
maintenance: “As the regiment provided the soldier with everything normally provided by marriage, a
wife could provide nothing extra except heterosexual sex, which he could find elsewhere.”
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denying the enlisted soldier the right to protect the woman to whom he was married,
and to give her the status and protections afforded by marriage, thereby making 
women in relationships with soldiers common prostitutes and lewd women (subject 
to use and abuse by men generally) rather than respectable wives (only subject to 
their husbands). 
Payne’s treatment of Corporal Greer’s wife suggested this tactic: He ordered her, 
as well as some other soldiers’ wives, to leave the barracks, ordering the drummers 
and Sergeant Smith, to lead her out of the barracks.  Smith started to escort Mrs. 
Greer away accompanied by the drummers, but “Capt. Payne came running up to 
him,” and demanded that he “take hold of that woman and lead her before the 
drums.”  Because he “never heard any body speak ill of her,” Smith did not “rightly 
understand” Payne’s intention at first: he had merely walked with Mrs. Greer beside 
the drums.  But Payne actually wanted her to be forced to march before the beating 
drums, making use of the traditional disgraceful method used to announce the 
forcible ejection of a woman from a military encampment because she was 
prostitute.124   Payne’s other threats of legal action to soldiers’ wives similarly denied 
their status as wives and respectable women.  Mrs. McLaughlin related that he has 
threatened to “put her in Bridewell,” a reference to the London prison which 
specialized in confining and reforming common prostitutes and other “disorderly 
women.”125    
 So long as an enlisted man was under an officer’s command, his wife was 
subject his officer’s approval.  Officers could determine whether he was permitted to 
live with her, whether she was to be allowed in the barracks, and even whether he 
was allowed to visit her.  Commanders' power to eject women from the military 
124.WO 71/81, p. 42, 50.
125.WO 71/81, p. 9.
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camp made it important for women to keep on good terms; a vindictive officer could 
destroy family ties and leave women destitute.126 
Officers paraded the power that they had to damage enlisted men's marital 
relationships: Major Samuel Montgomery of the 12th reminded Corporal Jamieson of 
the many favors he had done for him and his wife before telling him that his current 
"Conduct was such, as to forfeit all further claim to his protection, either on his own 
account or that of his Wife; and that if his behaviour in future was not better, the 
Major would prevent his Wife, or his Family" from living with him in the future. 127  
When Jamieson was later tried for attempting to murder the Major, he claimed that 
the Major's treatment of his family had driven him mad.128  
Commanders asserted their power to dissolve the bonds of marriage in practice if
not in law: Lt. Col. William Eyre, commanding the 44th Foot at Fort Niagara, had 
engaged the wife of Serjeant Cameron to do his washing.  However, having found 
her skills as a laundress unsatisfactory, he ordered that she should be turned out of 
the garrison.  When Cameron protested this treatment of his wife, Eyre responded 
that although he "was no Bishop or Pope, therefore could not take upon him to 
divorce the wife from the Husband, but he swore she never should come where he 
had anything of a command."129  The commander of Fort Stanwix, trying to suppress 
sales of rum, issued an order warning the “Married Women” at the fort that if they 
were caught, he would “turn them out of their Hutts…Cut them of the King's 
Provision & chase them Shamefully away.”  He made an acknowledgment of their 
126.Peña and Seeman, "Desire and Distrust: The Paradox of Women at Old Fort Niagara," 17-18.
127.WO 71/64, p. 19.
128.WO 71/64, p. 38.
129.WO 71/46, cited in Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, 126.
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marriage, immediately followed by a threat that emphasized officers' ability to 
negate the protections traditionally conferred by that status.130
Officers’ power also demonstrated the inability of soldiers to protect their wives 
from physical violence.  Women serving as nurses or in other regimental jobs 
mandated by the army during wartime were vulnerable not only to disease, but also 
faced the threat of being captured or killed.131  Furthermore, they were subject to the
same harsh military discipline as their husbands.  Soldiers’ wives were flogged or 
whipped for disobeying orders, either from the summary judgment of the provost 
martial or from after being convicted at a court-martial.  Being punished in the same 
manner as men both denied them the protections of feminine status and dishonored 
their husbands, because these punishments exposed their bodies to public view.132
Officers could interfere even more directly with marital relationships by making 
sexual advances toward soldiers’ wives. Daniel Morison, a surgeon’s mate of the 60th 
Regiment stationed at Michilimackinac from 1769 to 1772, kept a diary that 
consisted primarily of a litany of complaints about the behavior of another officer 
there, Ensign Johnstone: he “Vaunted he had Carnal dealings with Mrs. Oldham”; 
another wife claimed that “he used uncommon libertys with her Character”; and he 
“attempted a rape on a girl betwixt nine & ten Years of age,” the daughter of a 
soldier and his wife who lived in the barracks.  The child was spared only because 
“Her shrieking out Violently alarmed her step-father, Arthur Ross, & others in the 
130.Orderly Book, Fort Stanwix, 11 November 1758-30 January 1759, in GD 125/34/7, fol. 4., cited in
Brumwell, 125-126. See also Way, "Venus and Mars: Women and the British-American Army in the
Seven Years' War," 47-48, who claims that “Camp women were shorn of the full economic and legal
protection (however unequal) oﬀered their sex by the married state and thus were doubly subjugated--
to the male partners and to male oﬃcers.”
131.Fatherly, "Tending the Army: Women and the British General Hospital in North America, 1754-1763,"
596.
132.Kopperman, "The British High Command and Soldiers’ Wives in America, 1755-1783," 25-26; Fatherly,
"Tending the Army: Women and the British General Hospital in North America, 1754-1763," 572, 591.
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barracks.”133  Private Reeves claimed that “Capt. Chapman sent to his Wife…to come 
to his Quarters & when she came there, he Locked the Doors and wanted to lay with 
her,” but was prevented when her shouts caught the attention of the landlord.  Ever 
since that incident, Reeves claimed, Chapman and the other officers of the 18th had 
held “a spite against the woman.”134  Ensign Johnstone, too, used his rank to make 
life difficult for those who resisted his advances; Morison recorded the plight of “John
Savage, Taylor & Soldier in the general's Company,” who “had the Door of his house 
forced open [and was] committed to the guard-house for not suffering his wife to 
comply with obscene propositions made to her.”135
Interference with soldiers’ wives and their marriages was a way of denying men’s
patriarchal authority and establishing hierarchies of dominance because officers were
interfering in an institution with so much cultural power.  Raping a soldier’s wife or 
child blatantly proclaimed his inability to act effectively as a protector and thereby 
deeply undermined his male identity.136   
Because officers’ interference in enlisted marriages so often took the form of 
denying wives rations, expelling them from military camps, accusing them of being 
prostitutes, and sexual and other violence towards them, historians have commonly 
133.Daniel Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal (Fort Mackinac Division Press, 1960), 63, 57, 62.
134.WO 71/79, p. 165. Also, LO 2826, for a petition by an enlisted soldier to the Duke of Marlborough,
claiming that he had been demoted because his wife had refused to sleep with his Captain (cited in
Kopperman, "The British High Command and Soldiers Wives in America, 1755-1783," 18).
135.Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal, 57.
136.Sharon Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape, 1765-1815", The
Journal of American History 89, no. 3 (2002): pp. 849-868, notes the common perception that the
victim of a rape was not so much the violated woman, but her male protector, who was dishonored by
her rape. See also: Robin Griller and Jessica Warner, "’My Pappa Is Out, and My Mamma Is Asleep.’
Minors, Their Routine Activities and Interpersonal Violence in An Early Modern Town, 1653-1781,"
Journal of Social History 36, no. 3 (2003): 561-584, in which the father of a twelve year old who had
been sexually assault suggested that “what was really at issue was not so much his daughter's safety
as his own honor.” And WO 71/79, pp. 7-8, 13: After Ensign McDermott was accused of raping the
young daughter of another oﬃcer, the other oﬃcers of his regiment asked him how he could treat a
“Brother Oﬃcer” in such a cruel manner, and fretted about how to keep him from encountering the
victim’s father, “whom he was suspected to have iǌured in so particular a manner” and “in so tender a
point.”
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interpreted it as an expression of misogyny and part of a larger patriarchal project in
the army to subordinate or exclude women.137 I argue that in the eighteenth-century 
British army, when officers broke up marriages, separated wives from husbands, and
inflicted economic, social, and sexual violence upon army women, their goal was not,
in fact, to subjugate women.  Rather, this misogyny was a byproduct of men’s 
attempts to oppress other men.  
Officers were not concerned with the enforcement of an ideology that demanded 
the fundamental subordination of women to men, but instead sought the 
subordination of lower-status men to high-status men.  Lower-class women could be 
privileged over lower-class men when officers wanted to subordinate the latter, and 
in fact this was a common tactic they used.  Officers could and did undermine 
soldiers’ authority over their wives without inflicting any overt violence upon the 
women themselves; they could publicize soldiers’ lack of masculinity by interfering in
their marriages not only through the acts of expelling soldiers’ wives from the camp 
or raping them, but also by protecting them.  Quite often, this took the form of 
interfering in soldiers’ marital violence.138  Because of the link between violence and 
masculinity, violence against a wife or other dependents was a way of establishing a 
man’s dominance, and publicly preventing a man from beating his wife undermined 
his claim to exercise authority over his own wife and household.139  By using the 
rhetoric of humanity and tenderness for the gentler sex to justify lessening lower-
137.Way, "Venus and Mars: Women and the British-American Army in the Seven Years' War," 43-44,
argues that the army put soldiers in the role of “dependent children,” and that “the patriarchal army
validated its unique claim on men by conceptually divorcing them from women. Conceiving of the
feminine as corrupting of discipline and parasitical of resources, the army sought to eliminate women
from its masculine world.  Militaristic misogyny was a necessary complement to martial endeavor.”
138.Way, "Venus and Mars: Women and the British-American Army in the Seven Years' War," 58-60,
describes a commander’s order that an enlisted man move out of the rooms for married soldiers and
into the barracks, while his wife was allowed to remain, citing his abusive behavior towards his wife as
justification.
139.Joanne Bailey, "'I Dye [sic] by Inches': Locating Wife Beating in the Concept of a Privatization of
Marriage and Violence in Eighteenth-Century England", Social History 31, no. 3 (2006): 273-294.
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status men's authority over their dependents, officers could also raise their own 
status and reputation by this portrayal of themselves as men of sensibility and 
compassion, and better judges than the domineering husband of what sort of 
treatment the wronged wife deserved.140 
The inability to protect one's dependent women from rape was a marker of a 
shameful lack of masculine agency.  However, the defining factor in what made a 
wife or child’s rape shameful was not that another man had sex with a woman under 
his protection without her consent, but that another man had sex with the woman 
without his consent.  No violence needed to be offered to the woman.  Indeed, a lack
of violent coercion might even serve the purpose more effectively, as a man whose 
wife had been seduced rather than raped was far more limited in his options for both
violent retaliation and legal redress.  In addition to his attempts to rape the women 
of the garrison at Michilimackinac, Ensign Johnstone also made sexual advances 
towards soldiers’ wives without using overt violence.  Morison reported that he had 
“Attempted to sow Discord betwixt George McBeath and his wife to whom he offered 
one hundred pounds &c provideing she would take up with him & quit her 
husband.”141  Mrs. McBeath refused his offer, but Johnstone found soon found a more
willing participant: 
Ens. Johnstone decoyed away Sergt. Carlile's wife, which he has
been contriveing to accomplish many months before this finishing
stroake, & tho' her husband was like to break his Heart, and crying
out his Eyes on the occasion. Yet no Remonstrances would be
payed the least attention to.… [He] sleeped with her that night in
140.Jennine Hurl-Eamon, "'I Will Forgive You If the World Will': Wife-Murder and Limits on Patriarchal
Violence in London, 1690-1750," in Violence, Politics and Gender in Early Modern England, ed. Joseph
Patrick Ward (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), in concluding that there were real limits on early
modern patriarchs' ability to inflict violence on their wives, seems to ignore the class dimension. Her
examples of men’s intervention into other men’s marital violence does not acknowledge the
implications of the fact that many of the men who intervened were of higher social status—justices of
the peace, or men who employed the battered wives as servants.
141.Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal, 63.
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his new room where he lives with her still, without dread or
shame, while the poor Husband is left in such a disconsolate
situation that is not easy to describe.142  
And officers refused to censure any of their own for violating traditional 
conceptions of a man’s marital rights when the violated man was an enlisted soldier. 
Lieutenant George Quin was accused of improper behavior after his commander 
received a letter from a captain in another regiment concerned about rumors that 
Mrs. Davis, the wife of one of his regiment's sergeants, "eloped from her husband 
this day, & has robbed him of Fifty Guineas & most of his Cloathes,” and had been 
seen “this Morning in Mr. Quin’s Room.”  But the officer’s primary concern was that 
the stolen property be tracked down, so “that the poor Man who is an Invalid may 
recover his Money.”  Quin admitted that the woman had told him “that if he would 
Support her, she would come & live with him, for she did not chuse to stay any 
longer with her Husband,” and that he had agreed to support her, but that he had 
warned her not “to bring any Money or Wearing Apparel” with her when she left her 
husband.  Once Quin had satisfied his brother officers that he had no intention of 
defrauding the husband by claiming any of the Davis property, any further complaint
that he had acted improperly was dismissed as “frivolous.”  Quin was apparently still 
openly living with the woman when he was tried and acquitted.143  
Whereas men had generally been acknowledged to have certain rights and 
privileges over the women to whom they were married, to take charge of their 
financial affairs and determine where they would live, to regulate their sexual 
conduct and to correct their behavior, officers refused to respect or even 
acknowledge this authority when it came to the relationships between enlisted 
soldiers under his command and their wives.  They asserted power over soldiers’ 
142.Morison, The Doctor's Secret Journal, 57.
143.WO 71/96, pp. 158-224.
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wives, women who would otherwise be under the jurisdiction of their husbands, and 
increased their own authority by denying enlisted men’s right to control their wives’ 
bodies and their marital rights.  They did not do so without significant opposition.  
Enlisted men vigorously resisted what they saw as the infringement of their 
fundamental rights as men and as husbands, and sought to retain as much male 
privilege as possible.144 
Certain social relations of asymmetrical power already had an established history 
in eighteenth century Britain—that the wealthy rightfully had the authority to direct 
the actions of the poor, that fathers rightfully exercised authority over their children, 
that those of superior morals had the right to superintend those whose weaker 
natures inclined them to criminality.  Borrowing from more traditional systems for 
organizing power and using these accepted relations of inequality to frame and 
justify the principles of military subordination allowed the military hierarchy to 
operate within wider, mutually reinforcing systems of power.  
Closely linking patriarchal authority, wealth, class, military authority, privilege, 
and moral authority allowed the army to uphold the economic and social dependence
of enlisted men and their deference to officers.  The army’s hierarchy denied  the 
ability of enlisted men to regulate their own lives and put them in the subordinate 
role of the perpetual child rather than allowing them to exercise the privileges of 
independent manhood that might otherwise accrue to them as adult men.  
But even as civilian social hierarchies were used to support military hierarchies, 
claims of military need allowed officers to justify coercive interference in enlisted 
lives that ultimately served to uphold and strengthen existing social hierarchies.  By 
positing their interventions as necessary for the proper functioning of the army, 
144.Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century, 5, explores the “surprising
resilience of partnerships severed by war and army anti-marriage policies.”
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officers could justify interference in matters that would not be acceptable even in the
highly-stratified class system of civilian society, such as meddling in men’s marital 
relationships.  The class hierarchy supported the military hierarchy, but this also 
worked the other way around: the military hierarchy was used to shore up faltering 
social hierarchies of deference.  The army’s demands for bodily control supported 
tactical movement on the battlefield, but also could be used to support the class 
hierarchy.  When Cuthbertson wrote that “Soldiers should be instructed, never to 
avoid their Officers, through design, but rather to put themselves in the way of being
seen, that they may have an opportunity of shewing their respect,” by elaborately 
saluting them, he was seeing an opportunity to use military practice and the military 
system of coercive discipline to increase, display, and solidify the distinctions 
between two social classes as well as two military ranks.145   
The goal was to collapse the multiple systems for organizing authority and power 
in the civilian world into a very simple one, with just two levels: the officers, and the 
enlisted.  Subordinating the enlisted by assaulting their masculinity—insisting that 
they were to be obedient not only because of their lowly military rank, but because 
they were economically dependent on their officers, unable to regulate their own 
behavior without an officer to enforce morality, and ought to be seen as akin to 
children rather than adult men—allowed the officers to exercise extreme power over 
enlisted soldiers.  But it ultimately left army officers unable to effectively advocate 
for the subordination of lower-ranked men who were officers rather than enlisted 
men, for subordination had now been conclusively linked with low status, denial of 
male privilege, and a lack of proper masculinity.  
145.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
181.
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Chapter 3: Above the Law
 
“When a young gentleman betakes himself to the profession of
arms, he should seriously reflect upon the nature and duties of the
way of life he has entered into, and consider, that it is not as the
generality of people vainly imagine, learning a little of the
exercise, saluting gracefully, firing his platoon in his turn,
mounting a few guards (carelessly enough) and finally, exposing
his person bravely in the day of battle; which will deservedly, and
in the opinion of judges, acquire him the character of a good
officer: no, he must learn chearfully to obey his superiors, and that
their orders and his own be punctually executed.146
So opened General James Wolfe’s “Instructions for Young Officers,” a work later 
compiled with his other writings and orders and published in a hagiographic volume 
after his glorious death upon the Plains of Abraham.  And Wolfe was not alone 
among senior officers and military writers in his repeated admonitions to young men 
desiring military careers to take note of the importance of obedience, not only for the
enlisted soldiers of the army, but also for the officers themselves.  
In regard to this latter group, writers seemed to assume that even the most 
obvious principles of military subordination were not readily apparent to the aspiring 
officer.  “Orders must be obeyed,” one treatise on military discipline advised, along 
with an explanation that a military force could not function without “A due deference 
to our Superiors” and showing the proper “attention, submission and respect to all 
those whom his Majesty shall think fit to place above us.”147  This treatise then went 
on to warn officers against entering into conspiracies against their commanding 
officers.148  
146.Wolfe, General Wolfe's Instructions to Young Oﬃcers Also His Orders for a Battalion and An Army, 1.
147.Richard Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle (London, 1773), 29-30.
148.Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, 252-253.
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Such entreaties for officers’ obedience in prescriptive works suggest an army 
which had considerable difficulty enforcing a military hierarchy of subordination and 
obedience, not only (or even primarily) between the officers and the enlisted 
soldiers, but among the officers themselves.  And this suggestion is confirmed by 
army and government records demonstrating that junior officers were insubordinate 
to their seniors, and senior officers were insubordinate to the crown.149  Similarly, 
records of officers’ courts-martial are replete with examples of officers’ gross 
insubordination, disobedience of orders, neglect of their duties, and violent quarrels 
with each other.
 These problems with subordination were the consequences of borrowing existing
frameworks of deference and hierarchy to support military authority.  Linking (as 
shown in the previous chapter) subordination and obedience to being lower-class and
un-masculine had allowed the army to support a rigid class divide that allowed the 
officer class to consolidate their power over the enlisted soldiers under their 
command.  However, it came at the cost of greatly weakening the army’s power to 
extract obedience from the officers themselves, as these men now considered 
subordination and obedience to be lower-class and un-masculine.  
 Thus, there was need for a compromise, some way to make subordination 
palatable to the officer class.  Officers claimed that they were deserving of particular 
powers and privileges because of their innate status as gentlemen.  This appealed to 
many officers because it had the advantage of putting junior officers on a level of 
social equality with their superiors, and subtly undermined the the ability of the 
officers at the top of the military hierarchy to exercise authority over officers lower 
on that hierarchy.  The compromise proposed was that officers had two characters: 
149.Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Oﬃcership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-63, 37-42.
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that of the military officer, which was public, subject to military regulation, and 
dependent on the needs of the service; and that of the gentleman, which was 
private, not to be exposed to public view against his will, and an area into which the 
military had no rights to intrude.150 Even military authors who insisted on the 
supreme importance of obedience conceded this distinction: “The private and the 
public man must ever be distinguished,” one wrote, in a section otherwise devoted to
insisting on officers’ proper subordination to their superiors.151  Yet conceding that 
gentlemen had the right to have unregulated private lives did not resolve the 
conflict; it merely shifted its terms, displacing the dispute over subordination into a 
dispute about whether or not an officer’s insubordinate behavior was public or 
private. 
Junior officers naturally insisted that their often unmilitary and insubordinate 
behavior only occurred while they were acting as private gentlemen, and their 
superiors countered with arguments that officers’ actions did in fact affect the well-
being of the regiments, and thus ought to be subject to military regulation.  But 
junior officers argued strenuously for their immunity to regulation on the grounds of 
their high social class.  Being subject to rules and orders, they suggested, was 
tantamount to oppression or even slavery; such treatment was perhaps fit for the 
men of the lower classes, but an officer ought to above such petty regulation.  In 
fact, they claimed, being above the law was an essential marker of their high class 
and their gentlemanly status, and when their superiors insisted on their cheerful 
150.See Louise Carter, "British Masculinities on Trial in the Queen Caroline Aﬀair of 1820", Gender &
History 20, no. 2 (2008): 248-269, on the separation between public and private life as a particularly
aristocratic claim; at the end of the eighteenth century and especially in the nineteenth century, the
rising middle class sought to strengthen their own cultural power and reverse the trend of the 17th and
18th centuries that saw the privileges of manhood increasingly concentrated in the upper class by
asserting that there was no such divide, and that private vice made a man unfit for public oﬃce.
151.Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle, 252.
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obedience to orders, they were undermining officers’ status as well as the class 
divisions on which the army depended. 
Essential to these claims of being above the law was a strict distinction between a
man’s two roles: he was both an officer and a gentleman, but rarely both at the 
same time.  This was the basis of the protest made by Captain Patrick Wauchope and
Captain James Higginson of the 50th Regiment when they were court-martialed in 
Plymouth in 1781 for “Sowing the Seeds of disunion in the Regiment, and Spiriting 
up Officers to revolt against their Commanding Officer,” Lieutenant Colonel John 
Gordon.  Unhappy with Gordon’s orders regulating what times of day the officers 
were permitted to leave the camp, as well as Gordon’s insistence that the officers’ 
personal servants (who were also enlisted soldiers in the regiment) attend military 
drills instead of waiting on their masters, the two captains had supposedly acted as 
the ringleaders in forming an agreement among most of the regiments’ officers to 
“send Col. Gordon to Coventry” in protest—shunning the colonel by refusing to speak
to him off duty or to dine with him socially.  
In their defense, Wauchope and Higginson claimed that the court had no right to 
censure or even inquire into their behavior, because these actions towards their 
colonel were merely the actions of “private gentlemen” choosing not to associate 
with Colonel Gordon in his character as a private gentleman.  Socially shunning the 
Gordon did not involve "the most distant Idea of opposing him in his Command, or 
behaving disrespectfully to him, or of obstructing the Duty of the Regiment in any 
respect whatever," but was "merely not being upon speaking terms with the Lieut. 
Colonel as a private Gentleman."152  Other officers of the regiment concurred: Ensign
152.WO 71/58, p. 12.
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Robert Patrick claimed that when he agreed to send the colonel to Coventry, "he had
no other Idea then [sic] that of not speaking to him as Mr. Gordon.”153  
Other officers accused of disrespect to their superiors made similar claims.  
Captain John Rutherford, charged with writing an insulting letter to his commanding 
officer, defended himself by claiming “I wrote to the private Gentleman and not to 
the Officer, and therefore could have no intention of offending against Military 
Authority."  Rutherford claimed that the source of his dispute was a matter in his 
personal life, and one which his commander had no right to interfere with.  While he 
would put up with any military inconvenience the Colonel might impose, he could not
countenance "a personal degradation," which would, presumably, be an unbearable 
insult to his character as a gentleman.154 
  Captain Benjamin Chapman, called upon by Captain Benjamin Charnock Payne 
to testify to the latter’s excellent character, made clear the perceived difference 
between the two roles, officer and gentleman, and the distinct attributes of each: “As
a Gentleman,” Payne possessed “the Strictest Integrity and Honour, and [was] of the
most Humane and Benevolent disposition.”  As an officer, Payne was known for “the 
most unshaken Zeal for the service, and the most exact attention to every point of 
his duty.”155  Therefore, it was possible that one could object to a man’s behavior as 
an officer, but have no quarrel with his behavior as a gentleman, or vice versa.  For 
example, one officer reported that Lieutenant Nathaniel Fitzpatrick’s “behaviour as a 
Gentleman has been very exceptionable”—that is, extraordinarily poor. (Fitzpatrick 
had slept with the acknowledged mistress of another officer of the regiment while 
suffering from a venereal complaint, thereby infecting both her and her original lover
153.WO 71/58, p. 28.
154.WO 71/55, p. 305.
155.WO 71/81, p. 162.
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with the disease.)  But “as an Officer in action,” Fitzpatrick had “behaved remarkably
gallant.”156  Major Edward Drewe, court-martialed for his various neglects of military 
duty and for being absent without leave, had the opposite problem: when an officer 
was asked if he had “ever declared at any time, that Major Edward Drewe had not 
acted as an Officer and Gentleman,” he replied, “As an Officer I have said so!  As a 
Gentelman [sic] I never did.”157 
The statement that Captain Wauchhope and Captain Higginson offered in their 
defense suggested that as military officers, they were obliged to obey their colonel, 
but as gentlemen, they were naturally allowed to interact with Gordon on whatever 
terms they pleased: 
we have ever been taught to think that if an Officer in the British
Service supports in private life the Character of a Gentleman, and
in his public capacity, discharges his duty with zeal and attention;
he is placed far beyond the reach of censure, and that it is
perfectly immaterial what footing he is on with his Commanding
Officer in his private capacity, as a Gentleman or any other
whatever.158 
Gordon had no possible grounds to object to his officers’ ostracization of him, for 
military law could not be presumed to "restrain the private Conduct of an Officer, as 
to direct to whom in the Mess room his conversation should be addressed, with 
whom he should live in habits of Friendship or intimacy.”  No officer had the right to 
order his subordinate officers to associate with him, and he could not deprive an 
officer of “the choice of his friends and associates.”159
The officers’ dispute with Gordon demonstrated how the life of the officer and the
life of the gentleman commonly came into conflict in the 18th-century army, as 
156.WO 71/86, pp. 291-310.
157.WO 71/55, p. 247.
158.WO 71/58, p. 75.
159.WO 71/58, p. 75.
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officers tried to reconcile their positions as officers—defined by military hierarchy—
with those of gentlemen, a position which carried with it a presumption of equality 
with all other gentlemen.  
One’s status as an officer was undoubtedly predicated on military rank: the 
hierarchy was explicit and accepted by all.  Just as a lieutenant could give an enlisted
soldier an order and expect it to be obeyed, no one disputed a general’s right to give
orders to a colonel, a colonel to give orders to a major, a major to a captain and so 
on down to the lieutenants and ensigns.  
However, many officers—junior officers especially—maintained that this hierarchy
applied only to military matters.  Commanding officers might give their subordinates 
all manner of military instructions—who was to mount guard and when, who was 
allowed a leave of absence and who must stay, how the companies of the regiment 
were to be paraded, and so forth—but the loftiest general officer had not the 
slightest right to concern himself with the off-duty conduct of the lowliest ensign.  
Off duty, officers were private gentlemen, and there was no rank in the private 
sphere: one was either a gentleman or not a gentleman, and that was it; no man 
could be more of a gentleman than another.  
This was the root of the officers’ problems with Colonel Gordon’s behavior: By 
seeking to regulate actions unconnected to their military lives, he undermined the 
idea of the fundamental equality of all gentlemen.  Ensign Francis Kirkpatrick 
testified that a meeting was held among the officers of the 50th, during which they 
agreed to shun Gordon, because “The officers of the Regiment found themselves 
very much hurt and distressed in consequence of some very disagreeable Orders 
given out by Lieut. Col. Gordon,” and “had found from the tenor of his Conduct he 
was determined to give the Officers every uneasiness in his power."  These 
“disagreeable orders” were the ones specifying that “no Officer [was] to leave Camp 
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till he has seen the Orders of the day.”   This meant, in practice, that the officers 
couldn’t “go the smallest distance from Camp till three or four o'Clock in the 
afternoon” without violating those orders, and therefore were extremely unpopular 
among the officers because it restricted their social lives.160
Drinking, whoring, and other forms of pleasure-seeking social activities were 
seen as an officer’s right.  Unlike enlisted men, who found their movements closely 
controlled in large part to prevent them from social activities their officers found 
harmful, for a commander to restrict officers’ freedom of movement was considered 
(by officers) tyrannical and oppressive, and a violation of their rights as gentlemen.  
The military governor of Minorca was called upon to defend himself upon the floor of 
the House of Commons for the outrageous abuse of prohibiting the officers stationed 
there from “the social pleasure of making an afternoon visit above two miles without 
special licence.”161  Similarly, Lieutenant George Evans Bruce found his commander’s 
demands that he actually supervise the picket guard on the nights that he was 
assigned to supervise the picket guard to be an intolerable infringement, for in 
having to spend the night away from the assembling halls and dining rooms of the 
town, he “was debarred of the happiness of Society.”162  
Gordon’s subordinates shunned him for insisting that no officer was to leave the 
camp until the orders for the day had been read, a measure they found 
“disagreeable” and oppressive because “As the orders of the day were Seldom given 
out before three or four o'Clock, sometimes later, they found they were debarred of 
dining out of their own Mess, or enjoying any Society, it likewise debarred them of 
Morning Amusements, which Officers are naturally to expect."  When Gordon claimed
160.WO 71/58, p. 18.
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that these were purely military instructions, his subordinates retorted that his rank 
allowed him much unofficial and tyrannical power over subordinate officers, should 
he choose to exercise it: "a Commanding Officer must be possessed of very little 
ingenuity indeed, who cannot by the tenour of his conduct, make the lives of those 
under him very unpleasant, and yet in his public Orders bear the appearance of 
having only the good of the Service in view.”163
By claiming that military orders were interfering with their social lives, and that 
their right to have a social life took precedence because it was inextricably linked 
with their status as gentlemen, officers cordoned off a great part of their lives from 
the oversight of military authority and the duty of obedience.  In contrast to the 
regulation of enlisted marriages, no one regulated the sexual behavior of officers.  
Visiting brothels, keeping mistresses, and having sex with other men’s wives were all
unregulated by the military law and also by any sort of social disapproval from their 
brother officers—officers openly and unashamedly testified about these activities 
seemingly without any concern that it might harm their reputation amongst their 
peers. 
The testimony given in the trial of Ensign McDermott for the rape of another 
officer’s child in 1773 reveals how nonchalant officers were about their extramarital 
sexual behavior, as well as their general unwillingness to regulate or disapprove of 
each others’ behavior.  A portion of McDermott’s trial for hinged upon whether he 
had previously shown an irresponsible character by visiting a brothel in Ireland when
he was being treated for a venereal disease.  One witness, Captain Craig, reported 
that “About four o'Clock the Morning after they arrived at Cork he met him 
163.WO 71/55, p. 80. Note also Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement; Comprehending the
Tactick, Exercise, Manoevres, and Discipline of the British Infantry, 10, who wrote that the colonel, with
his power to grant or deny leaves of absence, recommend oﬃcers for promotion, or allow oﬃcers to
sell out, "has it frequently in his power to thwart such of his oﬃcers as may have rendered themselves
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[McDermott] in the Street very much in Liquor and afterwards in a Bawdy house.”  
Later that morning, Captain Craig spoke to McDermott about “the great impropriety 
of going to a Bawdy house and laying with a Girl when he knew that he was 
disordered, that he mentioned in very strong terms as strong as he thought he 
could, without affronting him; that Mr. McDermott acknowledged it to be wrong but 
that being in Liquor he could not avoid it.”164  
If there was anything improper in merely visiting the “Bawdy house,” the 
obvious tactic for McDermott at this point would be to ask Craig just exactly what he 
was doing there when he saw him.  Instead, he admitted being there, but claimed 
that Craig misremembered the conversation later that morning, when he reminded 
Craig that he had only been there because Captain Craig himself had asked 
McDermott to show a captain from another regiment “to a Bawdy House.”  And Craig
had asked McDermott specifically because he was known to be acquainted with the 
town “and particularly so with those houses.”  When asked if he could deny this, 
Craig could only testily reply that, “As he has already declared that he was very 
much in liquor he cannot remember particulars.”165  Nowhere was there a suggestion 
that either officer had done anything the least bit shameful by getting drunk in a 
brothel at four o’clock in the morning, one indication of the near-complete 
unwillingness of the officer class to regulate their own sexual behavior.  
Except for the case of Lieutenant McDermott, who was brought before a court-
martial because he was accused of raping an officer’s child, no other officer in this 
period was charged with a sexual crime.  Furthermore, it is important to note that 
even McDermott’s case reveals the primacy of class in the military culture of the 
period: his alleged behavior was considered a serious crime not because the victim 
164.WO 71/79, pp. 77-78.
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was a child, but because the victim was of the upper class, the young daughter of an
officer, and therefore any violation of her was also an insult to her father’s honor.  
Contrast this to the behavior of Ensign Johnstone in Michilimackinac in the 1770s, 
who tried to rape the daughter of a sergeant and never faced any consequences 
more serious than a damning indictment in the fort surgeon’s private diary.166 
Disapproval only ensued when one officer’s sexual behavior infringed on the 
perceived rights of another officer.  The other subalterns of the Queen’s Rangers 
refused to do duty or mess with Lieutenant Nathaniel Fitzpatrick because of “His 
laying with Capt. Murray’s Girl and thro’ her disordering him.”  Murray had kept a 
mistress, Mary Duche, and when the regiment was ordered on an expedition to 
Salem in March 1778, Fitzpatrick had applied to his commander, Colonel Simcoe, “for
leave to remain behind, being incapable of doing his duty from a Violent Venereal 
Disorder.”   Mary Duche had stayed with Fitzpatrick and was under his protection 
while Murray was away on the expedition, but when Murray returned and resumed 
sexual relations with her, he soon discovered that both Mary Duche and himself were
now “disordered.”  This behavior was considered dishonorable because the girl was 
“look’d upon in the Regiment as kept by Captain Murray” and Fitzpatrick himself had 
told another officer that “she belong’d to Captain Murray.”167  
By refusing to be ashamed of their off-duty behavior, or to censure other officers 
for theirs, these officers linked the regulation of the non-military aspects of their 
lives with degradation: they were gentlemen, therefore their private behavior did not
to be regulated and supervised like that of the lower classes.  To regulate an officer’s
behavior was to imply that he needed regulation, and thus was not of gentlemanly 
status.   Captain John Rutherford considered it a grave insult when he was told that 
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he would not be given the money needed to pay the men of his company, unless he 
were actually present with his company and able to pay them immediately: “The 
Articles of War provide ample remedies against embezzlement of Regimental 
Money,” he stated indignantly.  “All ungentlemanlike precautions are therefore 
unnecessary.”  Indeed, putting such precautions in place would “injure the Credit of 
Officers, and place them in a point of view scarcely equal to Journeyman 
Carpenters.”168  Rutherford was suggesting that the very act of regulation was 
dishonorable, and thus was only fit for the lower classes.  
Because officers insisted that it was an insult to regulate their behavior, they 
claimed to have actual private lives and a concurrent right to privacy.  The army’s 
control over enlisted men’s clothing, location, access to alcohol, food choices, pay, 
physical discipline, and hours were all aspects of both military discipline and social 
control.   Thus, officers had great reason to reject this sort of interference in their 
own lives, as it was also an assault on their status.  Therefore, in contrast to enlisted
men, officers’ conception of their own rights included a strong component of privacy. 
They insisted that their own bodies, words, letters, and conversation ought not to be 
“exposed” to public view, because of their class.  For instance, Major Edward Drewe 
protested that the very act of his commander’s public censure of him by prosecuting 
him at a court martial was an outrage, because it denied his status-based right to 
privacy.  While Drewe acknowledged that he had made some minor misdemeanors, 
they were “not of a Nature Sufficient to require less'ning Authority, by Exposing a 
Man of my Rank to the Publick as a Culprit”.169 
The social conventions of gentlemanly behavior required officers to defend each 
others’ privacy. Officers had private conversations and private letters, and exposing 
168.WO 71/55, p. 258.
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them to public view was denounced as an ungentlemanly activity.  Lieutenant George
Quin of the 35th Regiment of Foot was called to account for his behavior at a court 
martial after he was caught standing on a table in the room of another officer, 
Lieutenant Eyre, listening to the conversation taking place in the room above.  When 
Eyre discovered him, he claimed he told Quin “of the great impropriety” of his 
conduct, and Major Chester, who had been one of the group overheard, asserted 
that Quin had wounded the honor of the whole regiment after he had been 
discovered atop a table “for so shameful a purpose as to listen to our 
Conversation.”170  (This case also gives some indication of the comparative 
magnitude of various breaches of conduct in officers’ minds.  At the exact time he 
had been discovered on the table, Quin was supposed to be on guard duty.  But the 
neglect of his duty was clearly seen as an inconsequential side note compared to the 
enormity of his improper behavior in eavesdropping on his fellow officers.) 
Quin’s behavior was so shameful because the “private Conversation” of officers 
was supposed to be inviolate.  Officers refused to reveal information they had 
acquired through this method to the court, and often the court (also comprised of 
officers) agreed about the impropriety of these inquiries.  In the trial of Lieutenant 
Thomas Hardyman, when the parties disagreed about whether certain questions 
about what officers had said to each other in private should be allowed, the court 
declared that they were “of opinion that nothing exposing private Conversation 
should be asked.”171  Lieutenant Glenie, accused of making scandalous and insulting 
remarks about his commanding officer, vigorously protested the accusation, on the 
grounds that anything he had said about his commander had been said in private, 
and furthermore, that people who revealed what a gentleman said in private “must 
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have some mean & self interested Views” in doing so, “or wish to become Promoters 
of Mischief.”  Nothing said in such a conversation ought to be of interest to the court:
“Private Reports of private Conversation, supposing them even to be true, are never 
carried by any Person who has not some or dishonorable Motives for doing so, & are 
seldom, I believe the Subjects of Discussion, before General Court Martials.”172  
When Gordon tried to elicit testimony related to the defendants’ and other 
officers’ opinion of him to support his contention that Wauchope and Higginson had 
conspired to undermine his authority by organizing the officers to shun him, he 
found himself constantly thwarted by the officers, who refused to give any details 
about the various meetings of the dissatisfied officers on the grounds that it was 
private conversation.  Ensign John Lucas was present at a conversation between 
Lieutenant Rowe and Ensign Kirkpatrick which related to Gordon, and both the court 
and Gordon asked him to repeat it.  Lucas replied that he was "exceedingly sorry to 
incurr the displeasure of this Court, but as an Officer and a Gentleman he cannot be 
persuaded to betray private conversation, which has no relation to the Prisoners or 
to the Charge, the Court must therefore excuse him.”173  Major Henry Oglivie, when 
asked if he had any conversation with the defendants about the matter, responded 
that "it was a matter of private opinion only.”174  In the defendants' statement, they 
refused to give detailed public reasons for their behavior, because “there may be a 
thousand reasons for not chusing to associate with a Man in private, which this Court
cannot enquire into, or possibly be informed of, the Tenor of a persons Conduct may 
be sufficiently disagreeable to justify a resolution of [shunning him] and yet those 
172.WO 71/81, p. 196.
173.WO 71/58, p. 47.
174.WO 71/58, p. 64.
80
who form that resolution, may not chuse to point out to a Court Martial all their 
reasons for so doing.”175   
The trial further revealed the social necessity of respecting officers’ privacy as 
Lieutenant Rowe, who had found himself in the middle of the conflict between 
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon and his subordinate officers, became increasingly 
concerned about the other officers’ suspicion that he was a “tale bearer” who had 
violated social convention by alerting Gordon that the officers had held a meeting at 
which they had resolved to shun him.  Rowe wanted to make it clear that it was 
some other person, not him, who had informed the first informed the colonel, for a 
reputation as a tale-bearer made an officer despised among his peers.  
Other officers defended their silence about other officers’ misdeeds by claiming to
detest tattle-tales.  When Colonel Cosmo Gordon suspected that Major Collins knew 
the identity of the officer who had been aspersing his character, he demanded that 
Collins supply the man’s name, but Collins “seeming very uneasy, said it would be a 
very ungracious and disagreeable thing to him, to be oblig’d to be the informer.”176  
Dr. James Barton responded to another officer’s reporting his poor behavior to the 
general calling him “tattling Schoolboy” and castigating him for being willing to “blab 
my Conduct” to the general about Barton’s neglect of sick men in the hospital and 
his alleged medicine-pilfering.177  While the mistakes of the lower ranks were to be 
publicized, corrected, and punished as an example and deterrent to others, exposing 
an officer’s error was seen as illiberal, unjust, and proceeding from sinister motives, 
such as a desire to promote discord in the regiment: “I did refuse to tell my author 
and do still,” Ensign Cole insisted, “as I detest the Name of an Incendiary.”178  When 
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one officer demanded to know of another whether he had reported his neglects to do
his guard duties to the commanding officer, the other replied that it was “never in 
my recollection that I have ever reported an Officer’s mistake in my life.”179 
This was, of course, a privilege reserved exclusively for officers.  In sharp 
contrast to their own prerogatives, officers did not acknowledge that enlisted men 
had any right to keep secrets, or to have any aspect of their lives free from 
interference by officers if the officers thought such interference necessary.  Officers 
took it as a personal affront when they discovered that one enlisted soldier had 
concealed the crime of another enlisted man.180  Military treatises emphasized 
importance of noncommissioned officers reporting the faults of enlisted soldiers and 
not concealing them from officers; in fact, a willingness to inform on one’s fellow 
soldiers often seems to be the primary attribute that qualified a man to be promoted 
to corporal of sergeant, while non-commissioned officers who would "overlook many 
un-soldier-like practices on Guard, or other duties, by way of keeping in favour with 
the men" were to be dismissed immediately. 181  And these non-commissioned-
officers themselves were not free from oversight and correction, for “as [the 
Sergeant Major] has frequent opportunities, of closely attending to the morals and 
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behaviour of the Serjeants and Corporals, he should be quick in discovering their 
faults; and as ready in communicating them.”182
Wauchope and Higginson were on trial not only because they were suspected of 
leading the regiment’s officers in shunning Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, but because 
Gordon insisted that he had a perfect right to issue his unpopular orders regarding 
the regiment’s servants.  Higher-ranking officers and the army administration often 
claimed that officers’ claims of privilege were interfering with the working of the 
military and therefore an officers duty to obey his military superior took precedence 
over these private privileges.  Officers’ privileges could end up interfering with the 
welfare of the regiment as a whole, and this was a constant source of discord.
Officers’ rights regarding servants were an area in which officers’ privileges and 
regimental needs often came into conflict.  As each officer was a gentleman, he 
required the services of a manservant.  But wages and the other costs of keeping as 
servant were not just one more item on the extensive list of an officer’s expenses.  
Rather, this expense fell to the army, because every British officer had, by long-
established custom, the perquisite of requisitioning a private soldier from the ranks 
to employ as his servant.183  Commanders protested that officers’ servants weakened
the regiment by taking able-bodied men out of service in the ranks and away from 
regular duty.  As Captains Wauchhope and Higginson revealed in the course of their 
trial, Gordon’s orders restricting officers from leaving camp before hearing the orders
of the day was not the only source of his unpopularity with his subordinates.  Gordon
"frequently complained...of the Regiment Parading very weak, and 
recommended...some Method by detecting Malingrers [sic], and others who were 
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sculking, that the Regiment might appear stronger.”184  Alas, one of his methods for 
strengthening the regiment was to order the servants who attended and served the 
officers’ mess to attend military parades and training instead of serving the officers’ 
meals.  But denying an officer the use of a servant was an affront.  Gordon’s 
subordinates maintained that he had done it deliberately to “distress” them, as 
Gordon’s orders had disturbed their mess arrangements: Ensign Elliot claimed that 
“the Mess was very near broke up in consequence of that Order," and related that 
one day he “sent for some supper into his own Tent, having a companion there, 
when he received for answer that he could not have any, as there would not be 
enough for Dinner the next day."185  This was because the mess sutler and other 
mess servants, despite being “old Soldiers & perfect in their Exercise,” were refused 
permission to go to several miles to Plymouth to buy supplies, the markets in camp 
not sufficient to “afford provision proper to Mess a Corps of Officers.”186   
After the mid-Georgian reforms of the army, the privilege of requisitioning 
servants from the ranks was one of the few privileges that officers still retained, and 
thus was defended fiercely.  When commanding officers demanded that they give up 
these servants “for the good of the regiment,” officers’ privileges and military service
became set against one another, and officers suspected that commanders’ pleas to 
do their duty in spite of personal inconvenience was just a way to deprive them of 
their privilege and status.187  Furthermore, because of officers’ lack of pay and 
general inability to support a household, the lone servant that came as a perquisite 
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with their commission might have been the only person with whom they were in 
relationship of personal subordination and their last link to any patriarchal status 
deriving from personal authority over a subordinate.  Resisting their commanders’ 
demands regarding servants was a way to protect their gentlemanly status, and 
thus, status and therefore masculinity now became linked with insubordination.  
Gordon’s other main charge also indirectly assaulted his subordinates’ status 
when he accused them of violating military discipline by refusing the show him the 
customary respect and courtesies due to him as their commanding officer.  The 
captains insisted that they had never encouraged any of the officers to show "the 
smallest disrespect" to Gordon, and certainly never "spirited up any other Officer or 
Officers of the Regiment to revolt against the Commanding Officer," nor did they 
"ever sow the Seeds of disunion in the Regiment."  Colonel Gordon (and, ultimately, 
the court-martial board) disagreed, asserting that the officers’ behavior had in fact 
crossed the line into military disrespect.  The regiment’s major, Thomas Baskerville, 
reported that Gordon had complained to him "that some of the Young Officers in 
delivering in their Reports have not done it in the stile he thought they should have 
done it, when delivering a Report to their Commanding Officer.”
Gordon’s primary complaints were hat-related: Ensign Samuel Swinton said that 
when he “gave in his report of the Quarter Guard about three weeks ago, he took of 
[sic] his hat in the most respectful manner to the Lieut. Colonel; as some time was 
taken up in reading the report, and the Lieut. Colonel having put on his hat, the 
Evidence did not stand with his off, but put it on likewise, for which the Lieut. Colonel
reprimanded him."188  Ensign Edmund Tyrewhitt was returning to camp and met 
Gordon "on the road, and passed him without touching his Hat."  A few days later 
188.WO 71/58, p. 37.
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Gordon asked him what he meant by such behavior, "told him if he ever passed him 
again without paying him the Compliment of the Hat, that he would put him in 
Arrest, that he was but a boy, and not to be too consequential.”189  Gordon also 
issued numerous orders relating to proper hat behavior when guards or detachments
marching from one post to another passed the lieutenant colonel, and reprimanding 
various officers whom he thought had not carried out the proper hat courtesies 
towards him.190  
By stressing that the officers were neglecting courtesies due to the military 
officer, rather than to the private gentleman, Gordon attempted to demonstrate that 
their behavior was a violation of military law.  He further claimed that the officers’ 
inadequate attention to these courtesies due him were directly harming the 
regiment.  “[W]hen examples of this nature are daily shown to the Soldiers,” he said,
referring to the officers’ insubordinate hat behavior, the enlisted soldiers followed 
their example, “the effects of which are frequent punishments in the Regiment.”  
Even worse, Gordon complained, these punishments “I am told are constantly 
imputed to me as so many acts of cruelty,” damaging his reputation and his 
authority as the regiment’s lieutenant colonel.  “[I]f instead of forming cabals and 
associations against their Commanding Officer, every Captain of a Company 
attended strictly to his charge in preserving good Order and Discipline, which he is 
bound by every tye of honor and principle to do, punishments would be less 
frequent, I should hear less trouble, and the imputation of cruelty would be taken off
my shoulders.”191  In other words, Gordon was suggesting, the good of the regiment 
required officers to show him properly subordinate behavior.  
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But displaying subordinate behavior did not appeal to junior officers, who thought
that it threatened their high social position as gentlemen, as well as betraying a lack 
of manhood.   Once the army had convincingly linked subordination with 
unmanliness and low social status, the complementary association of insubordination
with masculinity and high social status could not be far behind.  Resistance to orders 
demonstrated spirit, courage, manliness, and independence; obedience was servile, 
passive, feminized, abject, and carried with it the suspicion that it ultimately 
stemmed from fear.  
Here, then, is some explanation for the military manuals’ constant pleas for 
officers’ obedience.  Some even touched upon the problematic unmanliness of 
submission and tried to combat it: “It is a false notion,” Simes wrote, “that 
subordination, and a passive obedience to superiors, is any debasement of a man's 
courage; so far from it, that it is a general remark, that those armies which have 
been subject to the severest discipline, have always performed the greatest 
things.”192
Yet authors seemed to be blind to the status implications of their instructions.  
The system as proposed by military theorists and defended by senior members of 
the military not only put enlisted soldiers in a dependent position, but did the same 
to lower-ranking commissioned officers.  In urging officers to think of their military 
duty first, Cuthberson used particularly unfortunate language in his attempt to 
persuade: Cuthbertson’s ideal corps was modeled on the family, with the commander
in the role of the “fond Parent” and the officers “like obedient Children, sensible of 
his Experience and Judgment, and anxious to oblige.”193  But Cuthbertson did not 
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seem to consider that officers might resent and resist a system that put them in the 
subordinate role of the “obedient Children” of the commander. 
In its ideal form, the patriarchal military hierarchy was presented as a 
harmonious pyramid of increasing authority: the enlisted men were to obey the non-
commissioned officers, who were in turn supposed to obey the company’s subaltern 
officers (ensigns and lieutenants), who obey the captain.  The regiment’s captains 
were to be under the authority of the major and the lieutenant colonel.  Obedience 
was to flow smoothly up the pyramid, and orders were supposed to flow back down. 
But many junior officers found little personal benefit in such a system.  Uncritically 
accepting the legitimacy of their superiors’ authority over them was not only a threat
to their class status and masculinity, but also had the potential to interfere with 
many of the enjoyable aspects of their lives, if a conscientious attention to duty took 
precedence over social outings or gatherings with friends.  And properly playing their
own patriarchal role brought few benefits they valued.194  
In theory, officers’ own authority over enlisted men was supposed to assuage the
resentment they might feel about being subordinate to their own superiors.  In 
practice, however, many officers found their authority over the enlisted to be deeply 
unsatisfying.  This was the alternate side of the regime of constant supervision 
detailed in the previous chapter; the consequence of asserting enlisted men’s 
incompetence and inability to properly feed themselves and manage their money 
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was to demand that their officers spend much of their time supervising and 
inspecting their men.  
Military manuals warned that supervision must be the officer’s constant duty; one
claimed that each time he encountered his men on parade, the officer was to 
“observe, that there are none of the detachment sick, lame, or drunk: that each man
is provided with a loaf, canteen, two flints, sixty rounds, and firelock in good 
order.”195  This supervision and inspection, the manuals warned, were essential to a 
functioning army.  Bland claimed that ensuring that soldiers used their pay to buy 
food and not liquor was “a Duty incumbent on every Officer to be more than ordinary
careful in this Particular, and not to think themselves above looking into these 
Things,” because “when it is neglected, great Numbers” of their soldiers would “fall 
sick and die” from the resulting malnutrition.196  
Because the ideological framework that justified officers’ control over enlisted 
men relied on presenting the enlisted as childlike and incompetent, constant 
supervision and minute observation was considered the only way to regulate their 
behavior.  “Nothing animates soldiers so much as the constant presence of the 
officers, upon all duties,” one author wrote.197  And after time, it was hoped, “the 
Soldiers will soon perceive, that as the smallest omission in point of Dress, cannot 
escape observation, the sooner it becomes satisfactory to the Officers, the happier 
must their time be, when reprimands or punishments are no longer necessary on 
that account.”198  Meanwhile, improper supervision would inevitably “bring the men 
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to disorders and crimes, and consequently to punishment, which would be avoided 
by a proper care of them, and watch upon their conduct.”199
Manuals and orders emphasized that officers were to supervise rather than 
entertain themselves: “An officer upon service, that indulges in a disposition for 
wine, women, for play, will neither gain reputation or honour,” one wrote,200 while 
Colonel Wolfe's instructions for young officers insisted that they were to make 
themselves useful in mundane training tasks, not occupying their time socializing 
until an opportunity for wartime glory presented itself.201 
But in arguing for the importance of these supervisory tasks and more mundane 
aspects of military duty, commanders were contending against a general culture of 
anti-military behavior by the military’s own officers.  The army was seen as a 
fashionable profession for a wealthy young man, one which provided him with ample 
opportunities to wear a splendid uniform, attract the admiration of ladies, and enjoy 
a robust social life of dinners, balls, drinking, and gaming.  An officer stationed near 
the enemy during wartime might be castigated for staying up all night drinking, but 
officers’ late hours were of little concern in other regiments, especially if they were 
stationed in Britain or other areas where enemy attacks were considered vanishingly 
unlikely.  The officers of the Hertfordshire Militia seem to have been regularly out 
dining and playing at cards in local assembly rooms until the early hours of the 
morning without garnering any censure from their commander unless it directly 
interfered with their duties.  This was the fate of Lieutenant George Evans Bruce, 
who was seen one night returning not with the picket guard he had been ordered to 
supervise, "but in a Phaeton [a light, fast carriage often favored by dashing 
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gentlemen] about Breakfast time.”  The commander’s insistence that Bruce be more 
attentive to his duty was apparently found restrictive enough for Bruce to reply with 
a demand to be allowed to resign his commission, claiming that he found his 
commander’s “Rules to be illiberal” and that he consequently found it “impossible…to
comply with your Lordship’s strict Discipline.”202
That a commanding officer insisting that his subordinates do their duty when they
were assigned to do duty could possibly be considered overly “strict Discipline” 
seems strange to modern sensibilities, but the eighteenth-century British army could
be surprisingly lax for officers.  In peacetime, up to half the officers of a regiment 
stationed abroad might be away on leave in more congenial places, usually visiting 
family or friends in Britain, at any one time.203  It was thought unnecessary for the 
whole complement of officers to be present in a peaceable garrison, and duty was 
easy and undemanding for those who remained.  An officer might find himself called 
upon to mount guard or serve as officer of the day perhaps twice a week, and, other 
than an occasional appearance at evening roll call, generally had the rest of the day 
to do as he pleased.204  And there is evidence that even these light duties were 
perceived by officers to be more in the line of suggestions or polite requests from 
their commanding officer rather than non-negotiable orders.  
Anti-military behavior was common, widepread, and unremarkable.  Wolfe, when 
he was the commander of the 20th Regiment in Scotland in 1750, repeatedly scolded
his officers for neglecting to oversee how their men spent their pay, which, he 
claimed, had led to “shameful drunkenness observed among the men, on pay-days 
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in particular,” and reminded them that “there is a standing order in the regiment for 
frequently visiting the quarters and messes.”205  The majority of officers in the 
Gibraltar garrison casually ignored orders that they were to attend the evening 
parade every day throughout the 1770s.206  Stationed at St. Lucia in the West Indies 
in 1780, Major Edward Drewe vowed to never show up to parades unless a general 
officer was there to see him, and once absented himself for several weeks to visit a 
friend stationed on a ship nearby.207  In military garrisons throughout the empire, 
officers sent NCOs to command guards in their place or left their guards a few 
minutes after arriving so they could go drinking, and the repeated pleading orders 
commanders issued for their officers to do their assigned duty and the records of 
courts-martial for neglects of duty make it clear that officers could generally ignore 
the duty roster with no official sanction until those neglects became truly 
egregious.208
Officers defended their claims to gentlemanly status by enforcing sharp contrasts 
between themselves and the men in the ranks.  Officers and enlisted men were 
judged by different standards; identical behavior resulted in different responses 
according to rank.  Whereas a soldier was commonly enlisted for life, and only 
discharged if the army could find no more use for him, an officer could resign his 
commission at any time.  When George Evans Bruce encountered delays when he 
was trying to attempt to resign his over differences of opinion with his commander 
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and found the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland disobliging, he was outraged, asking, “for 
what can be more introductive of Slavery in the Military that the [Lord] Lieut. of a 
County refusing Officially to apply to His Majesty” to release an officer from his 
commission?  Captain William Barry made a similar comparison when he defended 
his right to resign his commission so he could make insulting remarks about his 
commander without any fear of offending military propriety: “I lay it down as a 
Principle, that an Officer in the British Army is not compellable to Continue there 
against his Inclination, and that he has a Right to resign whenever he pleases”; if he 
were compelled to “continue in it for Life…he is no longer a Freeman but a Slave.”209
A private soldier who did not report for duty and who was found more than a mile
away from camp was automatically considered a deserter and might be convicted 
and executed, while an officer who did the same might be charged, at most, with 
being absent without leave.210  Major Drewe left his regiment to visit a friend on 
board ship for weeks at a time, didn’t show up to a court martial he was supposed to
be on the board of, and constantly neglected to appear at regimental parades, but 
when called upon to defend his behavior, he blithely observed that "tho' I miss'd 
some Parades,” they were those “where I had no Command, and was of no 
Consequence,” and claimed that his long shipboard visits were “To relieve my mind 
by Changing the Scene; of Course conceiving some Indulgence due to my Rank.”211   
Officers demonstrated their class status by deliberately flaunting insubordinate 
behavior and displaying their immunity to the rules and regulations that governed 
enlisted men’s behavior.  One humorous guide for officers advised:  
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Whenever you mount guard, invite all your friends to the guard-
room; and not only get drunk yourself, but make your company
drunk also; and then sing, and make as much noise as possible.
This will shew the world the difference between an officer and a
private man; since the latter would be flayed alive for the least
irregularity upon duty.212
Though satirical, this advice was borne out in reality.  Enlisted men were 
frequently confined for drunkenness or bad behavior while drunk, whereas no one 
seemed to care about officers’ drunkenness until it reached truly egregious levels, 
such as when Lieutenant Charles Bernard Warde was tried “for being Drunk at Roll 
Calling and speaking obsencely [sic] on Parade." Warde had come to a parade 
appearing to be “in Liquor,” then “fell into some Wild Discourse with Mr. Sidney the 
Surgeon of the Regiment,” and “among other things talked of a Bolus to cure an 
ulcer in the Leg of a Wench whom he kept, and concluded by saying with an 
Execration that she was a Damned good F__k.”213  Captain Hamilton got drunk and 
stumbled into the enlisted men’s barracks and started beating the men asleep in bed
with his cane, but was never tried or even censured for it; instead an enlisted man 
was tried for resisting his assault.  This was reflective of a larger cultural shift in the 
perception of drunkenness in the eighteenth century, from a universal sin to an act 
which was unfortunate but pardonable when done by the rich, but something to be 
controlled and regulated when done by the poor.214   
The role that insubordination played in establishing upper-class masculinity was 
generally masked in the more serious military works, confined to remarks like those 
of Cuthbertson, who claimed that a regiment marked by disorder and discontent was
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often the fruit of a commander who attempted to enforce his rules “by the most 
severe Austerity, without the least Endeavour to soften the Appearance of it's being 
so, by occasionally throwing in gentle, persuasive Arguments, by which alone, 
Gentlemen (particularly those of British Constitution) are to be governed,” thereby 
obliquely acknowledging that it was a mark of gentility to be insubordinate in the 
face of strictness.215  The status conferred by defiance to orders was openly 
acknowledged in humorous publications: “Evening roll-calling, which drags one from 
the bottle, is a most unmilitary custom: for drinking is as essential a part of an 
officer's duty as fighting.”  If the colonel was so unwise as to “insist on the 
attendance of the officers, they should not fail to get a little mellow first, to shew the
world that they are no milk-sops.”  Of course, this spirited insubordination was a 
particular privilege of the upper class; “if any of the soldiers should presume to 
imitate their example, they must be confined and brought to a court-martial; for 
what is commendable in an officer, may be in the highest degree reprehensible in a 
private man.”216 
By setting up military duty and gentlemanly status in opposition to each other, 
insubordination became linked with high status.  The separation of the public sphere 
of the officer and the private sphere of the gentleman allowed men to assert their 
status by refusing to act properly as officers while often avoiding censure.  It also 
allowed them to uphold their masculinity by only showing obedience in certain very 
circumscribed contexts; they based their claims to status on the idea that their 
behavior did not need to be regulated, so of course they tried to put as much of their
behavior as possible into the non-regulated ‘private’ category.  Furthermore, the 
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ability of insubordination to convey masculinity took on greater importance in the 
army because, in the eighteenth century, older forms of gaining and displaying 
masculine status were losing their potency and becoming more difficult for officers to
obtain as the benefits and privileges associated with manhood accrued in much 
greater proportion to those of high rank and wealth, rather than being available on 
more egalitarian terms and granted with age and marital status.217  
 Examining officers’ perceptions of the relationship between masculinity and 
subordination demonstrates why there was constant tension between officers of 
different ranks.  Senior officers were anxious to exact subordination and junior 
officers were anxious not to give it, and both groups were anxious to characterize 
this behavior in terms favorable to them: those in authority insisted that the 
subordination of the officers under them was nothing more than the “respect” due to 
them, while those primarily asked to obey denounced it as “servility.”218  Even 
Cuthbertson suggested that pleas for officers’ obedience must take into account the 
needs of their status.  Yes, the junior officers ought to cheerfully obey their 
commander, but it was also the commanding officer’s duty to behave with 
“Judgment, Coolness and Affability” to his officers, without which it would be 
impossible for his subordinates to obey him happily.219
Officers made a distinction between the ‘public officer’ and the ‘private 
gentleman’ as a way of trying to reconcile military subordination with their class 
privilege.  But when military duty and private status came into conflict with each 
other, there was a growing perception that it was more important to be a good 
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gentleman than a good officer.  Major Drewe certainly thought so, wanting to publish
the proceedings of his own court martial (in which he was found guilty and 
cashiered) in order to vindicate his character.  In his opinion, he could publish the 
record of his trial without any shame whatsoever, for although the trial showed him 
to be “neglectfull, perhaps in Some of the forms of Service,” his “Character was 
unimpeached in the Essentials,” for it had not been proven that he had ever acted 
unlike a gentleman. 220  Even Lieutenant Colonel Gordon ultimately prevailed by 
arguing that his character as a gentleman was more important than his character as 
an officer.  In the trial of Captains Wauchhope and Higginson, Lieutenant Colonel 
Gordon again and again elicited information that the quarrels his subordinates had 
were with the orders he gave as a military commander only; they had found no fault 
in him in his “character as a gentleman.”  Gordon used this as the foundation of his 
claim that the officers' behavior was unjustifiable because all of them stated that 
they had no problem with him as a private gentleman and that he had not done 
anything ungentlemanlike.  This was a tacit admission that had he not upheld the 
proper character as a gentleman, his subordinates would in fact have had the right 
to shun him and to eject him from the army.   
Officers lived in constant fear of showing an unmanly submission that would 
betray their lack of gentlemanly status and therefore their unfitness for military 
command.  Ironically, one of the most reliable ways to counteract any suspicion that 
they were not autonomous, independent, and masculine was to disobey the orders of
their superiors and position themselves as men who were above the law.  Thus, 
junior officers were increasingly at odds with higher-ranking officers and military 
220.WO 71/55, p. 211.
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administrators who wished to uphold the army’s hierarchy, seeking to undermine the
hierarchy in order to defend their personal claims to masculine status.  
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Chapter 4: The Cult of Courage
The military career of Edward Drewe, a major in the 35th Regiment of Foot until 
he was court-martialed and dismissed from the army in 1780, reads almost as a 
parody of Wolfe’s description of an unsatisfactory officer that opened the previous 
chapter.  Drewe had joined the army as a young man in 1769, and his wealth 
enabled him to rise quickly in ranks, so that he was the major of the 35th Regiment 
by 1779, despite his commanders’ reports of his many “Neglects, and Inattentions” 
to their orders.  Drewe had, in fact, “bravely exposed his person” in battle, having 
led the 35th’s light company at the Battle of Bunker Hill, and he clearly considered 
the wounds he had received there the crowning achievement that would indisputably
and irrevocably “acquire him the character of a good officer.”  However, his career 
ended after he was tried at court-martial by his commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Cockburn, who accused him of a litany of crimes including “frequently Absenting 
himself from the Service of the Regiment for Weeks together,” and “disobedience of 
orders.”  Furthermore, Drewe had indulged in “Repeated Neglects of duty,” the most 
notorious of which was publicly revealing that he had not even lived up to Wolfe’s 
sarcastic standard of “learning a little of the exercise,” but rather had so little 
experience of the manual exercise that he was completely unable to drill the 
battalion.221  
Drewe did not dispute the substance of Cockburn’s accusations.  He had, in fact, 
skipped parades, made extended visits to friends, and stayed in bed late into the 
mornings rather than performing his administrative duties as one of the regiment’s 
field officers.  On the day that Cockburn had demanded that he drill the battalion, 
221.WO 71/55, pp. 197-198.
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Drewe testified, he had in fact declined to do it: “Taken Unawares, Several Strangers
Present, not having seen that Exercise Practiced for above two Years: I excused 
myself,” he said, adding that he could “honestly…Confess that I am no Parade 
Officer.”222 But if Drewe lacked military knowledge, could not properly perform the 
duties of his rank, and was spending most of his days drinking in hovels late at night 
and then lying in bed until noon, then just what qualities in himself did he propose as
justifications for his continued service as an officer?  
Yet Drewe had little problem speaking in his own defence.  His early history in 
the army, he thought, proved his fitness to be an officer beyond all doubts.  He had 
“wished to be Early Distinguished” in his army career, and the opportunity had come 
within two days of the 35th’s arrival in Boston on June 17th, 1775, when the 35th was 
part of the force ordered to attack the fortifications that the rebelling colonists had 
hastily erected on Bunker Hill.  Drewe, who had gained command of the light 
company only the day before, led it into action, with devastating results: ”my 
Company was Cut to Pieces, to six Privates, almost in my Sight.  I received that day,
Three Wounds, two Contusions; and had my Shoulder dislocated.”223  Drewe 
suggested that he may have had his faults in his lack of care and attention to his 
company, his constant absences from parades, and his neglect of the duller 
administrative duties of an officer, but all that was immaterial in the larger scale of 
things, for he undoubtedly possessed the one true absolutely necessary quality for a 
British officer: unmatched physical courage.  In Drewe’s eyes, the events that led to 
his dismissal from the army were completely counteracted by his battlefield valor.224  
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He had shown courage, so his ignorance and inattention to the less important 
aspects of a military career were immaterial.  
Colonel Cockburn saw things differently.  In his reply to Major Drewe’s 
statement, he acknowledged the basic facts of the situation as Drewe had laid them 
out: “The Prisoner did March that Light Infantry Company as their Captain into the 
Field, at Bunker's Hill.  He had the Misfortune there, to be Wounded in the Multitude,
and had the good Fortune, to recover from those Wounds.”  But, Cockburn 
continued, “Did he there display any Judgment, as an Officer!  No.  Does a Wound 
mark the Merit of an Officer? no!  Yet ever Since that day it has been rung in our 
Ears, the Military Atchievements [sic] and Exploits of that Captain Drewe.”  Yes, 
Drewe had in fact been wounded, Cockburn suggested.  He had perhaps even shown 
great physical courage in battle.  But Cockburn ridiculed the idea that all an officer 
needed was courage: “Thank God every British Soldier Possesses true Courage.  
Something more I conceive is required for the Officer.”225  
On the surface, this dispute between Cockburn and Drewe appears to be a 
straightforward conflict about the foundations of military virtue, with Cockburn 
insisting that no man was fit to be an officer if he was not competent at the various 
duties that were an officer’s lot, while Drewe argued for the ultimate primacy of the 
virtue of courage.  But the two men actually represented the two sides of a more 
veiled debate about the proper sources of masculine status for army officers: the 
wealthy Drewe considered his high rank no less than his due because he had money 
and social prominence, while Cockburn had spent many years resenting the 
promotions of younger, well-connected men over his head while he loyally did his 
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101
duty in a remote Florida garrison and consequently thought that age and experience 
ought to be the primary qualifications for high military rank.  
But the two officers also placed these rather self-interested arguments about 
individual rank and status within a framework of concern for the national interest.  
Britain’s various imperial wars of the eighteenth century had frequently stimulated 
anxieties about British martial masculinity; every lost battle had unleashed a new 
round of fretting about whether British soldiers had lost the manly qualities 
necessary for battlefield success.  Cockburn’s insistence that officers be experienced,
dedicated, and knowledgable about the technical aspects of fighting with muskets 
made him the natural ally of commentators such as Major Robert Donkin, who 
argued that Britain’s burgeoning culture of luxury, refinement, and gentlemanly 
politeness was imperiling British masculinity, and, consequently, the nation’s ability 
to wage war effectively.226  Donkin worried that a desire for wealth and pleasure 
rendered a man incapable of waging war and therefore unmasculine, writing that the
“insatiable desire of making money, and that mean dispiriting passion, love of 
pleasure, renders us at times incapable of conducting either a sea or land war!”227  
Drewe, on the other hand, wrote numerous essays claiming that the strictures of 
linear warfare itself were emasculating, and dangerously feminizing the soldiers 
forced to practice it, because they restrained soldiers from exercising the manly 
courage that was fundamental to proper martial masculinity.  Furthermore, he 
claimed, the savage discipline associated with linear warfare threatened the very 
foundations of the state by being inimical to British liberty.  As this chapter shows, 
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the case between Drewe and Cockburn highlighted the tensions that were evident in 
the British army at this time, as it sought to uphold two increasingly contradictory 
goals: the value of courage—which had immense cultural prestige as a key 
masculine virtue in both the military and civilian worlds—and the needs of the British
army itself, which was struggling to adapt to the increasingly technical demands of 
early modern warfare.  
Cockburn’s case against Drewe was a testimony for the importance of officers’ 
behavior off the battlefield.  Any true British soldier, Cockburn had suggested, had 
the ability to show courage in battle.  But the modern British army had need of 
officers who were capable of more than merely braving the enemy’s shots on the 
field of battle: it was their job to ensure that the enlisted soldiers of the regiment 
were well-disciplined, to train the soldiers in the various formations and maneuvers, 
to inspect their clothing, weapons, and food, and many other administrative tasks 
essential to maintaining a functioning infantry regiment.  Thus, Cockburn argued, 
Drewe’s disinterest in these non-combat duties was actively harming the regiment.  
Cockburn blamed the way that promotion and rank were distributed in the army: 
Drewe had achieved a high rank at a young age not because of his exceptional 
military skill, but because of his wealth and connections, which allowed him to 
purchase promotions.  
Describing himself as “the only son of a Gentleman of Family; my Fortune 
independent of a Profession,” Drewe noted that he “did not rise Unexpectedly” to the
rank of major of the 35th Regiment, but that “my Birth, my Indulgent Parents, and 
my liberal Command of Money, entitled me at least to expect this Step.”228  Drewe 
was in the fortunate position of being able to buy high status in the army.  His 
228.WO 71/55, p. 217.
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military career started with his purchase of an ensigncy in the 35th in 1769, and by 
the time the regiment arrived in Ireland in 1773, he had also purchased his 
promotion to lieutenant.  When derided by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn for 
unmilitary behavior rendering him unworthy for promotion, Drewe defended his 
purchases, noting that when he purchased his promotion to captain in 1774, he had 
been recommended for that promotion by Cockburn.229
But Cockburn furiously refuted Drewe’s implication that he gained his promotion 
from any merit whatsoever.  “I perfectly agree,” he stated, “that a liberal Command 
of Money, procured him his present Rank.  That, and that only has.”230  Another 
officer remarked that it was “well known Mr. Drewe gave an Uncommon great Sum 
for his Commission.”231  Although the government had established set prices for 
commissions for various ranks, and made intermittent attempts to enforce them, the
actual prices paid for commissions fluctuated widely depending on the availability of 
commissions, the fashionability of the regiment, the current location of the regiment 
(regiments stationed in or near London commanded a substantial premium over 
those assigned to distant, unhealthy, or unpopular places), and supply and 
demand.232  They might go for far less than the regulation price, or for far more.  
Drewe reportedly paid 4000 guineas (£4200) to be promoted to major of the 35th 
Regiment, a substantial premium over the established price for a majority in a 
regiment of foot, which was only £2600.
229.WO 71/55, p. 212.
230.WO 71/55, 244.
231.WO 71/55, p. 232.
232.Throughout the century, the crown made attempts to regulate the commission trade: to establish a
minimum age, so that commissions could no longer be bought for very young boys; setting minimum
amounts of time to be served at a given rank before the oﬃcer was eligible for promotion, and to
establish fixed prices for each promotion. However, these regulations were not consistently followed;
men with money or influence could generally flout them.
104
Cockburn claimed that he found Drewe to be an inadequate and incompetent 
officer and his recommendation of Drewe for promotion to captain occurred only 
because the peculiarities of the system of promotion by purchase or influence had 
created an unfortunate collision of circumstances that resulted in Cockburn’s 
reluctant acquiescence to the promotion of the wealthy but undeserving Lieutenant 
Drewe: As Cockburn explained, when the 35th was stationed in Ireland in 1773, 
a Succession in the Regiment was Recommended, by the (then)
Lieut. Colonel Allen, from the Majority down; in which Succession
Lieut. Massey…declared himself a Purchaser of the Company; but
on the Commission coming over to Ireland, Mr. Massey, found he
could not raise the money.233  
This situation reflects the complex maneuvers surrounding officers promotions: 
the Regiment’s Lieutenant Colonel, Richard Allen, had a vacancy for the rank of 
major of the regiment.  That rank would be offered to the most senior Captain, if he 
was willing and able to pay the £700 required to purchase that promotion.  If he was
disinclined or impoverished, the offer would pass to the next most senior Captain, 
and so on down until a purchaser was found.  But this promotion would, in turn, 
create a vacant Captaincy in the regiment, and an opportunity for one of the 
lieutenants to be promoted into it.  As related by Cockburn, this opportunity was 
seized upon by Lieutenant Massey, and he secured the promotion to captain.  
But Massey proved to be short of funds when it came time to actually pay for his 
promotion, and asked his commander to use his influence with the Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland “not to Publish those Commissions, for if they had been Published, he would 
of Course been out of the Army, by being Obliged to put up that Company for 
sale.”234  That is, if Massey’s new promotion to captain were made public, Massey 
would owe the government £700 for it, and—not having the money he owed—he 
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would be forced to raise it by selling the Captaincy again right after he obtained it.  
Massey proposed instead that his superiors discreetly ignore his previous request 
and allow him to remain a lieutenant.  
But just as the captain’s promotion to major opened up a spot for one of the 
lieutenants to be promoted to captain, the promotion of Lieutenant Massey had 
allowed for a promotion of one of the regiment’s ensigns to his newly-vacated 
lieutenancy, which then allowed an entirely new man to be commissioned as an 
ensign.  If Massey did not take up his promotion to captain, he would destroy the 
promotion chain for everyone below him.235  Thus, this was not a feasible solution: 
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland had already promised these two promotions to other 
men, and was not about to revoke them and disappoint two officers with important 
political connections merely because Massey was insolvent.  If the 35th wanted to 
keep Massey from having to sell out, the only solution was to find another lieutenant 
in the regiment to purchase the captaincy, at which point the new lieutenant and the 
new ensign could just take the spots opened up by his promotion instead.  
Here the well-heeled Lieutenant Drewe eagerly stepped in to save the situation.  
He had the money, and Cockburn claimed that he was forced to recommend him for 
promotion and did so only to save Massey from being forced out.  He did so with 
much resentment, having observed many “Neglects, and Inattentions” in Drewe’s 
behavior as lieutenant.  But the perquisites of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland gave 
him no choice.  Although having, as Drewe described it, a “liberal Command of 
Money” was the quickest and surest path to promotion regardless of military merit, it
was not the only path.  Contemporary records make numerous references to the role
235.The deeply contingent nature of military promotion was well known at the time; see, for instance, the
example warrant for a promotion in Simes’ Military Medley, which specifies, after the retirement of the
major (“A.”), which senior captain was to succeed to the majority, and followed the promotion chain all
the way down through the ranks to "..and I. Gentleman, to succeed to the said H. as Ensign" (Simes,
The Military Medley, 180.).
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of “interest” in gaining commissions or promotions—that is, their tendency to go to 
people with parliamentary connections, to relatives of peers and people who 
controlled parliamentary seats, and so on.236  These commissions gained from 
“interest” often did not have to be paid for, and the men with the power to issue 
commissions—the Secretary at War, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and the 
Commanders-in-Chief of Britain and North America in wartime—found themselves 
continually deluged with letters from commission-seekers and their patrons.  
Patronage and using one's influence to secure plum positions for one's relatives 
and friends was a normal and acceptable part of a high-ranking officer's duties.  For 
example, in Lord Loudoun’s list of men who were to be provide ensign’s commissions
and why, he noted that some had been of great service to the army in North 
America, others came with recommendations from peers of the realm, and one was 
“A Relation of Mine.”237  A satirical advice manual warned generals not to try too hard
236.An ensign’s commission for a relative was a common favor asked by MPs who were "Friends of the
Government,” and were an especially common source of patronage in Ireland, often to the detriment of
the army (Odintz, 288-292). James Agnew, an oﬃcer stationed in British North America, wrote
numerous letters to his wife reporting on the schemes of other oﬃcers stationed at Halifax to ensure
that their friends and relations would be favored for promotions. One major, he claimed in 1758, was
considering making a winter trip across the Atlantic to London in hopes of using his influence to secure
a "Company without Money" (i.e. a promotion to the rank of Captain without the payment of £700
usually required) for a friend (James Agnew to Mrs. Agnew, Halifax, 6 November 1758, Agnew
Correspondence, Huntington Library, HM 2909). By 1762, with the war in North America winding
down, Agnew himself was claiming that he would leave the army if a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel
was not forthcoming, adding however that his "hopes were never more sanguine than at the present,
for by the late promotions made at home," he was "now the oldest [i.e. most senior] Major in the Army"
(James Agnew to Mrs. Agnew, Quebec, 6 March 1762, Agnew Correspondence, Huntington Library,
HM 2918). Fourteen years later, during Revolutionary War, Agnew triumphantly reported that he had
been appointed Brigadier General by Howe, which put him in far better financial circumstances as well
as putting him in position to dispense patronage of his own: he lamented that their son was not with
him in Canada, for, Agnew reported, "I could have had him appointed my Major of Brigade which is
more than ten shillings a day, & got him a company without purchase" (James Agnew to Mrs. Agnew,
Halifax, 24 April 1776, Agnew Correspondence, Huntington Library, HM 2921).  
237.Odintz, 303, 253-54. Odintz notes, for example, the extreme influence that one colonel of the 8th
regiment, Bigoe Armstrong, exerted in snatching up vacant commissions in that regiment for his
Armstrong relations; at one point nearly a third of the regiment’s oﬃcers were related to him. Captain
Dussaux claimed that Lieutenant Colonel Cane’s accusation and prosecution of him at a court-martial
was done “from Sinister designs” rather than any crime he had committed; because, Cane’s “Son in
Law being the eldest Lieutenant” in the regiment, if Dussaux was convicted and cashiered, Cane’s
relation could be promoted into Dussaux’s vacant captaincy (WO 71/55, p. 17).
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to defeat the enemy, as victory might “put an end to the war, before you have 
provided for your relations and dependents.”238  
Cockburn was hardly alone in denouncing the role that wealth and interest played
in obtaining promotion.  Promotion was hard for men without money or connections, 
often only coming after a wartime casualty necessitated promoting an officer to fill a 
vacancy without requiring any payment from him.  After many years of service, 
these men might be lucky enough to rise to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, but it was
far more likely for them to retire still at the relatively lowly rank of captain.239  
Meanwhile, it was well-known that officers with connections rose quickly though the 
ranks regardless of merit.240  Some satirical instructions to commanders warned 
them not to promote an officer, “however brilliant his merit, unless he be your 
relation...As you probably did not rise to your present distinguished rank by your 
own merit, it cannot reasonably be expected that you should promote others on that 
score.”241  
These older officers with much military experience but who lacked high rank 
inveighed against young, uncommitted officers whose money had bought them 
positions of authority, and the numerous detractors among the authors of popular 
military treatises, who claimed that it weakened the army.  Major Donkin compared 
the current British practice unfavorably to the virtuous Romans, who had demanded 
that all officers choose between “devoting themselves entirely to the service, or 
238.Williamson, Advice to the Oﬃcers of the British Army with Some Hints to the Drummer and Private
Soldier, 9-10.
239.Houlding, Fit for Service : The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795, 106.
240.WO 71/54, 155-176, for an example of the role of patronage as a regular method of obtaining
promotion; despite his thought that Lt. Bird was somewhat neglectful of his duty, Lieutenant Colonel
Bayard was Bird’s “particular friend” who had brought him into the corps, given him his original
commission, introduced him to all his friends, and “seem'd to be very urgent always to further him in
said Corps, and took a very active part for his promotion and Interest, Recommending him for a
Lieutenancy in the last promotions which were sent to Sir William Howe" (p. 171).
241.Williamson, Advice to the Oﬃcers of the British Army with Some Hints to the Drummer and Private
Soldier, 4-5.
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letting them that did their duty, pass over their heads.”242  Donkin was particularly 
incensed by the ability of well-connected officers who stayed in London while their 
regiments were stationed abroad to use their proximity to the sources of power to 
gain promotions at the expense of officers who were actually doing their duty, which 
would have put him in sympathy with Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn.  When Cockburn 
was a mere Captain, he protested the promotions of two other officers in the 
regiment, Captain Sherwood and subsequently Captain Gaul, to the rank of major, 
noting that while he "was struggling with an unhealthy climate at the risque of his 
life to do his Duty" in a Florida garrison, Sherwood and Gaul had "reaped the fruits of
his Labour" by staying home in England, where they were in a prime position to snap
up the vacancies in the regiment.243  Officers proposed various schemes for ensuring 
that the men who were actually doing their duty with regiments stationed abroad 
were not at a disadvantage, such as Major Donkin’s proposal “for all majors prior to 
1773, that are able and willing to purchase lieutenants colonelcy, to give in their 
names in order to be transmitted to the war office, that their pretensions may be 
considered when any promotions by purchase are going on at home.”244
As Cockburn’s further accusations of Drewe indicated, his resentments of the 
officers who had been promoted ahead of him stemmed not only from their literal 
good fortune, but also from what he perceived as their military incompetence and 
lack of professionalism.  Sherwood and Gaul had preferred soft assignments in 
London to the arduous duties of a frontier garrison in a remote outpost of empire.  
Drewe at least showed a willingness to cross the Atlantic and actually join his 
242.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 182.
243.BP 6A/516, James Cockburn Memorial), cited in Odintz, p. 131. It was common for many of a
regiment’s oﬃcers to be away on leaves of absence while it was stationed abroad; Stephen Conway
calculates that,n average, about 40% of a regiment's oﬃcers were absent from the regiment when it
was posted overseas. Conway, "British Army Oﬃcers and the American War for Independence,"
268-269.
244.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 198.
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regiment, but had little interest in the non-combat duties of an officer.  As well as his
various “Inattentions” while a lieutenant, after his promotion to captain, “he often 
neglected, and Disobeyed Orders, in the care of his Company, and Attendance on 
Parades.”245  Drewe’s next promotion to major did not improve his conscientiousness.
Despite written orders obliging "all Officers to attend Parade Morning and Evening,” 
Drewe “very seldom, not for Weeks together made his Appearance on the 
Regimental Parade.”  Lt. Shaw confirmed that he "heard Major Drewe declare, that 
he never would attend a Regimental Parade, unless a General Officer was there.”246   
And on the rare occasions that Drewe actually did attend the parade, Cockburn 
claimed that Drewe made his utter inability to act as a field officer unmistakably 
plain.  The final straw occurred when ”one Evening on the Parade,” Cockburn 
explained, “I did Order him as Major of the Regiment, to put the Regiment thro’ the 
Manual Exercise,”—the regiment’s customary musket drill in which they practiced 
loading, presenting, and firing their weapons.  “The Major's answer to me was, that I
took him then unprepared, and that he was not then Capable of performing it.”  
By allowing commissions and promotions to be purchased, wealthy men could 
obtain military rank without military experience, which, in the opinion of some 
writers, directly affected the fighting ability of the army.  For example, General 
Humphrey Bland praised the sophisticated tactics of armies of the Dutch Republic, 
which he claimed were only possible because of the superior experience of their 
officers, who were promoted by merit, “as the Selling and Buying of Commissions is 
a Traffick…unknown, or at least not allowed of, in the Republick.”247  
245.WO 71/55, 244, 240-41.
246.WO 71/55, pp. 200, 207.
247.Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 146-147.
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More common were complaints that those who expected to be quickly promoted 
to high rank often lacked of knowledge about the more humble aspects of company 
and regimental administration, and were uninterested in gaining it, seeing that 
knowledge as the provenance of poorer men who expected to spend many more 
years as subalterns and captains.  “When noble Birth and high Connections give 
certain Hopes to a young Officer, of his speedily arriving to the Rank of Colonel, he 
may in that case despise the Minutiae of the Service,” Cuthbertson noted 
disapprovingly.248  Cuthbertson claimed his instruction manual detailing the basic 
military duties of an officer “may in a particular manner be useful to those, whose 
Connections hurry them into rank, before they are qualified, by Application, to 
discharge the several Duties of it with Honour."249  
Simes argued that because influence was so much more reliable than merit in 
gaining “Preferment,” fortunate young officers were apt to neglect their duties: 
“Money and powerful Relations will always procure them what they want; they have, 
therefore, no Occasion to apply themselves to the Knowledge of their Duty.”250  And 
it was widely regarded as a commander’s lot to resign himself to “the intrusion of 
interest, too often exerted in favour of very improper persons,” because “when by 
these means, a man is forced upon a Regiment, there is scarcely an immediate 
redress, let his qualifications be ever so improper for the military profession.” All a 
commander could do was to try to make sure that the ensigncies that were within his
power went to men “unexceptionable in every respect,” in order to “guard against 
the mischief” that would surely be forthcoming from the political appointees.251  
248.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
ix.
249.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
ix-x.
250.Simes, The Military Medley, 33.
251.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
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As well as pointing out the negative effects on the service, those without money 
decried the purchase system in the language of outraged masculinity, claiming that 
worthy officers were passed over for promotion and had to bear the humiliation of 
younger, richer men holding higher military rank — and thus authority — over them. 
These men repeatedly used the term “mortification” to refer to this violation of the 
age-based social hierarchy.252  “[W]hich among us without interest…can expect to be 
more than a lieutenant colonel after 40 years service, with probably the mortification
of having seen many younger officers of power and credit skip over out heads in that
period?” asked Major Donkin.253  Captain Alexander Macintosh of the 10th Foot 
complained that "nothing is more mortifying to an old Soldier, than to be 
commanded by a number of young inexperienced Boys (which is often the case in 
our Service)".254  Another wrote of “meritorious Officers” who had the “cruel 
Mortification of seeing themselves commanded by young Men of opulent Families, 
who came much later into the Service, and whose Fortunes have enabled them to 
amuse themselves frequently elsewhere, while the others, continually at Quarters, 
have done the Duty of those Gentlemen, and have learnt their own.”255  
In Cockburn’s eyes, Drewe was the very picture of a young man of opulent family
who indulged in private pleasures while other officers were forced to take up the 
military duties he neglected.  Drewe, as the regiment’s major, ought to have been 
working closely with Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn in administering the regiment and 
issuing orders to the different companies and detachments.  But Cockburn 
1-2.
252.Shepard, "From Anxious Patriarchs to Refined Gentlemen? Manhood in Britain, Circa 1500–1700,"
295, suggests that during this period, class distinctions began to override age as a marker of status for
men.  
253.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 129.
254.WO 1/992, Capt. Alex. Macintosh in Barrington, Boston, 9 January 1776, quoted in Urban, Fusiliers :
The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution, 12.
255.Simes, The Military Medley, 303.
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disapprovingly elicited testimony from his adjutant that he “seldom saw him [Major 
Drewe], tho’ he called at his Tent every day from Ten, Eleven, and Twelve oClock, 
and his received Information from his Servant, that he was then asleep in Bed.”  The
adjutant professed himself “much surprised at his laying in Bed so late,” and could 
think of no acceptable reason for it: "I did not Conceive he laid in Bed from Sickness,
as I have seen him walking Out afterwards."  The cause of Drewe’s late risings soon 
became apparent, as one officer testified, “it was no Wonder it was so, for that he 
had heard that the Major was every night drinking" and another claimed that "Major 
Drewe had been seen night after night, drinking in a hovel, near the Lime Kiln.”  A 
Brigadier General told Cockburn “that he was Obliged a Second time to reprimand 
Major Drewe, for some Misbehavior he heard him Committ in a Hutt, at an 
Unseasonable hour of the night.”  And Lieutenant Shaw’s testimony showed that 
Drewe was keeping rather different hours and had rather different tastes in breakfast
food from the other officers of the regiment: Shaw "went to Robinson's Tavern to get
Breakfast" and was shown to a room in which Major Drewe was still in bed. "After I 
had been some time in the Room,” Shaw continued, “the Major's Servant came in; I 
asked him, if he had not better wake his Master to take some Tea; he Answer'd he 
believed his Master would rather have Grogg.”256
Cockburn’s claim that Drewe’s late hours and constant drinking constituted 
unmilitary behavior were hotly contested by Drewe, who demanded to know 
precisely which of the Articles of War forbade him from consuming alcoholic 
beverages with his breakfast.  As for his late hours, he stated, "I never heard for my 
part, that lying a Bed in the Morning was inconsistent with my Rank.  I thought it the
Privilege of a great Man.”257  
256.WO 71/55, pp. 198-204.
257.WO 71/55, pp. 208, 216, 229-230.
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This refusal to abide by the more sober and dutiful conventions of social 
behavior, however, did not make Drewe as much of an outlier as Cockburn might 
have wished.  Heavy drinking was the norm for most officers, and Drewe’s habit of 
taking part in the opulent privilege of lying in bed all morning was, for the time, an 
astonishingly mild example of an officer’s indulgence in decadent self-gratification.  
Many other officers were notorious for indulging in the whole trinity of luxurious 
vices--drinking, whoring, and gambling.  
The military culture of womanizing was extremely disreputable in North American
civilian eyes because it normalized not just fornication, but also adultery.258  It was 
almost unremarkable for officers to be having affairs with the wives of other officers, 
and this culture of adultery extended to—and perhaps was even more prevalent at—
the highest ranks of the army.259  Generals Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton all had 
mistresses who accompanied them during their North American campaigns, and each
of them was another man’s wife.  These women’s husbands were all lower-ranking 
men who, it was said, had willingly prostituted their own wives in return for lucrative 
government appointments or other favors.  Most notorious in this regard was Howe, 
whose affair with Elizabeth Loring was deeply criticized in the press both in Britain 
and in America.  Her husband, Joshua Loring, was a prominent loyalist whom Howe 
appointed to be the commissary for prisoners of war.260  Perhaps following in Howe’s 
footsteps, Burgoyne’s mistress, whom he took on the Canadian expedition which was
to end in disaster at Saratoga, was also the wife of a commissary.261  Clinton's 
258.Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 118-119.  
259.Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century, 169-170. Stephen
Conway, Military-Civilian Crime and the British Army in North America, 58, notes several more
examples of lower-ranking oﬃcers and their mistresses.
260.Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American
Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, June 11, 2013), 97.
261.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
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mistress, with whom he had five children, was the wife of an enlisted soldier, 
Thomas Baddeley, who seems to have gained an officer’s commission out of the 
affair and was promoted through the ranks to captain before he conveniently died in 
1782.262  Tales of wives of enlisted soldiers furthering their husbands’ careers 
through adultery were prevalent enough for writers to make references to the 
advantages of having “a pretty wife, sister, or daughter” for enlisted men seeking 
promotion to a NCO position, or for sergeants wanting to make the grand leap over 
the class divide into an officer’s commission.263 
British commanders were derided by civilians, especially God-fearing New 
Englanders, not merely because of their mistresses, but because their adulterous 
affairs were perceived as merely one part of a personal life steeped in the indulgence
of luxurious vice.264  Burgoyne was criticized for spending the days before the 
devastating surrender at Saratoga staying up all night carousing with his mistress, 
singing, and drinking.265  Broadsides claimed that Howe spent his days playing cards,
his nights in bed with whores, and all of his waking hours drinking, going so far as to
claim that Howe deliberately delayed engaging the rebels so he could continue to 
enjoy the charms of his mistress.266  But those who criticized high-ranking military 
men for their lives of immoral excess did not cite their need to adhere to the rules 
of the Empire, 146.
262.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 238.
263.Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century:'The Girl I Left Behind Me',
69-70.
264.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 238.
265.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 158.
266.Margaret Stead, "Contemporary Responses in Print to the American Campaigns of the Howe
Brothers," in Britain and America Go to War: The Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America,
1754-1815, ed. Julie Flavell and Stephen Conway (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 132.
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that governed ordinary men’s social behavior.  Rather, they claimed, these 
commanders’ indulgences in luxurious vice was harming the nation’s ability to wage 
war.  Luxury was making these men soft and and unmanly, sapping their appetite for
aggression and attack.   
Members of the military disapproved of lack of aggression and connected it to 
luxurious living; ideas on martial masculinity were heavily influenced by 
contemporary ideas of classical virtue.  In Major Donkin’s view, the Romans were the
quintessential exemplar of a warrior race, not only because of their stringent martial 
discipline, but because they rejected luxury: “fewer things were necessary for their 
sustenance; they were more frugal, their studies and exercises more useful and 
manly than ours.”267  He connected manliness with enduring hardship and rejecting 
luxury, and was also implying a link between luxury and insubordination.  The body 
of officers might not have gone as far as Donkin, but in general they were in 
agreement that too much concern with commerce and comfort were incompatible 
with martial masculinity, proudly enumerating the hardships they had suffered on 
campaign and expressing disdain for those who were too concerned with material 
comforts.  For Donkin, war was the ideal—and indeed the only—antidote to luxurious
vice.  The American war, he argued, provided an opportunity to combat the addiction
to luxury that was crippling the country.  Suffering physical hardship, especially if it 
was done on a military campaign, was a source of pride and masculine status.  
But Drewe rejected the idea that he needed to suffer hardship in order to 
properly prepare himself for the manly art of war.  Rather, he suggested, he had 
already proved his courage and his manhood in battle, and therefore he could 
indulge himself.  Suffering hardships during war not only made men more masculine 
267.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 3-4.
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but also seemed to give men some immunity from the charge that they were 
unmanly for wallowing in luxurious vice when they were wallowing in luxurious vice. 
Drewe clearly seemed to feel that because he had been wounded in battle, he could 
lie in bed all day and drink all night without incurring any deserved censure.  
This was due to the strong association of violence with masculinity, and the role 
that violence played in masculinizing otherwise problematic behavior.  Violence was 
indisputably a masculine act; a man who talked pleasantly in the company of women
and behaved with unfailing politeness might be thought unmanly, but a man who 
killed in battle could then talk pleasantly in the company of women without 
suspicion.  War was a way to reconcile politeness and luxury—which might otherwise
have problematic effeminate connotations—with masculinity.268  Michèle Cohen 
suggests that the concept of chivalry allowed the refashioning of the polite 
gentleman into an indisputably masculine character; exaggerated courtesy and 
veneration of women and other refined behavior to the weak or unfortunate could 
now be cast in this heroic medieval mold.269  However, violently masculine behavior 
was necessary to give such chivalrous behavior the proper tint of honorable 
masculinity rather than of craven effeminacy; a man could behave generously to a 
distressed enemy on the battlefield precisely because his previous violence negated 
claims that his good behavior was motivated from weakness and fear.
Courage, as the source of the soldier’s violent battlefield behavior, was therefore 
the foundation of all military virtue.  By positing courage as the basis for his status 
268.On support for the army and imperial conquest as a way to negate feelings of inadequacy and
unmanliness: John Tosh, "Masculinities in An Industrializing Society: Britain, 1800–1914", Journal of
British Studies 44, no. 2 (2005): 330-342. Also, Kate Haulman, "Fashion and the Culture Wars of
Revolutionary Philadelphia", The William and Mary Quarterly 62, no. 4 (2005): 625-662, on how the
connection between ornamental dress and femininity was often severed if the ornamental dress in
question was a military uniform.
269.Cohen, "’Manners’ Make the Man: Politeness, Chivalry, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1750–
1830," 315.
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as an officer and the heart of the code of military masculinity, Drewe had the 
advantage of advocating for a value that was unassailable.  No commentator could 
possibly propose that courage was a dispensable asset for a military man.  Even 
officers who spent immense time and effort to arguing for the necessity of strict 
military discipline admitted its supremacy.  ”No qualification whatever can supply the
want of courage in a military person,” wrote one such author, in a work otherwise 
devoted to minutely detailing the ways that soldiers ought to show proper military 
subordination.270  
In fact, officers who wanted to argue for the the value of discipline and 
subordination often had to try to hijack the cultural power of courage by insisting 
that the submissive behaviors that they wished to encourage in their subordinates 
were actually proofs of manly courage.  The soldier’s “natural and laudable passion 
for true glory,” one enlisted soldier recalled being told in an officer’s speech, was 
supposed to inspire in him “a sentiment of dignity, which leads to cleanliness, and 
neatness in dress, to abstain from drunkenness and every other abject vice; it 
renders them attentive and diligent on duty, cool and brave in action; on all 
occasions they will be patient, obedient, disinterested, and generous. The 
approbation of their officers will follow, and from thence many indulgencies.”271 Here,
the officer was trying to convince his men to behave in the way officers found ideal, 
by connecting military glory and fame not only to the conventional links with courage
and gallantry, but also the less intuitive attributes of obedience, cleanliness, and 
sobriety.  
270.Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle, 250.
271.Roger Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War From Its
Commencement to the Year 1783 (Dublin: Wilkinson & Courtney, 1809), 224-226.
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This sort of rhetoric was a way to try to link the culturally exalted values of 
masculinity with obedience by proposing a mutual association with courage.  The link
between manliness and courage was longstanding and uncontroversial, and its 
counterpart, the link between cowardice and effeminacy, was deployed as an 
effective way to punish those who avoided battle by forcing them to wear women’s 
clothes and thus taking away their place at the top of the gender hierarchy.272  This 
use of the gender hierarchy to shame men for cowardly behavior can also be seen in 
this order issued by General Wolfe: “If the soldiers of a company discover a maligner
[sic] at any time, or one of those rascals that shun duty and danger, from cowardice 
or effeminacy, they are to inform the non-commissioned officers of the company, 
who is to acquaint the captain of it, that such female characters may be properly 
distinguished.”273  
But Wolfe’s order was also an innovation, because it characterized the refusal to 
work, as well as the refusal to fight, as unmanly cowardice.  This was in keeping with
a larger rhetorical strategy that attempted to associate courage with obedience to 
orders.  “[T]he present method of fighting,” one military writer observed, required 
not physical strength, but obedience; thus courage “has been found to consist more 
in discipline, than in any particular constitution either of mind or body.”274  The 
supposed link between courage and subordination was emphasized by several other 
writers, many of whom referenced Saxe’s contention that “It is a false notion, that 
subordination, and a passive obedience to superiors, is any debasement of a man's 
courage.”275 In fact, Simes added, “so far from it, that it is a general remark, that 
272.Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, 102-103.
273.Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 41.
274.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 2.
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those armies which have been subject to the severest discipline, have always 
performed the greatest things.”276 
But Saxe was quoted so assiduously precisely because the eighteenth-century 
mind would not be persuaded on this point.  Manly courage was demonstrated not by
subordination but by its exact opposite.  Submission to another’s authority could not 
be divorced from the suspicion that it ultimately stemmed from fear, and thus 
obedience could never have an untroubled and uncontested existence as a primary 
value of military masculinity.  They thought, with Dr. Johnson, that “insolence in 
peace is bravery in war,” and so in spite of military men’s pleas that subordination 
was the most fundamental foundation of a functioning army, in the public mind 
courage would ever remain more fundamental still, and in any direct contest 
between the two the cultural power of courage must invariably triumph.277  
Courage, Drewe claimed, was ultimately the only thing a soldier absolutely 
required, far more important than learning about musket drills and maneuvers.  And 
this attitude was a common one.  Many officers reacted with bewilderment to the 
idea that they ought to educate themselves about military matters, learn their 
military duties, and behave with strict adherence to proper military discipline, and, 
indeed, often disdained those with technical military knowledge, such as the army’s 
engineers and artillery officers.278  Bennett Cuthbertson bemoaned the “indolent 
Dispositions” of officers who were unwilling to do the work of properly administering 
a battalion,279 and Thomas Simes and Humphrey Bland admonished officers to 
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remember the need to “apply ourselves to the Study of the military Art,”280 but 
perhaps were not too successful in reforming attitudes towards study.  A satirical 
book of “Advice to the officers of the British Army” claimed that young officers who 
were “advise[d] to learn the manual, the salute, or other parts of the exercise” ought
to reply “that you do not want to be drill-serjeant or corporal--or that you purchased 
your commission, and did not come into the army to be made a machine of.”  
Furthermore, the author advised, “It will also be perfectly useless for you to consult 
any treatises of military discipline, or the regulations of the army.  Dry books of 
tactics are beneath the notice of a man of genius, and it is a known fact, that every 
British officer is inspired with a perfect knowledge of his duty, the moment he gets 
his commission.”281  Perhaps even in reference to Drewe’s case, his “Advice for the 
Major” remarked on the uselessness of learning how to maneuver the battalion, for 
“no other manoeuvres are used upon service, but to march up to the enemy, when 
the battalion feels bold, and to run away, when it is not in a fighting humour.”282  
But Drewe, for his part, mocked those who emphasized turning out a regiment 
with a proper, orderly, military appearance, suggesting that they were fools who 
thought that looks were more important that fighting ability.  He ridiculed the idea 
that the carping of drill sergeants could play any essential role in assuring victory in 
battle. "Do you think...that the field of Blenheim was won by the manoeuvres of its 
general?” he asked sarcastically.  “No; he was entitled to his success by the superior 
polish of his boots…can ye think, that the success of an army depends on the genius 
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Competent Knowledge of the Art: To Which Is Added An Explication of Military Terms, Alphabetically
Digested, 32.
281.Williamson, Advice to the Oﬃcers of the British Army with Some Hints to the Drummer and Private
Soldier, 72.
282.Williamson, Advice to the Oﬃcers of the British Army with Some Hints to the Drummer and Private
Soldier, 44.
121
of its leader? Does it depend on the vigour of its troops? No. On whom does it 
depend but its drill serjeants.”283 
An officer who had too much concern for these matters, Drewe and other officers 
asserted, were betraying an officer’s exalted position as a member of the upper 
class.  They objected to the idea that they should learn the duties of enlisted men, 
on the grounds that this was demeaning to their class position as gentlemen.  
Training the men, they claimed, was for the NCOs and perhaps the adjutant, not a 
task for the commissioned officers.284  In fact, Lambart claimed, when “such minutiae
are dwelt upon by an officer,” it was a threat to the class system as a whole, “by 
serving to level and confound distinctions” between the classes.  In order "to 
preserve a suitable dignity for himself," an officer ought to "leave those littlenesses 
to those below him."285  Drewe went the furthest in mocking officers concerned with 
“the interior oeconomy of a regiment or company.  This concern with “the domestic 
duties of a soldier,” was
supposed to be an object of such consequence, that whole
volumes have been written on it, in which the character of a drum-
major has been delineated with uncommon exactness, and every
possible method of cleaning the accoutrements ascertained with
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the nicest precision; yet notwithstanding this assistance, the task
has been found so arduous, as to employ half the time of many
able officers, who, by the oath, the cane, the aid of courts martial,
and an unremitted attention, have absolutely arrived at the
perfection of settling their weekly pay bill, and bringing their shoes
and firelocks to a tolerable degree of polish.286
 But worrying about these matters of military minutia merely revealed one’s lack 
of status.  “I confess my deficiency in this great branch of my profession,” Drewe 
stated, claiming that this was because he was “born a gentleman, and educated as a 
soldier,” and therefore his “intercourse with mechanics has been but partial.”  In 
fact, he managed to link the neglect of boring military duties with proper upper-class
behavior: “altho' I allow a lance corporal to be of great use in his department, yet I 
have perhaps fondly supposed that a commissioned officer was a superior 
personage, whose dignity must not be prostituted; that he should command the 
troops he is entrusted with, not act simply as the first non-commissioned officer 
amongst them.”287 
But more importantly, Drewe claimed, the strict discipline and control over 
enlisted men that was characteristic of linear warfare was an active threat to the 
nation.  To control each minute aspect of the soldier’s life, to reduce him to the most
wretched submission, to make manifest the officer’s power of life or death over 
him—this was, in the British imagination, the glory or the shame of the Prussian 
system of military discipline.  As Drewe described it, 
The genius of the King of Prussia combines the most minute
attentions to trifles, with the sublimest depth of military tactics;
and he has won victories. But some of our commanders
overlooking, or rather not comprehending, the elevated scale of
war, have fixed all their attention on these trifles, hoping also to
win victories by the assistance of hatters, cordwainers, and
286.Drewe, Military Sketches, 42-43.
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taylors. But this would rather excite the smile of pity, than call for
the scourge of satire. The evil is of a deeper root. Frederick's
rigour is excessive, and his troops are amongst the best in the
world. We have therefore adopted this rigour, in all its force,
judging little of different situations, and still less of that attention
which should be paid to national character.288
The armies of each nation were thought to have a distinct temperament.  The 
French were thought to be in general indisciplined, but superior to all other nations in
art of sieges and fortifications, whereas the Germans (the Prussians in particular) 
were thought to be naturally obedient and pliable. The English were praised for their 
courage and eagerness to enter battle, but they were also thought to be 
undisciplined and insubordinate.289    Rigorous discipline, Drewe argued, might work 
for Frederick’s troops, but it was not suitable to the British character: 
The Prussian armies are chiefly composed of native Germans,
slaves from their birth; and soldiers of fortune, without home or
connexion. Deprived of these social ties, which call forth the finer
feelings of the mind, they are patient, submissive, and indifferent
to all worldly matters. Unaccustomed to lenity or comfort, with
them battle is vacation from punishment, and holds forth the hope
of relief from a painful existence. But far different is the high-born
spirit of the British soldiery. Active from the love of fame, and their
country; for these they risque all the comforts of our genial
government. In general, independent, accustomed to the freedom
of reasoning on the conduct of others, and of judging for
themselves, how impolitic is it to introduce this discipline amongst
them!290
Britons, Drewe argued, naturally possessed a tendency to be liberty-loving and 
courageous, and attempts to impose German methods of discipline merely 
squandered this priceless national asset.  Bland tried to counteract this claim, 
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asserting instead that the English lack of discipline stemmed from officers' neglect, 
not some inherent property of national character.  Although conceding that “It is 
allow'd by all Nations, that the English possess Courage in an eminent Degree,” 
Bland denied that insubordination was an essential part of the British national 
character: 
We have a common Notion, that this Sang Froid, or Obedient
Quality in the Dutch, is owing chiefly to Nature, by their having a
greater Proportion of Phlegm in the Constitution than the English,
by which their Minds are not so soon agitated as ours. But I look
upon this way of Reasoning, to be rather a plausible Excuse for our
own Neglect, in not bringing our Men to the same Perfection of
Discipline, than the Production of any natural Cause in the
Dutch.291
Bland opined that “a natural Love of Independancy…reigns in all Mankind,” and 
that officers must forever be on their guard against it; when troops became used to 
having their own way, it would require “Time, infinite Pains and Severity, to reduce 
them to their proper Obedience.”292  But those who concluded that the English could 
not learn discipline “are certainly mistaken in that, since none are more capable of 
Instruction than the English; and when proper Means are used, neither Patience, nor 
Obedience are wanting in them.”293
But Bland’s view was not widely adopted; instead, most continued to assert that 
it was not possible to bring English troops to the same discipline of a Prussian 
regiment.  Nor was it wise to attempt it, for English indiscipline was the inevitable 
result of English courage.294  Furthermore, they claimed, indiscipline was merely the 
price to paid in a country which placed such emphasis on liberty.  Although the harsh
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methods favored by Frederick the Great became popular among some British 
regiments after the Prussian successes during the Seven Years' War. However, 
commentators generally argued for the unsuitability of German methods for liberty-
loving Englishmen, who would not submissively accept beatings like the downtrodden
wretches of Frederick's armies.295  Drewe himself made a ferocious critique of 
admirers of the Prussian method, denouncing the foolishness of those who focused 
on “trifles” and ended by directly blaming the fad for the majority of the army’s 
problems: it encouraged tyranny; its “uncontrouled oppression” would “sink the 
tender spirit in despondence, or rouse the more active one to revolt”; and it caused 
disharmony among the officer class.  In his view, the army ought to encourage 
spirited, high-minded valor, not an excessive concern with trifling matters like 
properly cocked hats, perfect lines, or exacting obedience to orders.296 
And even more dangerously, Drewe argued, strict disciplinary practices were 
destroying the soldiers’ masculinity.  The focus on soldiers’ dress and the 
overwhelming emphasis on ensuring that they appeared in a proper uniform was 
making soldiers submissive and effeminate.  Modern scholars suggest that the 
soldier's splendid, fashionable, and ornamented uniform led to fears that they had a 
too feminine concern with appearance, but this was not precisely the connection.297  
Military dress did, in fact, threaten masculinity, but not precisely because of 
ornamentation or fashionability.  Rather, military dress was associated with 
subordination, and subordination was unmanly.  The uniform brought fears of 
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emasculation not because it was ornamented, but because it was regimented—the 
man wearing it had to submit his body to it.  This link was understood at the time; 
the same regiments that were renowned for their strict discipline were also the ones 
most admired for their military appearance.  Military commanders’ mania for all 
things Prussian in the wake of Frederick’s victories extended not only to desires for 
the unquestioning obedience reputed to be the hallmark of Frederick’s troops, but 
also a wish to turn out their regiments in the neat, orderly style of a Prussian 
regiment.298
This connection between military dress and an unnatural subordination was 
understood by both Cuthbertson, who emphasized its importance, and by Drewe, 
who denounced it.  Cuthbertson claimed that the dress of a battalion was important 
for establishing its reputation: “it is often suspected, that a slovenly and irregular 
method of dressing, bespeaks a drunken, unregarded Battalion.”299  Furthermore, he 
noted the importance of dress for forming a soldiers' character and bringing him to 
the requisite subordination: “When once a Soldier can be brought to take a delight in
his Dress, it will be easy to mould him to whatever else may be desired, as it is in 
general a proof, that he has thrown off the sullen, stubborn disposition which 
characterizes the peasants of most countries.”300  
The willingness to delight in dress was the willingness to submit to authority.  For
Cuthbertson, then, particularly concerned with reforming the British army on proper 
Prussian-style lines, controlling the minute aspects of a soldier’s appearance was 
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integral for establishing the necessary military discipline.  Drewe, on the side of 
proper masculine insubordination, claimed that a concern with appearance made 
soldiers unmanly.  In a letter to an editor which Drewe wrote in the guise of an old 
soldier who had fought with Wolfe upon the Plains of Abraham, who was now sadly 
confronted with the pernicious new fashion of the military, he wrote, “I live in a 
town, Sir, where a body of troops are quartered; they have what is called a Macaroni
colonel; of course all his soldiers are macaronies. When this regiment parades, the 
men are so curtailed in their cloaths, that they appear like a set of trimmed game 
cocks.”301
For Drewe, the limited movement allowed by tightly tailored uniforms made the 
man who wore it “ridiculous,” and “a man turned into a monkey.”  The problem with 
military dress was that it prevented proper manly violence; it was suitable only for 
the drill-sergeant-style uniform firing, not the dashing, aggressive, personal violence 
proper to a man.  In another fanciful writing imagining a confrontation between the 
300 Spartans of Thermopylae and a British regiment following the new system, he 
described the dress and fighting methods of the latter as so emasculating that a 
proper army would be dishonored by fighting them: 
Each figure was screwed into a jacket of such excessive tightness
that not a sinew had room to play, and the whole body resembled
much the form of a trussed rabbit...its head was loaded with a
quantity of flour, and dragged back upon its shoulders by the
weight of an enormous queue made of sheep's wool, and on the
head was perched a hat which seemed to be the manufacture of
Lilliput...there strode out from the ranks a form clad nearly in the
same vestment, but whose shoulders were so broad, and whose
face was so terrific, that I doubted not his being the champion of
the army, who had advanced to defy the boldest Spartan to
combat. He appeared conscious of his superior strength, since he
had no other arms, than a small rattan in his hand…[He]
301.Drewe, Military Sketches, 63.
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pronounced [the commands] in a shrill and delicate voice…After
which he strode back, and again sheltered himself amidst the
ranks.…[T]wo orderly corporals rushing from the ranks, armed
with hair brushes, began dusting of coats, settling of hats,
straitening of queues....Now had the Spartan phalanx reached the
opposing foes...and to all appearance would have entirely routed
them...when, wonderful to relate! I beheld them face to the right
about, and, marching back, take their way to Sparta, leaving the
pass undefended....I was thunder struck, that Leonidas, who had
so bravely opposed the united powers of Asia, should tamely give
up so important a pass to an army that scarce seemed women. I
thought in my dream that I saw him march off with shame and
indignation in his countenance, and I determined to enquire the
reason: he gloomily replied, the spears of my Spartans have been
embrued in the blood of men, and shall not be stained with that of
monkies.302
Military dress did have a level of ornamentation that could be perceived as 
suspiciously feminine, but those associations ought to have been wholly nullified by 
the uncontestly masculine acts of battlefield violence that soldiers performed.  But, 
as this passage by Drewe suggests, the emphasis on tactics that required soldiers to 
robotically follow the instructions of drill sergeants (who, in Drewe’s account, were 
also derided for giving the commands of war in “shrill and delicate” voices), as well 
as the increasing confinement required by the new military uniforms, did not allow 
soldiers to perform proper violent masculinity.  Their tactics did not allow it, and 
even if the tactics were dispensed with, the clothes they wore was too confining to 
wield swords and attack the enemy directly.  And furthermore, the desire to exercise
masculine violence must have been utterly trained out of an army that displayed 
such a feminine concern with making a neat and ornamental appearance—why, to 
rush upon the enemy ranks, sword in hand, and deliver glorious death might result 
in some dirt settling upon their coats, or set their hats askew, or disarrange their 
hair!  
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Drewe bemoaned this current effeminate trend, which made soldiers unworthy to
be the successors of the men who had fought at the great British victories of the 
Seven Years’ War at Blenheim, Minden, and Quebec: “Where is now the manly look, 
the vigorous form, that iron body which alike defied the deadly engines of the foe, 
and the bitterest inclemency of heaven? Alas, they are fled to the Russian or the 
Turk. In Britain they are found no more. Hence then ye less than women in the form 
of men. Resign the sacred name of soldier.”303  For Drewe, these changes in military 
dress and tactics so feminized soldiers that they would find it impossible to exercise 
proper martial, masculine courage, which he considered the fundamental basis of all 
military virtue.  
Even those who wanted to insist on the absolute necessity of obedience in a 
military context had to contend with the adoration of courage.  Military authors 
conceded that disobedience of orders that proceeded from rashness and eagerness 
for battle was “more excusable than the other [disobedience from cowardice], 
though the Consequences may prove as fatal, since it proceeds from a mistaken 
Zeal; but the other from a want of Courage.”304  When strict military duty clashed 
against manly courage, at the highest levels of government, in the opinions of the 
men most concerned with maintained discipline and subordination in the officer corps
as well as the army as a whole, military duty won, but only very reluctantly.   It was 
difficult to believe that a man who had shown conspicuous courage could be wholly 
wicked.  Having shown courage in battle, or, even better, having been wounded in 
action, had great value for enlisted men as well as officers.  Private Thomas Bartley 
of the 47th had been convicted of desertion in New York in 1779, a crime that carried 
a death sentence, but upon an officer’s testimony that he had previously “behaved 
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very bravely in action” and “been wounded, once or twice,” the court took notice of 
these “favourable circumstances” and chose to “recommend him as an object of 
mercy.”305
Drewe received some similar consideration.  When Drewe’s court-martial 
proceedings were forwarded on to London for review by the Judge Advocate General,
Charles Gould, they came with a note from the commander in the West Indies, 
General Vaughan, cataloging “several circumstances…favourable to Major Drewe.”  
Gould then related these circumstances to the king, who wanted further details of 
the proceedings.  He had then “taken into his Royal Consideration the several 
Matters produced in Evidence, wishing to have discovered some ground for a 
Mitigation of the Sentence.”  Alas, Drewe’s behavior had been proved beyond a 
doubt to be unmilitary and unprofessional and the king could not continue to allow 
him to serve because it was “indispensably necessary, in point of Example and for 
the inforcing of a Strict observance of discipline,” to dismiss him.  Yet the king came 
to his decision only “with much regret, having been informed of [Drewe’s] Spirited 
behaviour and the wounds sustained by him in the Service of his Country” at Bunker 
Hill.  Furthermore, the king wished to have it known that he remained convinced 
that, whatever failures Drewe had displayed as a military officer, he still retained an 
“unimpeached Character as a Gentleman.”306  
So Drewe was dismissed, but he retained the moral high ground, in great part 
because the cult of courage was associated with the aristocracy; it was more 
naturally theirs than the mechanized ways of linear warfare.307  This suggests 
another important point: in Britain, the methods and practices of linear warfare were
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not compatible with the values and ideals of martial masculinity.  Officers longed for 
what they imagined were the epic days of medieval combat—aristocratic, chivalrous, 
and glorious, with ample opportunities for individuals to distinguish themselves in 
combat by performing dashing feats of sword-fighting.308  The realities of linear 
warfare, which, when properly executed, allowed an infantry officer no opportunity at
all for engaging in personal violence, were not at all to their taste. (If the battle 
proceeded perfectly, an officer would never come into contact with enemy forces, 
and would do no more to inflict damage upon them than wave his sword as a signal 
for his men to fire their muskets.)   
And in their resistance to the orderly and disciplined ways of linear warfare, men 
like Drewe promoted a vision of martial masculinity that was actually increasingly 
separate from the practice of war itself.  In his criticism of linear warfare, Drewe 
made the interesting suggestion that the well-regulated battlefield was no longer the
prime place make a display of conspicuous masculine courage, and that battle might 
no longer serve as adequate public proof of the masculine qualities necessary for a 
military man.  This idea, combined with the perception (discussed in the previous 
chapter) that officers’ private lives were separate from and unregulatable by the 
military hierarchy, led to a military culture in which the private realm of officers’ 
personal honor became the primary arena for establishing and defending masculine 
status.  But like the realm of the battlefield, the most important method for gaining 
honor and status remained the exercise of violence.  
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Chapter 5: No Retreat
 Lieutenant Hugh Campbell of the 35th Regiment, on trial in 1783 for the murder 
of Lieutenant Boyle of the 27th Regiment of Foot, described “The Melancholy 
circumstances that closed a Friendship of long standing” between himself and the 
deceased: Campbell, Boyle, and a few other officers from the several regiments 
stationed in St. Lucia had gone on a pleasure outing, one part of which involved a 
recreational journey by canoe.  Whilst in the canoe, Campbell “told the deceased, 
who steer'd, (in a Jocular manner without the most distant idea of giving him 
Offence) that he knew not how to Steer and that he swayed the Canoe from one side
to the other.”  Boyle responded “in a very serious tone, 'don't be a boy’” and “in a 
very aggravating and impolite tone, said, I was a Blockhead.  I then, vexed at his 
reply, told him he was a Fool and told him he shou'd make choice of better Language
when he wished to express himself."309   
When the party reached the shore, Boyle demanded to know how the two of 
them would make up the quarrel—that is, inquiring whether Campbell was prepared 
to issue an apology for his insulting remarks, or whether the two men would have to 
fight a duel.  As Campbell related it, the two other officers in the party "then 
interfered, and endeavoured to make up the difference between us, saying it was 
Nonsense for Friends to Quarrell about so trifling a matter.”  Both Boyle and 
Campbell reaffirmed their friendship with each other: “the Deceased then said 
Campbell is the last Man in the World I would wish to quarrel with, I then said Mr. 
Boyle is the last Man I would quarrel with.”  But, added Campbell, “as I am conscious
of having given no Offence I can make no Apology,” and Boyle “in an outrageous 
309.WO 71/97, pp. 67-68.
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manner said I had injured him, and that I must fight him to which I replied I will as 
you desire it, the deceased then proposed as I was better acquainted in the Town 
than him, I should endeavour to borrow Weapons."  
Despite many attempts by Campbell to reconcile with Boyle, the duel took place 
the following morning, and Campbell shot and killed Boyle.  No one disputed this 
fact.  Campbell admitted to fatally shooting Boyle.  But he by no means considered 
himself guilty of murder.  “I find myself unfortunate, and unhappy, when I reflect 
upon the event, but it is not the unhappiness attendant on guilt,” he told the court.  
He had “not been the Aggressor,” he said, and so “I feel myself acquitted, in my own
breast of having acted wrong.”  But most importantly, he claimed, no guilt could be 
attached to him because he had no choice in the matter: “[T]he disagreeable affair I 
have been engaged in, was unavoidable—unless I could submit to be stigmatized a 
Coward.”310  
And, in the eyes of the officers of the British army, Campbell’s behavior was 
proper and justified.  They did not consider it morally wrong to kill rather than be 
branded a coward.  As the previous chapter showed, courageous violence on the 
battlefield was a marker of masculinity, and a very appealing one for military men.  
But its inevitable corollary was the extreme stigmatization of cowardice.  An officer 
could not allow the slightest imputation of cowardice to go unchallenged.  (In fact, a 
lack of reaction to an accusation of cowardice was itself taken as evidence of 
cowardice—proof that the man was too frightened to take action to defend his 
reputation.)  This led, as this chapter shows, to a military culture in which quarrels 
and duels were endemic, because officers had no way to honorably retreat from 
conflicts with other officers.  Too frequently, a conspicuous and often deadly act of 
310.WO 71/97, p. 80. 
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violence was required to defend one’s reputation as a man of courage and to 
preserve one’s honor.  
Boyle and Campbell’s trivial quarrel over canoeing skills escalated to a fatal duel 
because, as Campbell’s testimony implies, both parties thought they had been 
insulted and deserved an apology, and neither party thought they could apologize to 
the other without incurring shame.  In the final attempts at mediation before the 
duel occurred, the officer acting as Boyle’s second reported that Boyle claimed that 
"no Apology should be sufficient, except a very abject one, made before the 
Gentlemen and the Drummer who were in the Canoe."311  And this “abject” and semi-
public apology was precisely what Campbell could not honorably do in the hours 
before a scheduled duel.  To apologize before dueling, even if one was clearly in the 
wrong, might be taken as a sign of cowardice—it might be taken to mean that one 
had only apologized because one was afraid to hazard one's life in a duel. One could 
apologize, of course, after the duel had concluded.312  
Mutual friends of the disputing officers often had the role of trying to determine 
on what the terms the two would apologize to each other.  Demands that public 
offense be paired with public apology, similar to Boyle’s contention that he would 
only accept Campbell’s apology if it was made before all those who had been present
in the canoe, were common.  To take another example, when Ensign Townshend laid
out his apology requirements in a letter to his commander, he claimed that "As the 
insult offer'd to me by Mr. Haines was of the most public nature, if he will in the 
most Publick manner beg my pardon for it; On having done so, I am ready to 
311.WO 71/97, p. 74.
312.Robert B Shoemaker, "The Taming of the Duel: Masculinity, Honour and Ritual Violence in London,
1660-1800", The Historical Journal 45, no. 3 (2002): 525-545; Stephen Banks, A Polite Exchange of
Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850 (Woodbridge, Suﬀolk: Boydell Press, 2010),
132.
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acknowledge that I mistook his intentions.”313  Townshend’s letter also alludes to 
another aspect of the negotiation over what types of apology were proper and did 
not show any unmanly submission: the careful distinction between an 
acknowledgment of fault, and begging pardon.  After Lieutenant Anthony Allaire and 
Ensign Robert Keating got into a fight one evening after they had both been drinking,
the other officers of the regiment tried to reconcile them, but although Allaire was 
willing to “acknowledge his fault to Mr. Keating,” he “would not beg his Pardon as it 
happened at a Drunken Frolick.”  Only if the concessions made by each party were 
strictly equivalent would he agree to more: “as it was my Opinion that the fault was 
equal on both sides, I could never think of asking his Pardon singularly; This I'll 
agree to that as Mr. Keating and I have both been in the wrong we'll ask Pardon 
(reciprocally).”314  Alliare was making a further distinction with this proposal of a 
negotiated, mutual, simultaneous exchange of apologies, more likely to be 
considered honorable than the suspicious and unmanly unilateral offer of an apology.
One officer even had to defend the terms on which he had apologized: “I did not 
think it unbecoming my Character to confess myself sorry for any Improprieties I 
might have Committed, and therefore made an Apology to Captain Holms with which
he was satisfied. But this I did in such Terms as became me, and he was intitled to, 
and not in abject or disagreeable ones.”315
Campbell’s defense suggested that he desperately wanted to reconcile with his 
friend, but had no way to do so while retaining his own honor.316  He was ultimately 
313.WO 71/54, p. 395; see also WO 71/60, p. 399, for a second’s report that the quarrel between two
oﬃcers “would not be made up unless Captain Townshend would make a public apology to Mr.
McKenzie on the place where he had aﬀronted him.”
314.WO 71/93, 287-311.
315.WO 71/97, pp. 1-8.
316.Banks, "Killing with Courtesy: The English Duelist, 1785–1845," 552, notes that honor codes made it
diﬃcult to reconcile without dueling.
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acquitted, possibly because he was able to document his numerous attempts to 
make peace with Boyle through the mediation of other officers.  He and Boyle had 
agreed to duel at 6 a.m. on March 22, 1783, but the night before, Campbell had sat 
up until 1 a.m. waiting for the visit of another officer, a mutual friend, "expecting by 
his assistance to have settled the difference without coming to the extremities 
proposed by the deceased.”  Alas, Campbell reported, “in this expectation I was 
unfortunately disappointed," and so in the morning, Campbell and his second went to
Boyle’s quarters, “where we were confident in finding him in Bed and settling the 
dispute in an amicable manner,” but found that Boyle had already left to go to the 
appointed dueling grounds.  Upon hearing this, Campbell and his friend thought that 
they “had then no alternative left, but to follow them, which we did, without 
Weapons, still hoping to settle the matter without coming to extremities."  But when 
they met Boyle at the agreed place, he refused to reconcile, and preferred to lend 
Campbell one of his own pistols instead of delaying the duel any longer, and the duel
occurred, leading to Boyle's wounding and subsequent death.  
Note again Campbell’s defense: he had no other options; he did not desire the 
duel, but he had to fight it—the choice ultimately came down to killing his friend over
an argument about how to paddle a canoe, or being “stigmatized a Coward” 
forevermore, and he chose the only honorable course.317  In the perception of the 
general public, this behavior was ridiculous but hardly unexpected for a military man.
In the popular culture of the eighteenth century, army officers were notorious for 
dueling, especially over relatively trivial incidents that nevertheless managed to 
offend their touchy honor.318  And the army’s court-martial proceedings confirm this 
317.WO 71/97, p. 80.
318.Shoemaker, "The Taming of the Duel: Masculinity, Honour and Ritual Violence in London, 1660-1800,"
540, finds that a third of the duels that took place in Britain before 1774 were fought by military
oﬃcers, and 44 percent of the duels from 1775-1800. Banks, "Killing with Courtesy: The English
Duelist, 1785–1845," 532, finds that duels were unequivocally linked with the military in the age of the
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view, recording innumerable duels, fights, quarrels, and other outbreaks of violence 
among officers, quite often for rather minor reasons—duels that started over such 
incidents as one officer presuming to give another advice on how best to strike the 
balls during a game of billiards, or Ensign Gaskell and Lieutenant Dalrymple’s fight, 
in which swords were drawn, which stemmed from a dispute the officers had over 
which of them was handsomer, who was more educated, and which man most 
resembled the regiment’s dog.319  
The clear threat that honor culture presented to the military hierarchy (because 
officers perceived some insult in their commander’s orders, and demanded to duel), 
and the very fact that these altercations were recorded and preserved because 
officers were prosecuted for indulging in them, might lead to an expectation that 
military authorities made serious attempts to suppress the practice of dueling among
officers and reform the duel’s inevitable precursor—the military culture of extreme 
sensitivity to matters of honor.320  Yet even the authors who most emphasized the 
importance of officers’ subordination to their superiors endorsed the importance of 
honor and the need to preserve it at all costs.  “I don't pretend to say, that one 
Napoleonic wars: most duels were provoked by military quarrels and the participants were military
oﬃcers. Furthermore, there was "a very close correlation between the distribution of fleets and
garrisons around the country and the incidence of dueling." 
319.Gaskell and Dalrymple, WO 71/77, pp. 107-117. WO 71/66, 136-146, for duel provoked by one oﬃcer
giving another advice on playing billiards; WO 71/91, pp. 412–427, another case that started as a
billiard-room quarrel; WO71/76, pp. 11-21, for a fight that began over a card game. WO 71/83,
309-331: Lieutenant Peter Augustus Taylor and Captain Job Williams of the Queen’s American
Rangers got into a violent quarrel (which led to Taylor’s death) about whether the tablecloths in the
oﬃcers’ mess had been “plundered” by Taylor, or sent to him by his mother. However, trivial incidents
that escalated into violent conflicts and even death were not confined to oﬃcers; for example John
Cameron and Edward Yeats, both enlisted men of the Royal Artillery, got into a fight (which led to
Yeats’ death) that started in a dispute about the proper way to spell the word "Spain." Minorca, 1769,
WO 71/77, pp. 222-225.
320.See Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 225, on the
practical diﬃculties of exercising military authority without oﬀending honor.
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should tamely suffer an Affront,” Simes remarked.  “No! A Gentleman should defend 
his Honour, and rather lose his Life than bear an Insult or Spot on his Reputation.”321
Honor was thought to be particularly fragile and easily tarnished.  Cuthbertson 
claimed that the best officers were “of so refined a composition, that the small stain 
is never to be erazed.”322  Donkin compared honor to “the eye, which can't suffer the 
least moat [sic] in it, without being blemished! Honor may be called a precious 
stone, which the smallest speck makes less valuable! it is a treasure irrecoverable 
when once unfortunately lost!”323  Furthermore, Donkin claimed, life had no value if 
honor was lost.  
Honor was more important than life, worth dying for, and worth killing for.  
“[W]hy should he be acquitted who kills in defence of life, yet he condemned, who 
kills in defence of his dearer reputation?” one officer asked.324  Campbell appealed to 
the court’s “just sense of the dearness of an Officer's reputation, and the delicacy of 
his honor,” and was acquitted, suggesting officers’ general agreement on this 
point.325  Thus, opponents of dueling had the difficult task of attempting to separate 
the duel from the demands of honor, which could not be gainsaid.  But this is not to 
say that the practice of dueling reigned unopposed in the military.  As Campbell’s 
own testimony suggests, officers did in fact recognize and lament the high costs of a 
dueling culture.  
It was common for officers to express regret for a duel, and condemn those of 
quarrelsome temperaments who dueled frequently or goaded others to duel, but 
these men cannot be properly categorized as opponents to dueling.  They were not 
321.Simes, The Military Medley, 296.
322.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
2.
323.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 202.
324.Drewe, Military Sketches, 40-41.
325.WO 71/97, 80.
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exactly in favor of dueling, but the most accurate way to describe them is anti-anti-
dueling; to them, pro-dueling sentiment was dangerous to good order, the 
brotherhood of officers, and life itself, but anti-dueling sentiment was more 
pernicious still, for it threatened honor.  In this vein, Donkin suggested that 
abolishing the duel could come about only if men became so craven as to fear death,
and so insensitive to the claims of honor that fear of some other, lesser social 
sanction could override it.  Until that unhappy day came to pass, Donkin wrote, 
ending dueling was impossible for purely pragmatic reasons: “The extinction of 
dueling is become impracticable! for what penalties can intimidate men superior to 
the fear of death? or stigmatize what honor approves?”326  
Donkin insisted that the price to be paid for officers’ collective honor was a fair 
one: “Was a computation to be made of all that have fallen in duels for a series of 
years, the inconsiderableness of the number wou'd but ill justify the extravagant 
clamour against them.”327  But even officers who were horrified at the wasteful 
violence of the duel felt a profound ambivalence about dueling.  It led, as in the case
of Campbell and Boyle, to good friends killing each other over a trivial argument over
how to paddle a canoe, but officers refused to consider the dueling a fundamentally 
immoral act.  Some officers went so far as to concede that a man who deliberately 
provoked duels was akin to a murderer, but all recognized the necessary role that 
the duel played in safeguarding reputation and restoring honor.  
In fact, the role of violence in establishing, maintaining, and damaging masculine
status and reputation, combined with officers’ preoccupation with upholding their 
class position within the military hierarchy, made the duel a necessary part of 
military life, and is an explanation for why it could not be eradicated.  Linking honor 
326.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 200.
327.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 200.
140
with the ability to perceive insult led to the belief that the most honorable men were 
those who were insulted even by small and accidental slights.328  But protecting one’s
honor was an assertion not only of one’s masculinity, but also a marker of class.  
Gentlemen could not be expected to put up with insults or abuse, and that very 
unwillingness to put up with insult or abuse was a way of asserting gentlemanly 
status in an era when the definition of who was a gentleman was becoming more and
more vague.329  These sentiments were echoed in the words of one officer, who 
insisted that if he didn’t “demand the Satisfaction of a Gentleman,” he was 
“unworthy of the Rank of an Officer.”330  Dueling was so prevalent not because 
officers were too prideful and irrationally concerned with minor points of honor, but 
because the culture of military masculinity had left them with no alternative but to 
be (rationally) concerned with minor points of honor if they wanted to defend their 
class status, upon which their military authority ultimately rested.  
Furthermore, dueling was not only the result of honor culture, but also enforced 
it; the prevalence of dueling had the pernicious side effect of destroying officers’ 
ability to retreat honorably from a conflict.  An apology could be construed as 
cowardice, the desire to avoid the hazard of the duel.  Engaging in violence, on the 
other hand, established one’s masculinity and honor.  
The stereotypical perception of dueling as an expression of chivalry and concern 
for women has little basis in fact.  It was threats to specifically masculine status that 
provoked violence and duels, and protecting women’s interests was only incidental.  
Duels that started over women did not stem from the chivalrous defense of a woman
in distress, but only the distress of (or, for that matter, the negligible 
328.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 6.
329.Robert Shoemaker, "Male Honour and the Decline of Public Violence in Eighteenth-Century London",
Social History 26, no. 2 (2001): 190-208.
330.WO 71/91, 97-112.
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inconveniencing of) a woman over whom a man had a proprietary interest—because 
his honor was diminished if he publicly demonstrated that he could not protect her 
interests.331  When Ensign George Hume beat George Terry with a cane in a Gibraltar
bathhouse in 1770 for insulting Ann Wentworth, he acted not out of a disinterested 
concern for Wentworth, but because she was a visitor from Ireland and explicitly 
under Hume’s “protection.”332   The 1782 duel between Captain Townshend and 
Ensign McKenzie in Jamaica may at first appear to have been caused from the 
chivalrous motivations common to romantic fiction—Townshend had objected when 
McKenzie had thrown a bottle that struck a black woman—but a closer examination 
of the case reveals that the duel was fought not in the cause of the protection of a 
woman, but for the honor of a man.  The woman had seized one end of Townshend’s
walking stick, and he had been struggling with her to regain control of it when the 
bottle struck her.  But the deadly insult in this quarrel came not from the fact that 
McKenzie had thrown the bottle at a woman, but that Townshend asked McKenzie to 
declare upon his word of honor that he didn't throw the bottle with a "design to 
strike that black Woman.”  Upon hearing McKenzie's reply that "he declared upon his
word of honor and as he was a Gentleman that he did not intend to strike the 
Woman with the Bottle" but rather intended to throw it at the "Croud of Negroes" 
around the woman, Townshend claimed to be "astonished,” and observed that there 
was no crowd around the woman except for some officers.  In other words, 
Townshend had responded to McKenzie’s declaration upon his word of honor with an 
implication that McKenzie had just told a clear lie.  Townshend then further escalated
331.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 58: “One might
react aggressively when one's theatre companion was obliged to rise from her seat by a latecomer;
one did not react if from one's townhouse one could hear one's neighbour beating his wife.”
332.WO 71/77, 278-284.
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matters by announcing to the assembled officers that he was shocked that a man 
could make such an untrue statement while wearing the uniform of a British officer.  
As the court-martial testimony makes clear, the officers perceived the injured 
party in this dispute to be not the woman struck by the bottle, and not Townshend, 
who had objected to this treatment of a woman, but McKenzie, who had been 
publicly accused of being a liar.  Townshend did not challenge McKenzie to a duel, 
but the other way around—McKenzie sought the duel after Townshend insulted him 
by challenging his veracity, telling acquaintances that "he had been very much 
insulted by Captain Townshend,” having been “told by him that he was not worthy to
wear His Majesty's Cloth.”  And Townshend and the other officers explicitly denied 
that the treatment of the woman was a factor in the duel, as Townshend had 
declared “that if he must go out with Mr. McKenzie it would not be for the Cause of a 
black Girl,” but because the two officers had each objected to the other’s behavior, 
considering it dishonorable—and, more importantly, a personal insult.333 
An examination of the numerous courts-martial of army officers for making 
insulting remarks, engaging in violent quarrels, and dueling provides a taxonomy of 
the fighting words of the late eighteenth century.  These generally fell into two 
categories: denigrations of the target’s abilities or behavior, and implications of 
insufficient masculinity.  In this latter category were terms such as “Puppy” and 
“Schoolboy,” popular for insulting younger officers.  Lieutenant Charlton indignantly 
reported that during a dispute Lieutenant Edwards had insulted him, “making use of 
the Expressions 'Impertinent Puppy' and 'Young Bear.’”334  
 “Rascal,” “Scoundrel,” and “Villain” were also popular insults, but as these were 
direct reflections on an officer’s moral character they had more serious 
333.WO 71/60, pp. 402-404.
334.WO 71/55, p. 61.
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consequences.  Because officers were court-martialed not only for inflicting violence 
upon each other after being provoked by such language, but also for the 
“ungentlemanly” act of uttering the insulting remarks themselves, we can attempt to
reconstruct a hierarchy of insulting remarks from officers’ defenses to these charges.
Lesser insults were followed by officers defending themselves by claiming that the 
language they used did not, technically, defame another officer’s character, such as 
when Captain Harrington Baudin tried to claim that he was innocent of the charge of 
taking “ungentlemanly and unjustifiable liberties with the Character of Lieut. Berks,” 
because he had merely called Berks a “Fool” and “stupid fellow.”  Unlike terms such 
as “rascal” or “scoundrel,” Baudin argued, this species of name-calling ought not to 
render him subject to official disapproval because although his words were “a 
reflection on his Mental Abilities,” they were “no Impeachment of his Moral 
Character.”335  Berks defended himself from the charge of insulting Baudin with a 
similar claim: "As for the Words false and Blockhead, I acknowledge that they are 
not the most civil that might have been picked out of the Dictionary; but...surely, 
Sir, they cannot be worth the notice of the Court."336  
The moral judgment implied in such terms as “Rascal,” “Scoundrel,” or “Villain” 
frequently provoked duels because they implied that an officer’s character and 
reputation as an honorable gentleman was deficient.  But because courage was the 
virtue prized above all others by soldiers, the acknowledged basis of all martial 
virtue, the term “Coward” occupied the pinnacle of the military man’s hierarchy of 
insults.  A man who had been called a coward could not dismiss it or laugh it off—he 
335.WO 71/60, p. 314.
336.WO 71/60, p. 261.
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had to demand a retraction, and, if that was not forthcoming, issue a challenge to 
duel.337  
Equally damning as accusations of cowardice were accusations of lying, a 
situation that might initially appear odd considering officers’ general lack of 
appreciation for traditional moral prescriptions.  But to call another officer a liar was 
a shocking insult not because lying was considered an inherent moral wrong, but 
because lying was considered the act of a coward.338  “Calumny is the weapon of a 
coward, and his shield the secrecy of others,” claimed a series of military 
aphorisms.339  The subtle distinction officers made between privacy and secrecy 
illuminate the links that officers drew between openness, candor, and courage, and 
the concurrent link between secrecy, falsehood, and cowardice.340  Privacy, as we 
have seen in a previous chapter, was an officer’s right.  On the other hand, secrecy 
was a pernicious fault.  
It is important to note, however, that this perjorative use of the term “secrecy” 
applied only to interpersonal violence between officers.  Officers could have secret 
meetings amongst themselves, or keep secrets from other officers, without any loss 
of honor; these actions were merely an exercise of their right to privacy.  But for an 
officer to attack the body or reputation of another officer without making public the 
337.Court-martial testimony records that many of these other, less serious insults were not always taken
seriously, but a claim that an oﬃcer was a coward always was. Gilbert, "Law and Honour Among
Eighteenth-Century British Army Oﬃcers," 75, suggests that of the four primary violations of the
oﬃcers’ honor code (1. cowardice 2. insuﬃcient regard for one’s social status 3. accusations of lying
or slander 4. defaming the regiment), acting in a manner perceived as cowardly, or accusing another
oﬃcer of being a coward, were the most serious. See WO 71/92, pp. 76-88 for an example of oﬃcers’
behavior being constrained by fears that it would be perceived by onlookers as “timorousness.”
338.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 48. on
accusations of lying as insults to courage: “it was not the allegation of having uttered a falsehood that
wounded the honour of the accused, but rather the implication of a lack of courage.”
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340.e.g. WO 71/81, p. 244: a character witness claimed that one oﬃcer was known “to be a Gentleman of
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information that he was the one who had fired the shot, or first circulated the 
insulting rumor, was grossly dishonorable.  
When Lieutenant Colonel Cosmo Gordon accused Frederick Thomas of, among 
other things, “secretly aspersing his Character,” he pointed to the adverb to imply 
particular misconduct.  As Gordon related it, Thomas had been spreading rumors 
that he had behaved improperly during a recent battle.  The defendant, Thomas, 
agreed with Gordon’s assessment of the wickedness of making secret aspersions, 
remarking on the “Odiousness of the Charge—It implies a secret & assassin like 
stabbing in the Dark at Lieut. Col. Gordon's reputation.”  Such an action, he stated, 
“implies…the want of every human Virtue, for they must be incompatible with that 
Heart that is base enough to attempt to undermine a Reputation.”  If the court did 
find him guilty of such a shameful crime, Thomas said, he would “beseech them in 
Mercy to deprive me of Life by the same Sentence.”341  These melodramatic words, 
implying that to be judged a man who destroyed reputations by secret machinations 
was a fate worse than death to a man of honor, were similar to the dismay 
expressed by men accused of cowardice, and quite appropriate when one realizes 
that this charge of secrecy was actually a veiled charge of cowardice.  By attacking 
another’s officer’s reputation in secret, a coward wounded the man without exposing 
himself to retaliation, just as an assassin was denounced as a coward for killing his 
mark without giving his victim an opportunity to defend himself.  
A public attack, on the other hand, demonstrated one’s courage (and also 
masculinity—when Gordon first tried to determine the source of the rumor, he called 
upon the officer who has been making unflattering remarks about him to be “Manly 
enough to declare it” in his presence).342  Thomas’s defense was that he could not 
341.WO 71/56, p. 95.
342.See also Wolfe, Instructions to Young Oﬃcers, 20. Faced with anonymous letters complaining about
conditions in the regiment, Wolfe issued orders forbidding the “mean and underhand practice.” The
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possibly be guilty of secretly aspersing Gordon's character, as he "publickly, openly, 
and to Colonel Gordon's own Face, accused him on the spot of Neglect of Duty.”343 
Thomas avowed that he had made a proper “honest & open Attack” against Gordon—
and, he implied, Gordon was the one truly at fault, for responding with court 
proceedings rather than with a duel.344  
Even more damaging than verbal insults were physical assaults.  To receive an 
assault impugned a man’s courage and masculinity, but it was also an attack on his 
social position as a member of the upper class.  To strike a gentleman (and officers 
were—in theory—all gentlemen) with one’s fists or with a cane was a deadly affront. 
A gentleman was someone whose person could not be assaulted, and in fact this was
one of the prime characteristics that distinguished a gentleman from other men.  
(The distinction that gentlemen made between their public and private characters 
also served to distinguish between honorable and dishonorable violence; “wounds 
received in fair action” on the battlefield were by no means dishonoring, because 
there, the attack was made on the officer’s public character in a military setting.  
Dishonorable assaults were those made on a man’s private character as a 
gentleman.345)
Only gentlemen had honor.  The common perception among the upper class was 
that the "lower orders" lacked the fine feelings of honor of a gentleman, and thus 
beating them caused them to suffer no shame, but only the physical pain of the 
disdain for secrecy as an unmilitary and unmanly virtue existed in the Continental Army as well.
Confronted with the news of Benedict Arnold's treason, General Greene painted the action as
shameful: “Our Enemies despairing of carrying their point by force are practising every base Art to
eﬀect by Bribery and Corruption what they cannot accomplish in a manly way." (General Greene's
Orders, Sept. 26 1780, Showman, Cobb, and McCarthy, Papers of General Nathanael Green, 6:
314-315, cited in Ruddiman, "'A Record in the Hands of Thousands': Power and Negotiation in the
Orderly Books of the Continental Army," 762.)
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which Gordon killed Thomas and was tried for his murder.
345.Drewe, Military Sketches, 31-32.
147
assault.  For that reason, a soldier might need a savage flogging of hundreds of 
lashes to convince him of the error of his ways, while a single blow to the person of a
gentlemanly officer would permanently dishonor him.  To officers, the need for 
different punishments based on a criminal's class was unquestioned: 
punishments...are peculiarly adapted to the respective ranks; for
what would be an adequate punishment for an offence in one rank,
might be extremely inadequate in another: as, for instance, simple
dismission, which is a very heavy penalty to an officer, might be
esteemed by a private soldier rather a benefit than otherwise;
whereas, a few lashes, which might be inflicted on the latter for a
trifling breach of duty, would be to the former a most irreparable
injury as depriving him of his honour, and rendering him unfit for
the the society of gentlemen.346 
In practice, the bodies of the enlisted and the officers were treated with blatant 
disparity.  After “high words" passed between Lieutenant William Hamilton and 
Captain Richard Nesbitt over the pulling down of a hut, a bystander reported that he 
“heard Lieut. Hamilton say that he did not care a fart for him [Nesbitt], and that he 
would blow a ball through his old head."  Nesbitt replied with a threat of disgraceful 
physical violence, telling Hamilton that “if he continued to make use of such abusive 
language he should be obliged to stop his mouth by gagging him.”  Hamilton 
responded with an insult and threat of equally disgraceful violence, calling him “a 
Rascal, a Scoundrel and a Coward, and said that he would cane him at the head of 
the Regiment.”  When Nesbitt had Hamilton arrested after making this last remark, 
Hamilton protested that his words were quite reasonable under the circumstances, 
demanding of an eyewitness, “Had an Officer threatened to gag him, what would he 
have done?"347  Meanwhile, gagging an enlisted man or physically confining him was 
routine.  Ordinary soldiers were kept under lock and key in conditions far worse than 
346.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 163-164.
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that of a confined officer, who when under the most strict arrest still had the 
freedom of his own quarters.  One officer testified that an enlisted man “is apt to get
in liquor and is then so impertinent and noisy that they are often obliged to gag 
him.”348  Thomas Bailey, a private, described the wretched conditions of his 
confinement in the guard house after he had been accused of assaulting an officerin 
Boston in 1775: he found himself “almost perished with the cold not able to walk to 
keep myself warm nor seeing a bit of fire for the forty hours I was there Confined 
which caused a violent pain in my head.”349  Particularly troublesome prisoners were 
confined in the “Black Hole,” a part of the guard room with no regular access to light,
where prisoners were often kept on a diet of bread and water.350  
It was certainly not unthinkable for enlisted men, confined in these harsh and 
unpleasant conditions, to break their arrest and escape their confinement.351  On the 
other hand, such behavior was unimaginable for an officer, so much so that no 
precautions were put in place to prevent an officer from breaking his arrest, and, 
indeed, it was considered a grave insult to put a guard at an officer’s door, or take 
any measures whatsoever to prevent his escape.  In 1780, Lt. Fortye of the 75th, 
stationed in the British garrison at Gorée, off the coast of Senegal, was put under 
arrest by the town major, the latter telling him “that it was his Orders, that he 
should go to his room as an Officer and a Gentleman.”  But Fortye answered, “I will 
go to the black Hole first” and then started walking to the guard house.  The enraged
348.WO 71/86, pp. 413-417.
349.WO 71/82, 191.
350.Simes, The Military Guide for Young Oﬃcers: Containing a System of the Art of War, 166-167.
described it as a room “free from damp,” and “to be supplied with clean and dry straw once a week,”
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carried back to his home regiment to be court-martialed, “the Corporal of the Guards that escorted the
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town major sent a sentry after him, and only after the intercession of another officer 
was Fortye persuaded to “go to his room as a Gentleman” and not to force anybody 
to participate in “the Violation of an Officer’s privilege.”  The town major noted that 
he dismissed the sentry as soon as the lieutenant agreed to go to his room, and 
when Fortye was found guilty of “refusing to go to his room when Ordered under an 
Arrest,” the court “in consideration of his being put under the Charge of a Sentry, 
and afterwards complying to go to his Room, do therefore Adjudge that to be a 
sufficient punishment, for that part of the Crime laid to his Charge.”352  
Far worse than putting a sentry at an officer’s door was to take measures not 
only to alert the arresting officer that the prisoner was escaping (an enlisted sentry 
posted at an officer’s door was prevented by the disparate rules of power and bodily 
integrity from doing much more than allowing the officer to push past him, and then 
informing his commanding officer353), but to suggest that not only the honor of his 
word, but also the integrity of his body, was now compromised.  
This was done through the implied willingness to use physical force against his 
person.  Captain William Dussaux of the 6th Regiment of Foot, accused of various 
financial irregularities and put under arrest, revealed the conditions he had been 
subjected to in tones of outrage: After he had been arrested, the regiment was 
ordered to move from their previous quarters to new ones, and during this journey, 
the commander ordered that Dussaux was ordered “to be Marched between the 
Battalion and Rear Guard with fixed bayonets in an ignominious and disgraceful 
manner like a common Criminal.”  Dussaux used this incident as proof of the 
fundamental injustice of his treatment at his commander’s hands, for this 
352.WO 71/55, p. 150-166.
353.For example, see WO 71/55, pp. 68, 56-57, in which the enlisted sentry at the cabin door of the ship
was repeatedly shoved aside by Lieutenant Edwards and the petty oﬃcers of the ship, and was
consequently useless for keeping anybody but the common sailors out of the space.
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“humiliating treatment” for his “pretended Crimes” was “a punishment quite 
unprecedented in our Army” and a “wanton violation of the most sacred and dearest 
right of an Englishman, which exempts his person from any Confinement, much 
more a disgraceful one, without good and sufficient cause.”354  Dussaux’s co-
arrestee, Captain James Scott, who had endured similar treatment, even more 
explicitly claimed that this “disgraceful confinement” was shocking because it 
subjected officers to treatment that was normally meted out only to enlisted men 
and others who lacked gentle status: “Such treatment to Officers must annihilate 
every distinction of Military rank, after this [they] may expect to be put in Irons and 
Dungeons.”355  
Scott insisted that officers should not and could not be treated with the 
harshness that was customary towards enlisted men: “Officers in the English Army 
are not to be ruled with a rod of Iron,” he claimed.  “Military discipline and 
Obedience from inferior towards superior Officers,” should instead proceed “from the 
liberal principles of the Officers, from their Zeal for their profession, their love of 
their Country and Attachment to their most gracious Sovereign.”  Scott based his 
appeal not only on the contention that these admirable qualities were sufficient to 
motivate an officer to perform his military duties, but also on the claim that using 
any other methods to direct officers would only lead to ruin: further treatment such 
as he and Captain Dussaux had endured, he said, “must extinguish in [them] all 
ardour for their profession and damp the Spirit which is Characteristick of 
Englishmen.”356  
354.WO 71/54, 16-17.
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151
The freedom of movement allowed to officers was considered so fundamental a 
right that it often persisted even after an officer had been arrested.  Officers 
distinguished between being under a “close arrest,” in which an officer was confined 
to his quarters, and the far more common practice, in which an officer was nominally
under arrest but had few restrictions.  He was not permitted to be on duty or bear 
arms, and often enjoined from being out of his quarters after a certain hour of the 
evening, but otherwise he was free to come and go as he pleased.  
These important distinctions in the treatment of the bodies of the upper-class 
officers and the lower-class enlisted soldiers were fundamental in upholding officers’ 
honor.  Honor was inseparable from class position.  An example of this is found in 
the 1777 conflict between Ensigns William Mair and Thomas Smith of the 60th 
Regiment of Foot, which stemmed from a rumor going around the regiment that Mair
had “spread reports prejudicial to the Character of Ensign Smith” by “declaring…in 
the presence of several people, that he had horsewhipped or Caned Ensign Smith at 
St. Augustine.”  When Mair allegedly claimed to have beaten Smith, he dishonored 
Smith by implying that his body was not immune to physical assault, that he was not
a member of the officer class.  And the insult to Smith was exacerbated by the 
particular disgrace of the weapons that Mair was said to have used.  A cane was used
to beat persons of low status—children, servants, a particularly recalcitrant enlisted 
man.  A whip was even worse, being used to formally punish enlisted malefactors 
and—a fact probably not lost on these officers stationed in the Caribbean—slaves.  
Smith’s status was threatened on two fronts: first, it was rumored that he had 
been caned or horsewhipped; second, reports were circulating that he had “patiently 
suffered” this shameful treatment.  Despite the general advocacy of the virtues of 
patient suffering and submissive resignation to insult and misfortune in the Christian 
writings of the time, no officer concurred with this assessment.  In fact, to say that 
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an officer had reacted to an insult with “patient suffering” was defamatory.  During 
Smith’s trial, Ensign George Dennis, whom Smith had named as the man who had 
been telling others that Smith had been horsewhipped by Mair, was asked if he had 
“ever at any time cast any reflections upon Mr. Smith for or upbraid him with or 
insinuate to him that he had patiently suffered any disgraceful treatment from Mr. 
Mair?”  Dennis denied it absolutely—for if he had ever made such a claim, Smith 
would have a had a legitimate grievance against Dennis for aspersing his 
character.357  Patience and resignation might be virtues fit for weakly women, but a 
manly man responded to an insult, whether in the form of a word or a blow, with 
“proper resentment.”  This emotion, resentment, was an assertion of not only 
masculinity but also class, an emotion elite men reserved for themselves alone.  It 
was anger that stemmed not from the irrational outbursts of passion and the lack of 
self-control characteristic of the lower sorts, but righteous anger, rational anger, 
anger that was entirely reasonable, because it was generated directly in reaction to a
threat to a man’s social status or reputation as a honorable gentleman.358    
But for army officers, responding with the proper resentment meant not only the 
mere expression of emotion, but also action.  When Ensign Townshend and 
Lieutenant Haines fell to arguing, Haines, “being raised to a great degree of Passion 
gave him the Lye,” that is, accused Townshend of being a liar.  Townshend replied 
that Haines was the liar, and Haines objected to this behavior, saying that “his 
retorting the Lye was no resentment shewn at all.”  For Haines, and for the British 
officer corps more generally, “proper resentment” for a gentleman meant willingness
to inflict violence.  Haines went on to demonstrate exactly what he meant, when he 
357.WO 71/54, pp. 84-85.
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said that if being called a liar “was not sufficient for him (Mr. Townshend) to resent it
as a Gentleman, desired him to take that; at the same time giving him a Blow with a
Riding Switch.”359  Ensign Townshend’s response to being hit by a riding switch 
wielded by Lieutenant Haines was to attempt to strike Haines back, and thus “put the
Can’d Townshend on a footing” of equality with Haines.  The actions of both men 
suggest the power of violence to repair insult.  It re-established his status and 
served as a public display of his masculinity and his willingness to use force to 
defend his reputation.360          
Violence had redemptive power, because violence established one’s lack of 
cowardly submission.  Behaving “submissively” was not a virtue; Lieutenant Triste 
used that very word to condemn Captain Payne’s behavior when the baggage 
wagons he was leading were confronted by a New York mob.  “[H]e yielded them up 
very submissively,” he said of Payne, when called to give evidence that Payne had 
“acted a cowardly, pusillanimous, and unsoldierly part” by allowing the baggage to 
be taken from him.361  And Payne’s violent propensities were cited by the officers 
who sought to defend him: “if I had any reason to Complain of Captain Payne’s 
Conduct it was rather for recommending Violent than Pusilanimous Measures,” Major 
Hamilton stated when he testified in favor of Payne’s character and behavior.362  A 
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tendency towards violence, then, was perhaps a vice, but as it was seen as almost 
the exact opposite of cowardice, it was by far the preferable vice.  
Not responding with violence—or at least the threat of future violence embodied 
in a challenge to duel—demonstrated a lack of “proper resentment” that was fatal to 
an officer’s reputation.  If an officer failed to display it, he could be suspected of 
cowardice—rumors might fly that he had accepted some dishonorable treatment out 
of fear—or alternately, that he lacked a proper understanding of his class position.  
Being insulted without responding with resentment called into question one’s status 
as a gentleman, and were grounds for being dismissed from the army.  Officers were
tried for behavior unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman for 
allowing themselves to be assaulted or insulted without responding with appropriate 
resentment, as was the case with Captain John McKinnon, who was sentenced to be 
discharged after he was convicted of “Suffering himself to be kicked by Captain 
McEvoy…without properly resenting it.”363   
In officers’ understanding, displaying resentment was a virtue.364  But officers 
went further in their assessment, claiming that displaying resentment was not only 
proper, but inevitable.  In the civilian sphere, resentment’s initial claim to being a 
proper and exclusive emotion for upper-class men stemmed from its close 
association with reason; it was presumed to proceed from a rational assessment of 
injury.  But in the late eighteenth century, resentment changed from a reasoned 
evaluation of insult that led to righteous anger, to the immediate arousal of the 
passions and anger from circumstances under which it was reasonable to be angry.365
Military understandings of resentment paralleled its civilian evolution into a less 
363.WO 71/87, pp. 173-176.
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controllable emotion, as officers insisted that feelings of resentment at injury were 
fundamental to the character of “a Man of honor and sensibility.”  The person who 
gave him the injury might be his superior, and in direct military command over him, 
and the army might in fact work more smoothly if the injured man could swallow his 
resentment and continue to obey orders, but officer after officer insisted that this 
was impossible.  The feelings of resentment were natural and manly, and to try to 
suppress them would be to suppress the very characteristics that made a man an 
acceptable officer.  Not to feel insulted was a sign that one was in some way 
crippled: “Unless the senses be palsied, the feelings of nature will operate,” Captain 
John Rutherford claimed.366  In this way, they seized hold of the language of 
sensibility and turned it to support their own purposes.367    
Officers frequently invoked their own sensibility when tried by court-martial, 
claiming overwhelming emotion as a defense for their violent and insubordinate 
behavior.368  “[M]y mode of acting towards Mr. Cawley, tho perhaps of too violent a 
nature to correspond with the Strictest Rules of my profession, was by no means 
unmerited,” claimed Ensign Farrell.  He described Cawley's behavior as "so cruel and 
so unjust an Attack as this upon my feelings as a Man, as an Officer and a 
Gentleman” that it “roused my resentment and I was so far led away by passion as 
to make use of the Expressions, for the impropriety of which I am now brought 
before you."  But Farrell claimed that he could not have done otherwise: "my 
situation at that time was such as that few Young Men in a Similar one could have 
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Commanded their Temper."369  After being insulted, “I could not refrain from an 
immediate resentment,” another officer claimed.370  
Lieutenant Richard Berks and Captain Harington Baudin of the Nottingham 
Regiment of Militia were both tried by court-martial in 1782, Berks for striking his 
superior officer and Baudin for using ”language...of a gross and unwarranted nature"
towards Berks—accusing him of being an embezzler and a “Scoundrel” while the 
regiment’s officers were gathered on the parade ground—“which produced an Affray 
between them.”  Berks defended himself with an impassioned speech justifying his 
violent reaction, claiming that when Baudin
presumed to make me the public butt of his low Buffoonery, when
he dared before the Corps of Officers to call in question my
Integrity, he Sir who had so often attempted to wound my
reputation in the dark, when this Man, I say, Sir, dared charge me
with the foul Crime of Embezzlement, and in the same breath to
insult me with an opprobrious appellation that includes all infamy,
the appellation of Scoundrel, I confess Sir, my indignation
overpower'd my reason and I struck him.371
Berks’ defense not only cited his overwhelming emotion as a defense for his 
violence, but also invited the members of the court martial board to display their 
own sensibility by recognizing and affirming the emotions that he had felt upon being
insulted.  Could “you Mr. President, or you Gentlemen of the Court…bear without 
discomposure perpetual injuries and a constant endeavour to undermine and ruin 
your Character by Practices the most dishonest as well as unceasing efforts to turn 
your most indifferent actions into ridicule,” he asked.  “[A]s I conceive you to be not 
only Men of Probity, but of feeling, Men who know the value of a good Name, and are
369.WO 71/60, pp. 356-367. Jamaica, 24 June 1782.
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alive to what ever might concern your Honor, so I shall confide in your Justice, being
the Justice of humanity."372  
Other officers used similar tactics.  “I was tortured to agony, irritated even to 
anguish, by menace, insults and blows,” one officer explained.373  “I submit to this 
Court, what my feelings as a man of honor must have been,” Lieutenant John Heslop
stated, “when I was informed that Colonel Barton had called my Veracity in question,
and accused me of Perjury.  This Charge awakened my sensibility, roused my 
Passions, and as I was grieved by so base an insinuation, I determined to pursue 
every prudent step, to obtain Justice from the Author of so illiberal false and 
scandalous an Assertion.”374  
Civilian men who claimed to have been overwhelmed by their passions faced the 
danger that this lack self-control would mark them with the stigma of feminine 
hysteria or a lower-class inability to regulate oneself.375  But this central worry about 
male demonstrations of sensibility was far less of a concern in the army, because 
officers sidestepped it handily by integrating their displays of sensibility with 
violence.  When the expression of sensibility was actually an uncontrolled violent 
outburst, it masculinized the feeling and immunized it from accusations of a feminine
lack of control.376  Furthermore, the redemptive power of violence, in particular 
violence motivated by the treatment of a gentleman in such a way as a gentleman 
ought not be treated, affirmed rather than undermined an officer’s claim to belong to
the upper class.  Reacting to this treatment with violence—verbal or physical—
enhanced an officer’s status, even if (or especially if) it was violence that violated the
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military’s chain of command because it was inflicted on a superior officer.  It was 
then further proof of the man’s willingness to defend his honor even at the cost of 
risking his career.  “[H]aving received a Treatment from Lieut. Col. Doyle while his 
inferior Officer, that had hurt my feelings as a Gentleman,” Captain Barry claimed, 
had led directly to “my Resentments being warm, my Sensibility awakened by 
Insults, & Injuries,” and Barry’s subsequent insubordinate behavior to Doyle.377  In 
Barry’s mind, this behavior was natural, justified, and evidence of a proper 
gentlemanly sensibility.  But it was also an implicit assertion of the supremacy of 
private honor over military law.  
Self-control and “coolness” were still prized, especially on the battlefield, and 
were not incompatible with being a man of sensibility: At his trial, Payne’s friends 
testified that he was “sensible, polite, Cool, and Spirited.”378  At courts-martial, it was
common for the opposing officers to each call upon witnesses to testify to his own 
"coolness and decorum" in contrast with the other party’s "passion.”379   But although
calmness was advisable for officers to maintain in their day-to-day life, as well as in 
battle, such calmness in response to a definitive personal insult was described with 
the term “Stoicism.”  
In the later eighteenth century, the tenets of this classical philosophy were still 
admitted to be a moral ideal, but it was increasingly portrayed as a virtue impossible
for the feeling man to actually achieve, especially a man with the honor-sensitive 
temperament that suited him to military life.  Berks asked if any men in the court 
were “such Stoics as to bear yourselves accused of infamous actions, and insulted 
with appellations too opprobrious and too vulgar for either the ears of the lips of a 
377.WO 71/92, 295-318.
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Gentleman without emotions of Anger, or the kindling of any agitating passion,” and 
implied that forbearance after such treatment was an impossible standard to which 
to hold an officer.380  Captain Payne, accused of “Tyrranical, cruel and oppressive 
treatment to Non Commission Officer & Men,” defended his angry beatings of the 
soldiers under his command in similar terms: “I must own, Gentlemen, that I have 
never considered it as a Crime to resent when provoked, nor can I boast of that calm
Stoicism that can with Indifference turn aside from offered insult.”  Brought to 
righteous resentment by insolent treatment from his inferiors, he had lashed out at 
them, but this was only a natural feeling.  Payne did “confess also that from Warmth 
of Temper, I may have sometimes carried my Resentment farther than the Occasion 
would justify on cool reflextion,” but it was outrageous for him “to be branded with 
the odious Epithets of Tyrant and Oppressor” for merely resenting what a gentleman 
ought to resent.381  Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Peacocke objected to being 
“prosecuted for the little irregularities of temper” that even the best officer would be 
led to if faced with an undisciplined regiment.382
When officers’ righteous rage resulted in violent actions to their enlisted 
subordinates, it was often a matter of little concern to military authorities.  But 
violence to superiors almost inevitably led to a court-martial.  During these trials, 
some officers claimed that they had heroically controlled their temper so far as to 
refrain from attacking their insulter outright, but that they could not be expected to 
refrain from “demanding the satisfaction of a gentleman”—a duel.  After Colonel 
Barton had accused him of perjury, Lieutenant Heslop testified, he had taken the 
“prudent step” of speaking to Barton warning him to “be more circumspect in what 
380.WO 71/60, 261-262.
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you say of me.”  But after Barton replied that Heslop was “a lying Scoundrel” and 
threatened to horsewhip him, Heslop claimed that he could hardly be expected to 
refrain from demanding gentlemanly satisfaction.383  
An officer insulted either verbally or physically by an enlisted man had some 
different options for inflicting retaliatory violence.  He could have the man arrested 
and tried by a court-martial, which might sentence him to a savage flogging or even 
to death for his crime, or he could choose the more direct method of beating the 
offender on the spot.  But the only proper method for using violence to remove the 
stain of an insult or an assault from one’s social equal was the duel.  
After Ensign Mair had ascertained that Ensign Smith had, in fact, publicly called 
him a coward, he wrote out a formal challenge to be delivered to him: 
Sir, 
The affront you gave me demands immediate reparation and I
insist on your meeting me with a brace of Pistols this Evening at
half an hour past Six o'Clock on the race Course at the Starting
post, bring your friend with you, I shall bring mine. If you have
not Pistols I have one at your Service.
I am Sir Your Humble Servant
William Mair, Ens., 60th384
This letter laid out the basic requirements for a duel: It specified the time and the
place the men were to meet (preferably an out-of-the-way one to minimize the 
likelihood of passers-by coming upon the scene and meddling).385  Likewise, it 
specified the weapons to be used (swords or pistols were the only acceptable 
options).  The reference to each man bringing a “friend” with him to the meeting 
referred to the seconds, who would negotiate with each other to determine the 
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precise terms of the duel—for example, how many paces apart the duelists would 
stand, and how many shots each man was to fire—once both parties had reached the
appointed place.386  
Mair’s letter also demonstrated one of the other commendable traits in a duelist: 
a cool and dispassionate character.  It conveyed the information that Mair felt so 
injured by Smith’s remark that he insisted on Smith’s coming to some place where 
Mair could fire a loaded pistol at him, but it did so in a polite manner, following all 
the proper conventions of letter-writing etiquette.  Mair indulged in no name-calling 
or recriminations that might betray an uncontrollable rage.  He courteously offered 
Smith the use of one of his pistols.  The overall tone was meant to communicate that
Mair had been grievously insulted, that he resented that insult extremely, and that 
Smith would have to hazard his life to rectify that insult, but that Mair nevertheless 
remained a gentleman in control of his emotions.  
Because it satisfied the demand for violence without sacrificing the residual desire
for emotional control, the duel was an opportunity to display the ideal species of 
upper-class masculine anger.  The ritual required feeling angry, but also required 
controlling the expression of anger and resentment until it could be properly 
discharged.387   The duel also served as categorical proof of a officer’s courage.  
Spontaneous violent behavior affirmed one’s masculinity and was also evidence for 
courage, but the duel was a more perfect showcase of the virtue.  Inflicting violence 
on another person indicated a lack of fear of that person, but standing before a 
loaded pistol or naked blade and risking death indisputably established (or re-
established) an officer’s reputation as a courageous man; this was why the duel 
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served as a definitive refutation of an accusation of cowardice.388  There was no 
moral dispute to be settled by dueling.  The purpose of the duel was not to redress 
wrongs—one dueled even if one thought one was clearly at fault—the purpose was to
affirm the courage of the participants and to counteract claims that they were 
cowardly or dishonorable.389  
This was why Lieutenant Campbell and Lieutenant Boyle had chosen to resolve 
their argument over the proper way to paddle a canoe through a deadly duel.  The 
duel was not fought to uphold the superiority of one canoeing method over the 
other—nobody thought that because Campbell had triumphed and killed Boyle, his 
assertion that Boyle did not know how to steer a canoe had now been proven 
indisputably true.  Rather, the duel was fought because not fighting it would make 
both officers vulnerable to the charge of cowardice.  And Campbell’s defense 
statement shows that this was a normal part of officers’ military culture.  “It gives 
me satisfaction when I consider my case is left to the decision of a Court who have a 
just sense of the dearness of an Officer's reputation, and the delicacy of his honor,” 
he stated.390  Campbell expected the officers judging him to hold him blameless, to 
understand the supreme importance of an officers’ personal honor.  And he was 
correct to do so; the court-martial unanimously found him not guilty of murdering 
Boyle.  
And this dispute, by no means atypical, suggests some reasons for officers’ 
constant quarrels, fight, duels, and other violent behavior: often, no middle ground 
was possible.  No compromise could be honorably reached.391  The social benefits of 
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inflicting violence were high, and the social costs of accepting violence were ruinous. 
Officers had created a society in which inflicting violence was a key way to gain 
masculine status—indeed, refraining from violence under many circumstances was 
seen as unmanly and dishonorable.  However, because they also considered being 
the victim of violence deeply shameful, army society was a place of continual tension
as men all sought to inflict violence on others, while preventing others from inflicting 
violence on them.  
Because officers held to courage as a most perfect expression of masculine virtue
and status, violent behavior was one of the easiest and most effective ways for 
officers to gain status.  This, combined with the practical difficulties of conducting 
warfare with an army that held pacifist values, made it perhaps inevitable that the 
eighteenth-century British army would develop a culture of violence and a society in 
which violence was an essential marker of masculinity.  But it came at the cost of 
making officers ever more disinclined to seek peaceful rather than violent resolutions
to conflicts.  Violence gained so much cultural power as a fundamental value of 
military masculinity that, as the next chapter shows, military commanders had 
extreme difficulties regulating the various quarrels that broke out over questions of 
officers’ personal honor, even when these disputes threatened the interests of the 
army itself.  
between dominance and dependence, between violent revolt and submission.
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Chapter 6: A Government of Men, Not of Laws
On February 22, 1780, John Lawrence was tried for murder.  Lawrence, an ensign
in the 1st Battalion of New Jersey Volunteers, was brought before a military court in 
New York, then occupied by the British Army, and accused of murdering Ensign John 
Moffatt of the Queen’s Rangers.  The prosecution’s case seemed clear: Several 
witnesses agreed that Lawrence had shot Moffatt with a pistol and the ball had gone 
all the way through Moffatt’s body.  Moffat collapsed to the ground and, upon being 
approached by an anxious friend who had witnessed the scene, could say only “My 
dear fellow I am killed” before dying.   
But this was no unprovoked attack by Lawrence.  His homicidal violence took 
place in a highly ritualized form, and was mirrored in every particular by the victim, 
Ensign Moffat.  The encounter took place beside a hill on the property of Mrs. Pryan, 
a widow, and both ensigns had travelled several miles from their respective quarters 
in New York to arrive there.  The journey had been arranged the night before 
through several messages exchanged between the two ensigns, who had agreed 
upon a suitable place and time for their meeting.  Furthermore, each of them had 
brought another officer with them: Lawrence had brought another ensign in the 
battalion, John Thompson, to accompany him, while Moffat had asked his friend 
Lieutenant John Pendred, a fellow officer in the Queen’s Rangers, to accompany him.
Once all four men had arrived at the appointed place, Pendred and Thompson chose 
the ground in consultation with the other two, agreed that Moffat and Lawrence 
should stand six yards from each other, and marked out the distance.  Thompson 
testified that he had personally witnessed that Lawrence and Moffat each had a pistol
loaded with one shot, and Pendred testified that both had waited to shoot until they 
were given an express command to fire.  The two men fired at exactly the same 
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time, and both bullets hit their targets: Lawrence received a slight wound on his 
right side, but Moffat was fatally wounded and died within minutes.  
The encounter had, in other words, conformed in every particular to the rules and
customs of the duel.  In this regard, none of the witnesses could find any fault with 
the conduct of either Ensign Lawrence or Ensign Moffat, who had exchanged shots 
precisely according to the established procedure.  Moreover, each had conducted 
himself in a cool and dispassionate manner throughout the proceedings, and—apart 
from the portion of the event when they fired loaded pistols at each other—were 
careful to behave to each other with courtesy and consideration.  On the journey to 
the appointed dueling grounds, Lawrence and Moffat had a friendly conversation 
about matters unrelated to their dispute, and Lawrence, who had brought two pistols
with him, graciously asked Moffat if he would care to choose one of them to use.  
Moffat, with equal politeness, declined and said he would rather use one of his own.  
Though each thought the insult done to himself by the actions of the other severe 
enough to necessitate the hazarding of his life in this contest of honor, neither lost 
his self-control and charged at the other in a rage at any point.  Neither did they 
resort to vulgar brawling with their fists or sticks; instead, they were careful to 
confine their exercise of violence to the civilized and gentlemanly method of 
exchanging pistol fire.  
Furthermore, Ensign Thompson and Lieutenant Pendred had behaved in a 
similarly exemplary fashion as seconds.  They understood that their role was not to 
act as partisan supporters of their particular friend, joining in the contest of arms 
and turning it into a general mêlée, but to be disinterested regulators of the event: 
marking out the ground, overseeing the loading of the weapons, and giving the 
command to fire.  They also had important duties before the duel itself: they were 
charged not only with carrying messages between the duelists, but also with 
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attempting to persuade the duelists to make up their differences amicably and 
negotiating with their counterpart to see on what terms the principals would 
apologize or ask the other’s pardon and obviate the need to duel.  Thompson and 
Pendred had spoken with each other and discovered that both parties refused to 
make any acknowledgment of wrongdoing as each thought himself entirely innocent 
of any misconduct and unjustly injured by the other.  Thompson “thought it was a 
pity that the dispute could not be settled without a Duel,” and Pendred told him that 
“he had endeavoured every thing in his power to Settle the affair,” but they both 
concluded that their efforts had been to no avail, and that a duel was inevitable.392  
Yet, no matter how impeccably the duelists and seconds had behaved according 
to the rules of gentlemanly honor, they had acted in a manner totally contrary to the
rules of the actual law.  Dueling was manifestly illegal, and the law made no 
provisions for exceptions when death occurred in the private settling of differences 
through a proper and gentlemanly duel.  In this legal theorists were agreed: a death 
that took place during the course of a duel was, legally speaking, indistinguishable 
from a homicide.393  To arrest and try John Lawrence for murder was the state’s only 
possible correct response according to the common law.  
But none of the participants in the duel between Ensign Lawrence and Ensign 
Moffat seemed to be troubled about its illegality, and though many of them thought 
that the duel was regrettable, none thought it was immoral.   Rather than dueling, 
which had an unfortunate tendency to kill its participants and undermine the unity of
the officer class, military authorities had been promoting the court-martial as a non-
violent method of dispute resolution since well before the mid-eighteenth century.  
The court would hear the complaint of the aggrieved party, question witnesses, allow
392.WO 71/91, p. 201-213.
393.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets, 11-16. 
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the defendant to tell his side of the story, determine whether a serious offense to 
honor had actually occurred (important in an age when drunken quarrels about the 
proper way to strike billiard balls or which officer was the handsomer could escalate 
into deadly duels), and sentence one or both parties to publicly ask the other’s 
pardon, or, if the matter was especially egregious, dismiss them from the army.  In 
this way, disputes could be settled without the risk of death for any of the 
participants.394   
Yet the court-martial did not work as anti-dueling advocates had hoped.  In the 
trial of Ensign Lawrence for the murder of Ensign Moffat, the utter impotence of the 
law to outlaw dueling was made plain.  The court-martial board questioned the 
witnesses minutely about all aspects of Lawrence’s conduct and declared themselves 
satisfied with it.  Lawrence had, in fact, shot Moffat with a pistol and killed him, but 
the death had occurred during a duel in which he had conducted himself with the 
utmost propriety.  Therefore, they acquitted him, in flagrant defiance of the law but 
in their eyes the only verdict they could honorably render. 
In this case, then, the court-martial, which military leaders hoped to promote as 
an alternative to dueling, was itself used to give public sanction to an officer who not
only spurned the court-martial as an authority in matters of honor, but who openly 
declared that he had killed another man completely unjustified by any law other than
that of honor.  Lawrence’s acquittal signaled that whatever the law might declare, 
dueling remained a viable method for receiving satisfaction for slights to one’s honor.
Had the incident taken place in Great Britain, civilian authorities might also have 
involved themselves.  Lawrence might have found himself facing a jury of 
tradesmen, farmers, and merchants unconcerned with a military man’s delicate 
394.Gilbert, "Law and Honour Among Eighteenth-Century British Army Oﬃcers," 79-80.
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sense of honor—or he might have had to flee abroad to avoid prosecution.395  By the 
early 19th century, the mood of the country turned decisively anti-dueling: less 
tolerant of violence, more enamored with the ideals of politeness, self-restraint, and 
respectability as markers of masculinity; and more convinced that all men ought to 
be subject to and governed by the rule of law.396  To duel was to publicly claim to be 
above the law—a reason why it had such appeal for elite men, but also why the duel 
was attacked so vigorously by middle-class reformers.397  In Britain, anti-dueling 
advocates directly interfered when they saw a duel, but they also used the law to 
prosecute duelists, who in turn sought to conceal their actions from the law.  
Gentlemen who dueled had to conspire to prevent prosecutions by concealing the 
manner of death and refusing to testify if they were witnesses, and even producing 
deathbed declarations that they wished no one to face any legal consequences for 
killing them.398  
Thus, in Britain, the law was increasingly more effective at preventing duels and 
undermining dueling culture.  But Lawrence killed Ensign Moffat in British-occupied 
New York during the American War of Independence, and there was no civilian 
395.Donna T Andrew, "The Code of Honour and Its Critics: The Opposition to Duelling in England,
1700-1850", Social History 5, no. 3 (1980): 409-434, however, suggests that Lawrence might not have
done too badly with a civilian jury in England, though it still might have convicted him of manslaughter
and fined him. In 1780, before opponents of dueling became powerful, his scrupulous observance of
dueling convention would probably have reflected well on him with a civilian jury as well as in a military
court.
396.Shoemaker, "The Taming of the Duel: Masculinity, Honour and Ritual Violence in London, 1660-1800,"
544; and Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen, (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2011), 26-44. See also Banks, "Killing with Courtesy: The English Duelist, 1785–1845," 544,
on a similar point regarding the decline of the acceptability (and necessity) of public displays of violent
masculinity in London.  
397.Shoemaker, "The Taming of the Duel: Masculinity, Honour and Ritual Violence in London, 1660-1800,"
540, on dueling as a marker of elite status because the act was a statement that one was above the
law, and the increasing isolation of such a position by the beginning of the 19th century.
398.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 138.
Shoemaker, "The Taming of the Duel: Masculinity, Honour and Ritual Violence in London, 1660-1800,"
537, on members of the public intervening to prevent duels. See also Banks, "Killing with Courtesy:
The English Duelist, 1785–1845," 533, on deaths from dueling abroad being concealed by army
oﬃcers well into the 1840s.
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authority by which he might be tried.  The military court of the British army was 
literally the only court in town, and it gave the officers deciding cases an ability to 
impose their own views of honor and acceptable violence that was only possible on 
the contested edges of the British empire.  Abroad, therefore, military duelists were 
willing to take their chances with a jury that was far more assuredly of their peers 
than any that might be assembled from the civilians of the British Isles.  
Army officers were one of the last holdouts of men claiming to be above the law, 
and in a courtroom where other army officers acted as judge and jury, they often did
not even need to conceal their beliefs or their actions.  Officers who dueled 
considered it prudent to conceal their intentions before the duel took place, but 
afterwards, they openly related them to the court.  Lawrence and the other officers 
present at the duel showed no reticence at testifying to what had occurred.399  And in
their decision to acquit Lawrence, the officers of the court-martial board made 
manifest their rejection of the principle of the rule of law.  The law said that what 
Lawrence had done was murder, but in the officers’ minds he had only done what 
any honorable gentleman would do.  Their sense of honor demanded that Lawrence, 
and others who had committed similar deeds, be judged not by the standards of the 
law, but by their own personal judgment as honorable men.  
Two things were necessary for the court-martial board to acquit Lawrence when 
the law said he was guilty of murder: A lack of a civilian court, which would 
otherwise have jurisdiction for trying a murder case, and the system of military law 
399.Just as openly, Ensign Mair avowed his machinations to circumvent the Articles of War and his
commander’s duty to prevent quarrels between oﬃcers from escalating into full-fledged duels. “I
considered that had I made any shew of resentment" upon that occasion, we would…have been both
put under an Arrest; and brought to a Court Martial,” at which point “my hands [would be] so far tied
from receiving, or taking that proper satisfaction which I was determined then to demand and
have….whereas I further considered that if we were not put under an Arrest, it would give me an
Opportunity of calling Mr. Smith to a proper Account for such his behaviour to me, and of which in my
own mind I had formed a fixed and determined resolution” (WO 71/54, p. 124).
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in which the procedures for administering military justice were controlled almost 
entirely by officers.  
In keeping with contemporary ideas about British liberty and fears of the military 
usurping control of the government, military law was supposed to occupy a position 
strictly subordinate to the civilian system of law.  The Articles of War insisted that 
soldiers accused of non-military crimes were to be tried by civil magistrate: 
if any Officer, Non-commission Officer, or Soldier, shall be accused
of any capital Crime, or of any Violence or Offence against the
Person, Estate, or Property of any of His Majesty's Subjects, which
is punishable by the known Laws of the Land; the Commanding
Officer or Officers of every Regiment, Troop, Company, or Party, is
and are hereby required to use his utmost Endeavours to deliver
over such accused Person to the the Civil Magistrate; and shall
also be aiding and assisting to the Officers of Justice in the seizing
and apprehending of such Offender, in order to bring him to
Trial.400
What this meant was that unless an area was under martial law, a court-martial 
had no right to try non-military crimes.  If a soldier deserted, or disobeyed his 
superior, or neglected his duty, that was the legitimate province of the military court.
However, if a soldier committed a robbery, rape, or murder, he was to be delivered 
up to the civilian authorities to be tried by them.  
But military courts often illegally usurped the power of the civil law.  When 
William Turner and John Ball, privates in the 50th, were accused of desertion and of a
robbery in Salisbury, a general court-martial tried them for both crimes and 
convicted and sentenced them.  But when the proceedings were sent to London for 
the sentences to be confirmed, the Judge Advocate General ordered the commander 
to turn the two men over to "a Civil Magistrate, in order to their being Tried for the 
Robbery, with which they are charged, in the Ordinary Course of Law."401  This case 
400.An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 91-92.
401.WO 71/54, p. 52.
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was a problem because the crime was committed in Britain, a civilized territory with 
a functioning legal system.  But overseas, it is most likely that trying this case in a 
military court would have been completely authorized; in imperial space, there was 
usually no civilian court to which these crimes could be referred.402  Away from 
Britain, and especially in wartime, officers necessarily had to be the sole 
administrators of military law; they were often far from alternate sources of 
authority, and during a war it was naturally extremely inconvenient to demand that 
the army be accompanied at all times by civilian judicial authorities, especially as the
army might occasionally need to resort to immediate and summary punishment to 
preserve order.  
The necessities of empire and war made it a requirement to cede almost all 
control of the military justice system to officers and removed central oversight.  
Supposedly, a check on officers’ power existed because all general courts martial 
(the only ones allowed to try capital cases) had to have the proceedings sent to 
London for approval by the king before the sentence could be executed, but this, too,
needed to be dispensed with in overseas posts.  The right to approve the 
proceedings and confirm the sentences of courts-martial was delegated to the 
commander-in-chief.  The government eventually received records of these 
proceedings, but this was so that they could properly archive and preserve them in 
accordance with the Articles of War, rather than to approve of them.  Because only 
the military commander of the theater and not the government in London had to 
approve of the sentences of overseas courts-martial, in imperial settings, one of the 
402.See Tatum, "Civilian Intervention and Military Justice in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic," 66:
“For much of the eighteenth century, key portions of the British Atlantic were claimed solely by military
garrisons, which were, in theory, free to proceed as they desired in maintaining order as long as their
reports met with approval from the army’s headquarters at the Horse Guards.”
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only sources of civilian oversight, observation, and control was removed, leaving the 
army free to impose its own values.403  
Almost the entire court-martial process was under the control of the officers.  The
commander-in-chief determined whether a general court martial was to be held or 
not (and in the case of regimental courts-martial, this was the job of the regiment’s 
commander); the court-martial board, which acted as judge and jury, was drawn 
exclusively from the roster of officers; the Deputy Judge Advocate, who controlled 
the administrative aspects of the trial, was also an officer.  Enlisted men were 
specifically barred from all these roles—most importantly, they were never permitted
to sit on court-martial boards, even when the defendant was one from their own 
ranks.  The class hierarchy meant that it was unthinkable to have enlisted judging 
officers, or even other enlisted soldiers.  Therefore, officers’ practical ability to 
manipulate the court-martial meant that they operated more like two parallel justice 
systems, separated by class, in which the double standards for acceptable behavior 
for officers and for enlisted that existed in practice were also formally upheld by the 
law.404
The power that officers held within the system of military law gave them the 
ability to direct the legal procedures that governed courts-martial.  Unlike civilian 
courts, which by the eighteenth century had been transformed into spaces where 
formal legal procedure was interpreted by lawyers and judges with specialized legal 
training, courts-martial retained a more informal tone.   Officers who judged cases 
403.Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment," 54.
404.A N Gilbert, "British Military Justice During the American Revolution", The Eighteenth Century: Theory
and Interpretation 20 (1979): 24-38; G A Steppler, "British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of
Regimental Courts Martial in the Later Eighteenth Century", The English Historical Review 102, no. 405
(1987): 859-886.
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lacked legal training, and the format of the trial was often subject to the whims of 
the senior officer presiding over it.405  
In many cases, the court-martial board appear not to have been conversant 
with recent legal developments.  For example, the court allowed hearsay evidence, 
although legal authorities as well as Adye’s Treatise on Courts-Martial declared that it
ought to be disallowed.406 And in contravention of the standard of proof nominally 
required in civilian courts by this time, courts-martial convicted on evidence that was
hardly conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt.407  This was especially apparent and 
complained of in cases of desertion, the crime most often tried before a general court
martial, but convictions despite scanty or contradictory evidence occurred in trials for
other crimes as well.  Furthermore, court-martial boards were apparently often 
ignorant of the most basic principles of modern legal procedure.  Cuthbertson had to 
warn officers that members of the court-martial board were not supposed to give 
evidence in the cases they were judging.408   
However, this is not quite to say that officers rejected any innovation in law.  
The end of distinction between principals and accessories in felonies—so that “any 
soldier who shall persuade another to desert the service, or to commit any other 
crimes contrary to the articles of war, will be deemed a principal, and be perhaps 
found more deserving of punishment than the person who actually commits the 
crime”—was a reflection of a comparative development in common law, which no 
longer held that "those only were to be judged principals in felony, who actually did 
405.Arthur Gilbert, “Military Justice and Civilian Justice,” p. 48.
406.Adye, p. 85.
407.Dayton notes that during eighteenth-century, courts in North America were increasingly influenced by
new rules of evidence and higher standards of proof, imported through treatises on English law (pp.
59-60).
408.Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry,
145-146.
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the fact; as in murder, those only who gave the mortal blow; in rape, those only who
actually ravished the party," but now asserted that all those present with intent were
to be treated as principals.409  Officers freely borrowed the common law 
developments that would enhance their power, but rejected the others.  Thus, this 
was not the wholesale rejection of the legal process, but an insistence on using and 
controlling the legal process, and a firm intention that military justice should proceed
according to their own values and allow them to uphold those values; the more 
objective law and the increasingly elaborate legal process that was developing in the 
common law did not suit their purposes.  
In general, therefore, they were ignorant of the law, and furthermore they 
were indifferent to their ignorance.  The Deputy Judge Advocate was the only person 
on the court-martial board who had any legal training.  He supposed to challenge the
selected members of the board if he doubted their ability to be impartial, collect the 
witnesses before the trial, notify the prisoner when his case was to be heard and 
give him a copy of the charges brought against him, and ask the prisoner which 
witnesses he intended to call in his defense so that Judge Advocate could call them 
to appear.  However, he had no vote and had no power to overturn the verdict of the
board even if it was not in accordance with the law.410   Even throughout the trial, he 
could offer advice as to what was legal and what was not, but the court-martial 
board was not actually obliged to accept his judgments.411  
409.Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial, 66.
410.Adye, pp. 44-46.  
411.Adye, who acted as Deputy Judge Advocate in numerous cases in North America during the
Revolution, complained about the tendency of court martial boards to ignore legal rules and admit
evidence that was irrelevant to the charge, despite his attempts as Deputy Judge Advocate to insist on
proper legal procedures: "Every Court Martial brings together a new set of men, who from not having
fixed rules or recorded precedents, have each an Opinion of their own to adopt. Young men are too
apt to imagine, that the parchment on which their Commissions are written, inspires them with military
knowledge, and those in superior ranks...fancy that length of service must make them adepts in their
profession, and consequently render them above information" (Stephen Payne Adye to Sir Charles
Gould, 30 September 1782, Stephen Payne Adye Papers, American Philosophical Society).  
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The trial of James Barton, Surgeon to the 88th Regiment, in Jamaica in 1781, 
clearly demonstrated officers’ unwillingness to abide by the Deputy Judge Advocate’s
legal advice.  In this case, the deputy judge advocate made repeated objections to 
the questions that the court asked of the witnesses—primarily, it seems, because the
court was seeking hearsay testimony.  But the court constantly overrode him and 
demanded that their questions be answered.  When he later objected to a question 
asked by the defense of one of its own witnesses, "as not tending to disprove any 
thing contained in the Charge,” the reply was, “The Court were of Opinion that it 
ought to be answered." And, in fact, they did not just overrule his objections; a few 
pages later, when the deputy judge advocate himself wanted to ask a question, it 
was "Rejected by the Court"!412  
And in the regimental courts-martial formed to try lesser offenses, there was 
no provision to have an officer with knowledge of the law present for the trial, and 
the officers serving on regimental courts often found themselves quarreling with 
each other about points of law and about how to conduct a regimental court 
martial.413  With no deputy judge advocate to advise them on legal points, the 
members disputed over whose opinion should prevail.  Lieutenant James Paterson 
was tried for his "unmilitary behavior" to Captain Faviere, who was president of a 
regimental court martial that the lieutenant was a member of.  The two men 
quarreled over what was proper to enter in the court martial proceedings, Faviere 
insisting on his own opinion because "he was a Judge."  Paterson "then said that he 
was a good a Judge as he, in an angry manner, & that they were all Judges alike."414 
412.WO 71/58, pp. 447, 452, 454, 456, 457, 462.
413.Alexander Fraser Tytler, An Essay on Military Law and the Practice of Courts Martial (Edinburgh, 1800),
183-184.
414.WO 71/78, pp. 75-78. The diary of George Nicholson, a major 3rd Regiment of Foot, oﬀers a more
extended view of oﬃcers’ squabbles over their authority to judge and punish enlisted men, containing
a complaint that a sentence that Nicholson imposed on a drunken sergeant was countermanded due
to the defendant “being a favorite of the Commanding Oﬃcer” who was “Jealous of his Power &
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Eighteenth-century commentators commonly disparaged military law and 
denounced it for its lack of consistent guiding principles.  The seemingly arbitrary 
nature of courts-martial and military justice in general was the most prominent 
criticism.415  But more generally there was a contemporary belief that army life was 
not compatible with traditional English liberties—a view adopted not only by civilian 
critics but also by officers themselves.416  
"The rigorous principles of military law, and the arbitrary manner in which it is 
administered, have given occasion to several writers, to exercise their real or 
pretended humanity, in lamenting that so many of their fellow creatures are 
unhappily subjected to its coercion,” wrote John Williamson in his treatise on the 
discipline of war.417 But, he continued, the military could not have the same liberties 
as civilian society, for "those principles and institutions, that constitute freedom in a 
state, would be productive of licentiousness in an army."418 He argued that, because 
of the military's needs, "Courts-martial are certainly warranted to act in a more 
summary, which some may call a more arbitrary, manner than the courts of common
law: and it cannot be expected, that they should be in every respect tied down to the
observance of the same punctilio."419
Officers were convinced that if they were forced to observe the “punctilio” of 
civilian court practice, the law would be incapable of delivering true justice.  In his 
analysis of regimental courts, Glenn Steppler claims that the absence of codified 
Authority” as well as complaints of excessive authority in the other direction, when he wrote of his
resentment of General Barrington’s insistence on punishing men for drunkenness “without the
Sanction of a Court Martial”—which, Nicholson pointed out, was highly illegal (George Nicholson
Journals, 10 September 1758 and 11 June 1759, National Army Museum, NAM 2001-02-400).  
415.Steppler, "The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-1793," 144.
416.Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment," 41.
417.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 152.
418.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 183.
419.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 125.
177
standards in fact allowed for a more nuanced response to the disparate defendants 
they tried: "the chronic drunkards, the insensitive brutes and the honest soldiers 
gone astray by misadventure," he suggests, all required different standards of 
judgment: merciless floggings for the "unsavoury and unruly men," and lighter 
sentences or outright pardons for the "men of better character and generally good 
behaviour."420  Certainly, the discretion allowed to officers in these regimental courts 
could prove more advantageous than a strict adherence to a harsh and inflexible 
legal code. However, these benefits were only realized when officers were diligent, 
experienced, and men of good judgment—and the complaints about officers' neglects
of duty and inappropriate levity seem to imply that many were not.  Those who 
wished to uphold the 'consequence' of courts martial not only had to fend off 
challenges to their authority from enlisted defendants, but also had to police the 
behavior of the officers assigned to judge the cases.  Despite the Articles of War 
warning that “All Members of a Court-martial are to behave with Decency,” there 
were complaints about inappropriate levity and lack of attention by officers assigned 
to sit on regimental courts martial, particularly the youngest officers.421  Occasionally
this behavior was egregious enough to result in the courts-martial of the officers 
themselves, such as Lieutenant Samuel Shephardson of the Royal Artillery, who was 
accused of being drunk while serving on a court martial.422
420.Steppler, "British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of Regimental Courts Martial in the Later
Eighteenth Century," 878-879. See also Rabin, "Drunkenness and Responsibility for Crime in the
Eighteenth Century," 477, who suggests that in England's civilian courts, "the plea of drunkenness
provided a convenient and almost universally applicable excuse that could serve as grounds for lesser
punishment or pardon." This gave juries a way avoid conforming to the harsh legal code of the time,
instead adhering to the older practice of determining an appropriate punishment based on the
defendant's character rather than the standardized sentences prescribed by the law. 
421.An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 190; Steppler, "British Military Law, Discipline, and the
Conduct of Regimental Courts Martial in the Later Eighteenth Century," 874.
422.WO 71/39, pp. 138-177.
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The "immilitary & improper behaviour" of Lieutenant James Hoy at the regimental
court martial held by the 39th Foot at Gibraltar in July 1779 began when Hoy 
objected to the wording of the charge in the first case to be tried, claiming that it 
was disallowed by the Articles of War.  During the next case, the president of the 
court "could not prevail on Mr. Hoy to attend, as he was turning over the Articles of 
War, still objecting to the former Crime, and saying he wondered he cold not find the
Article that was against it, which he continued to do so (i.e. turning over the leaves) 
during the greatest parts of this tryal."  When the court then proceeded to the trial of
two soldiers who had "broke into the house of a Serjeant of the 12th Regiment and 
ill treated his Wife," Hoy wanted to ask her prurient questions about just exactly 
what sort of ill-treatment she had received.  When another officer said that he was 
convinced that she had been treated rudely and that "he did not think it necessary to
urge the Woman to say any thing that was indecent; that they were not trying the 
man for a Capital Crime" (i.e. the victim had only accused the soldiers of assault, not
rape, and therefore was not obligated to give the intimate details necessary to prove 
a charge of rape), Hoy insisted on questioning her further, claiming that "as a 
Member of the Court Martial I may ask any question I please."  The president 
exclaimed, "why will you put a Modest Woman to the Blush by obliging her to answer
so particularly upon so nice a point," and he and Hoy got into a quarrel that led to 
Hoy's arrest and court-martial.423  
Yet such behavior was supposed to be an isolated incident.  Officers proposed 
that a court-martial board comprised entirely of officers was superior to a civilian 
jury, for "an officer is bound by a sense of honour with which we cannot always 
expect a juryman to be actuated,” and that officers, with their liberal education, 
423.WO 71/82, pp. 359-376.
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gentle birth, lofty principles, and delicate sense of honor, were manifestly superior to
the rustic clods that the system of trial by jury might select.424  Officer defendants 
echoed this view on the superiority of military courts to civilian because they were 
tried by men of honor. "It is a privilege and the dearest one which a Soldier enjoys 
as a Compensation for the civil Liberties which he relinquishes,” claimed on officer, 
“that he is tried in a Court of honor, where no Stain can be fixed on him by the low 
chicaneries of form unsupported by the sacred and substantial Maxims of Justice."425
Stephen Payne Adye, an army officer, a deputy judge advocate, and the author
of a popular guide to conducting courts-martial, with the customary British pride in 
the system of trial by jury, explicitly compared the military and civilian systems of 
justice, and defended the military system from critics who pronounced it corrupt, 
capricious, and a perversion of traditional English liberty.  Indeed, Adye claimed, the 
court-martial had several advantages over a trial in a civilian court, primarily in that 
it did not need a unanimous verdict.  Adye claimed that the requirement for 
unanimity in trials by jury meant that, because the jury was not allowed “meat, 
drink, fire, or candle” until they had delivered a verdict, jurymen would agree to 
convict the defendant simply so that they could leave, “injur[ing] their souls for the 
conveniencies of their bodies.”  Even in capital cases where the sentence was death, 
the concurrence of nine of the thirteen members of the court-martial board was 
sufficient.  Adye suggested that when the members of a jury were required to come 
to a unanimous verdict, they would be too “ready to acquiesce in the sentiments of 
some overbearing and dogmatic leader.”426   
424.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 99; Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in
Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment," 62.
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Remarks that the court martial's lack of formal legal principles was, in fact, a 
benefit were common.  Williamson claimed that a military court was "not be 
governed by the same principles, clogged with the same formalities, nor open to the 
same sophistry and chicanery, with the ordinary courts of law."427  While the civilian 
courts of Britain were filled with cases where clearly guilty prisoners were acquitted 
on legal technicalities, the army scorned them.428  Military courts were, as seen, 
readily prepared to convict or acquit in defiance of the established law to uphold their
own values.  
Military law, Adye claimed, 
is laid down in so plain and simple a manner, that every military
man is or ought to be well acquainted with what are thereby
deemed crimes, and may judge in a great measure what is to be
expected by one who is guilty of any of them, but at the same
time he has the satisfaction to know that he must be previously
convicted by a court, where justice and equity always preside, and
where the innocent can run no risque of punishment, but the guilty
are sure to meet with their deserts.429
And if this was indeed so, officers might have been happier.  While it was 
certainly preferred to civilian law, even plain and simple military law had its 
pitfalls.430  Officers showed a deep distrust of legalism, which they saw as a 
pernicious influence that might result in the conviction of defendants who—in their 
opinion—were not at fault at all (such as an officer who had honorably dueled) and 
any provisions for hurrying the court-martial board into deciding a verdict.
427.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 115.
428.Douglas Hay, Albion's Fatal Tree : Crime and Society in Eighteenth-century England (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1975), 33, argues that legal technicalities served an important function in convincing
the public that the law was not merely "the creature of a ruling class," but a high and impartial ideal to
which all were subject.
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likewise the acquittal of the certainly guilty (such as an enlisted man who had shown
undoubted insolence to his officers but was now demanding appeals and re-trials and
careful records showing that every particular of his trial had been conducted with 
exact adherence to legal procedure).  
Those who turned up in court looking too prepared with notes and legal treatises 
were regarded with suspicion.431  There was a concern that too much formality and 
preparation got in the way of truth; this why witnesses were forbidden to prepare 
their testimony in advance.  This was also the reasoning behind the ban on defense 
attorneys.  Although a prisoner was allowed to seek the advise of counsel before his 
trial, no lawyer was to be permitted "to take an active part in the trial, as by 
addressing the court, questioning the evidences, &c."432  Writing at the end of the 
eighteenth century, Tytler sugested that it was "not unusual for a prisoner to request
the aid of counsel to assist him in his defence," but not in any direct fashion; rather, 
the counselor was limited to "suggesting fit questions to the witnesses, or in drawing
up in writing a connected statement of his defence, and observations on the general 
import of the evidence."  This, Tytler thought, was an acceptable reliance on a legal 
specialist, for "in those unhappy circumstances, the party may either want ability to 
do justice to his own cause, or may be deserted by that presence of mind which is 
necessary to command and bring into use such abilities as he may actually possess."
431.Written documents, in particular, seem to have been regarded with some disfavor. Richard Joseph
Sulivan, Thoughts on Martial Law, with a Mode Recommended for Conducting the Proceedings of
General Courts Martial (London, 1784), 59, claimed that all witnesses must give their evidence “viva
voce, no matter prepared in writing is admissible; neither is a witnesses permitted to read it as his
deposition: he may, however, have reference to notes.” Tytler, An Essay on Military Law and the
Practice of Courts Martial, 251-252, wrote that “No witness is permitted to read his evidence to the
court; for this might give room for subornation of evidence, against which every court is most anxious
to guard, by the preliminary questions, whether the witness has been instructed to say, or received any
reward, or promise of reward, for giving his testimony.” See also the legal dispute between Thomas
and Gordon (discussed later in this chapter)—there was a common perception that a man who came
into a military court with lots of legal-looking papers and testimony he wished to read was clearly up to
no good.
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However, he denounced the excessive legal formalities of civilian courts, warning 
that "the prisoner's counsel who properly understands his duty, will see that it is his 
part not to embarrass, to tease, or to perplex the court."  He was not "to force the 
discordant and unsuitable axioms and rules of the civil courts upon a military 
tribunal, but candidly to instruct himself in that law which regulates their procedure, 
and accommodate himself to their forms and practice.”433 Tytler was of the opinion 
that military men and lawyers simply did not mix:     
Courts-Martial being in general composed of men of ability and
discretion, but who, from the nature of their profession and general
mode of life, are not to be supposed versant in legal subtilties, or
abstract and sophistical distinctions...counsel, or professional lawyers,
are not allowed to interfere in their proceedings...For lawyers being in
general as utterly ignorant of Military law and practice, as the
members of Courts-Martial are of civil jurisprudence and the forms of
the ordinary courts; so nothing could result from the collision of such
warring and contradictory judgments, but inextricable embarrassment,
or rash, ill-founded, and illegal decisions.434
Military commentators made unflattering comparisons to civilian courts, with 
predictions of further woe if military courts continued the trend of adopting practices 
then becoming increasingly common in civilian courts, such as the innovation of reply
and rejoinder:  “[O]f late the judge advocate has been permitted to reply to the 
prisoner's defence, and bring other evidences to endeavour to weaken what the 
prisoner and his witnesses have urged, and to strengthen the testimony of witnesses
for the prosecution,” Adye wrote in 1778.  And “where such a reply has been 
allowed, as it seems but just that every advantage should be granted the prisoner to 
clear himself of the crime, he is always indulged with an answer, and new witnesses 
to confirm his former assertions, which is called a rejoinder.”435  By 1791 this custom
433.Tytler, An Essay on Military Law and the Practice of Courts Martial, 254-255.
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had apparently become well established, and Williamson condemned in particular the
protracted exchanges of lawyerly rhetoric at the end of cases: "It is now the general 
practice of courts-martial, when the prisoner has finished his defense, to allow the 
prosecutor to reply...The prisoner is also permitted to rejoin...This reply and 
rejoinder seem to be a excrementitious shoot, which has sprung from the unnatural 
mixture of civil with military law, since counsel have been admitted at courts-
martial.”  And in “the pleadings of counsel at common law,” it was even worse, for 
there “we have reply, rejoinder, sur-rejoinder, rebutter, and sur-rebutter."  If 
military courts adopted this practice of allowing extended statements and replies to 
statements by each side's counsel, he claimed, the now-straightforward military 
justice process would become "frittered and lengthened out in the same manner" as 
the civilian courts.436
The general principle that officers wished to adopt regarding military courts was 
that the individual judgment of the members of the jury ought to have primacy over 
formal legal practices.  This was most apparent in considering which witnesses ought
to be permitted to give testimony.  The focus on individual judgment allowed the 
court martial board to dismiss the testimony of some witnesses because of their 
personal feeling that the witness was unconvincing; but, on the other hand, this 
principle also allowed the a wider variety of people to testify because the court-
martial board, rather than the court, was to determine whether they were proper 
witnesses.  In his defense statement, one officer reminded the court martial board 
that they must evaluate the honesty of the witnesses as well as the substance of 
their testimony, and "reject all Evidence however legal or formal that does not bring 
the Conviction of Truth to his Mind along with it.”  This, he added, “is the Office of 
436.Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, 127.
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the English Jury and this is the single Cause why England is a free Nation and why 
the other Nations that surround her are not free."437  Thus, the rejection of legalism 
and the rule of law, in favor of personal feeling and judgment, was now being 
proposed as the foundation of English liberty.  
This was in keeping with army officers’ culture and ideas on masculinity.  The law
was a tool, useful for bolstering the authority they enjoyed by virtue of their class 
and rank, but also something that could not be allowed to reign supreme over their 
lives, because of its ability to interfere with military authority, class privilege, and 
masculine honor.  
Especially in its opposition to private violence, the law undermined the 
fundamental sources of officers’ identity as honorable gentlemen.  Maintaining their 
status necessarily required the judicious exercise of violence, and they had an 
understanding that the law was not the sole arbiter of interpersonal violence.  
Certain relationships, even when they were characterized by extreme or even lethal 
violence, were outside the regulation of the law.  The duel as a method for settling 
disputes between gentlemen was one primary example of officers’ preference for 
extralegal violence over the using the law.  
Defensive violence was not only natural and uncontrollable, but also an action 
that had clear moral superiority over seeking redress from the law.  Officers believed
that legal mechanisms allowed others to abuse them contrary to the rules of honor 
enforced by violence. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Thomas bewailed his position as 
defendant in a court martial: 
In addition to the Mortification of being obliged to answer to such a
Charge from such a Man, I have found myself a Prisoner,
subjected to the Humiliation (without having it in my Power to
make the proper reply) of having myself loaded with every
437.WO 71/60, p. 150, Portsmouth, 1782.
185
approbrious Epithet; with a Torrent of Abuse and Aspersion, not
hastily dropt from Excess of Passion, but coolly and deliberately
from written Papers.438  
His prosecutor’s use of the law rather than violence to satisfy the supposed slight
Thomas had given him; Thomas’s own inability to reply to insulting words with 
violence, because they were said in a courtroom and he was a prisoner of the court; 
and the legal process which allowed his adversary to “coolly and deliberately” think 
up insulting remarks about him, write them down so he could remember them later, 
and then say them in the public forum of the court, Thomas suggested, were all 
nearly intolerable to a man of proper honor.  
Rev. Robert Newburgh, chaplain to the 18th Regiment during its unhappy postings
in North America in the years leading up to the Revolution, was despised the other 
officers of the regiment for constantly rumors and accusations that he was a 
“notorious Buggerer” with lawsuits instead of violence.  Furthermore, he was 
continually offering up various papers and certificates as legal proof of his innocence 
from the charges.  The officers of the 18th soon became exasperated with these 
sorts of appeals.  In their minds, a man who was accused of buggery ought to 
challenge or assault the person who had so insulted his character; to respond by 
deluging the various third parties who had heard the accusations with certificates 
from respectable persons testifying that he was not a buggerer but a decent Anglican
clergyman was the height of ridiculousness.  
But Newburgh was not a soldier—could a clergyman really be expected to engage
in the violent defense of honor customary to a military man?  Perhaps not, but in 
that case, the officers of the 18th insisted, Newburgh had no right to claim the 
masculine privileges and honors that were rightfully the soldier’s.  
438.WO 71/56, p. 125.
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The officers initially called a court of enquiry to into Newburgh’s behavior and 
reputation.  Captain Benjamin Chapman claimed to have observed "unbecoming 
behaviour in him [Newburgh] as a Clergyman,” citing among other things an incident
“on a Sunday in the month of November last at Bristol in the province of 
Penselvania; he was walking with Colonel Fanning, when the Rev. Mr. Newburgh 
Galloped Close by him full Speed, in a very unbecoming dress.”  Colonel Fanning 
“asked him if he knew whose groom that was,” and Chapman “answered that he was
sorry to say, he was a Clergyman and Chaplain to the 18th Regt. and Colonel 
Fanning reply'd he was also sorry to see it, for that he Looked more like a Groom or 
a Jockey than one of that Sacred Function.”  This, according to Chapman, was the 
final straw.  This incident (and the rumors of sodomy that were constantly 
surrounding Newburgh) were the “particular reasons he determined within himself 
never to take any notice of him unless unavoidably compelled to it."439  
The particulars of Newburgh’s “Indecent dress” were described in detail: “a Close 
light Coloured Surtout, with a Scarlet or Crimson falling Collar, with a round Buck 
Hatt, perfectly in the Stile of a Groom.”  Furthermore, Newburgh had also been seen 
“in the Barracks and Streets at Philadelphia in a Dress that had not the least 
resemblance to that usually worn by a Clergyman,” such as “a light Coloured frock 
made of Bath Coating, Close Buck or Lamb skin Breeches, white Silk Stockings, and 
a smart Fashionable Cocked Hatt, in short what is now termed a Macaroni 
Dishabille.”  And his fashionable dress was not the only defect in Newburgh’s 
“appearance and Deportment.”  Chapman related that, “to his utter Surprise,” he 
had seen Newburgh “during an Entertainment, plant himself in the front row of the 
Stage Box in Philadelphia Theater.”440  
439.WO 72/7.
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 “This Style of Behaviour…might indeed become a Captain of Grenadiers,” 
Chapman claimed.  Such a dashing officer, he implied, perhaps had the right to 
parade himself in fashionable attire at fashionable entertainments, unhampered by 
any accusation of effeminacy for his eye-catching clothing because of the glorious 
violence he dispensed on the battlefield.  But, he continued piously, it was “badly 
Suited to the Gravity and Dignity of a Clergyman, whose Character should be like 
that of Caesars Wife, not only free from Vice but even from the Appearance of it.”  In
fact, Chapman claimed, Newburgh’s dress and behavior were offending the 
inhabitants of Philadelphia, “a Country, where strict Propriety and Decorum are the 
distinguishing Characteristick of almost every Clergyman, and who Studiously avoid 
appearing at any publick amusement whatsoever.”  But Chapman’s complaints 
suggest another intriguing point.  He was implying that soldiers were immune to the 
normal rules of local behavior—they could patronize the theater and wear 
fashionable clothing decidedly not in keeping with the sober tastes of the local 
Quakers, but Newburgh, by doing these things, was scandalizing the local 
community.  And it was wrong for him to cause scandal, but officers could not be 
expected to restrain their disorderly drinking, swearing, violence, whoring, and 
theater-visiting merely because the locals disapproved.  
Newburgh in particular ought to have been careful to avoid any appearance of 
scandal, Chapman noted disapprovingly, for his “reputation was by no means free 
from blemish,” but Newburgh showed an utter disinclination to reform his behavior: 
“when the Impropriety of his wearing a very fashionable Cock’t Hatt was mentioned 
to him,” Newburgh “replied in a very determined Tone of voice, that he would next 
day wear another still more fashionable.”441  
441.WO 71/80, pp. 112-113.
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Newburgh was also hated by the officers of the 18th for encouraging the enlisted 
men of the regiment to pursue legal means of redress.  Private Nicholas Gaffany, 
who spent many months trying his officers’ patience by demanding his legal rights, 
consulting lawyers, bringing charges against his officers for daring to punish him 
without trying him by court-martial first, and being flogged for his impertinence for 
doing these things, claimed that Newburgh had encouraged him in these legal 
activities and offered to pay his fees for consulting an attorney.  Captain Shee 
claimed that had Newburgh not been there to egg him on, Gaffany “would not have 
carried Matters to those violent lengths, had he not been assisted.”  Shee 
characterized Newburgh as a “Miscreant, Enemy to the peace & harmony of the 
Regt.”442  Therefore, the officers of his regiment considered themselves utterly 
justified in using legal trickery of their own to attempt to remove Newburgh from the
regiment.  
Soldiers who chose to use the law when military ideas about masculinity 
demanded that they should respond to insult with violence were scorned.  But there 
was also a more generalized disapproval of people who eagerly embraced the law 
and sought out precedents, legal rules about evidence, and other such things to 
support themselves in the courtroom.  The army, Williamson wrote, had better 
things to do with its time than to indulge offenders with the "the sophistry and 
chicanery of the ordinary courts of justice, and the useless forms, with which their 
proceedings are impeded."443
Military courts showed a marked dislike of those who were thought to have 
evaded justice due to their exploitation of legal technicalities, such as Private John 
Bolton of the 35th, who was tried for desertion in Brooklyn in July 1778.  An officer 
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reported that Bolton had actually deserted from the 35th almost two years previous 
to his trial, but by January 1778 he had enlisted in the New York Volunteers, a 
loyalist corps.  But Bolton had gotten into trouble and had apparently been 
sentenced to be flogged when,“in order to avoid a punishment assigned him,” he told
the adjutant that he “declared himself a Deserter from the 35th Regt.”  This strategy
was successful in the short term—the adjutant of the New York Volunteers “therefore
had not punished him” and instead sent him to the custody of the 35th, where the 
lieutenant colonel of the regiment had pardoned him.  But in July Bolton went 
missing again, and when he was recaptured he was tried and sentenced to death.444
 The court showed a similar disdain for officers who sought legal loopholes.  While
some officer defendants emphasized their “Candour,” “Manly Openness,” and trust in
the court-martial board’s ability to instinctively determine whether their actions were
honorable or not without any reference to law books or any code other than the 
informal one of honorable military gentlemen, others seized upon the court-martial’s 
(deliberate) resemblance to a civilian court and barraged the court with objections, 
demands for clarifications of legal technicalities, and sarcastic references to the 
Articles of War.  
Captain George Isham Parkyns, accused of being away without leave for several 
months and of embezzlement, objected to individual questions asked by the 
prosecutor of the witnesses giving evidence against him, some of the witnesses 
themselves, and to the particular article of the Articles of War under which he was 
charged, requiring the court to be cleared several times while the board discussed 
and determined the merit of the objections.445  Captain John Rutherford, charged 
with “insulting his Commanding Officer,” informed the court that he had “carefully 
444.WO 71/86 p. 216–218
445.WO 71/56, pp. 45-68.
190
examin’d the Articles of War, and so far from finding any crime specified under the 
denomination of 'Insult'; I have not been able to find even the word itself.  If there is
such a word, the Judge Advocate will I am sure do me the favor to point out the 
passage which contains it.  If there is no such word how shall I reply to a Charge 
under a denomination not found in the Law itself?"  He also noted that he had also 
done the court’s work for them should they wish to contend that case law and 
precedent might support the charge even if statute did not: “I have examined such 
trials as I have been able to select, to seek for a precedent of the charge of Insult; 
but have not succeeded.  I have enquired of Military Gentlemen for such a 
precedent; but also without success.”446  Major Edward Drewe replied to his 
prosecutor’s charge that he was constantly “lying a Bed in the Morning” by 
demanding to to know “under what Article of War it falls,” and also wanted similar 
information about the supposed crime of “Breakfast[ing] on a Crust of Bread 
accompanied by Grog, Punch, or Porter.”447  
Although Adye in the 1770s was insisting that courts-martial needed to name 
specific violations of the Articles of War with which to charge defendants in order to 
add legitimacy, by 1800 Tytler was recommending that courts omit them to prevent 
sophistry, perhaps in direct response to officers who followed the example of 
Rutherford and Drewe: 
It was formerly a very usual custom, to express in the sentences of
Courts-Martial, the particular Articles of War of which the sentence
declared the prisoner to be guilty of a breach or violation; but the
more recent, and better practice, is to omit all such reference to the
Articles of War; as being in itself unnecessary, and frequently affording
handle for cavilling, and sophistical objections of irregularity or
incongruity with the articles referred to.448 
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Officers and enlisted alike were disposed to prefer direct and manly violence to 
the indirect, circuitous, lengthy, and somewhat effeminate recourse to the law.  The 
wartime needs of the empire gave officers far more authority to use the law for their 
own purposes than they would have been allowed at home, but empire and war also 
had effects on officers’ view of the law.  The finer points of law were not something 
that could be indulged in uncivilized places, or in wartime.  Military law was a marker
of empire; uncivilized colonies in the throes of war and rebellion could not be allowed
the same civil liberties as the metropole.  "The slow and cautious procedure of the 
King’s ordinary courts of justice, keeps no pace with that daring celerity which 
attends the operations of rebellion; nor are their regulated forms and publicity of 
procedure fitted to bring to light the dark designs of a conspiracy,” wrote Tytler.449  
In these circumstances, he argued, it was foolhardy to depart from the necessary 
speed and secrecy of military law in order to indulge defendants with the rights they 
rightfully ought to enjoy only in peaceful Britain.  And war itself disrupted the 
workings of law and the pursuit of justice.  When Lieutenant Colonel Cosmo Gordon 
wanted to prosecute another officer, Frederick Thomas, for aspersing his character 
by questioning his behavior during a Revolutionary War battle, the events of the war 
itself overtook him.  Eventually, Gordon and Thomas had to fight a duel to settle the 
matter, four years after the events that provoked it, and on another continent, 
because the matter of whether or not Gordon had behaved as a coward in a battle 
now had absolutely no chance of being resolved by a trial—all of the other witnesses 
had died in subsequent Revolutionary War battles.450
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Often, officers’ understanding of the law was like paperwork to fill out, a formality
that was necessary to keep up appearances.  When circumstances allowed, it could 
help create a pleasing appearance of civilization.  The court-martial's primary value 
in an imperial setting was to establish and legitimize colonial authority.  The 
appearance of legality seemed to be more important than an actual commitment to 
the law.  So officers found that the apparatus of the law had its uses.  But they also 
recognized its dangers, and were determined to keep it firmly under their own 
control. 
Officers thought that the law was a threat to their honor.  As seen in the 
examination of dueling at the beginning of the chapter, a strict adherence to the 
terms of the law could be an obstacle to protecting honor and reputation, and it was 
often willingly broken by officers seeking what they claimed was a higher form of 
justice.451  When Private Nicholas Gaffany used the system of military courts to bring 
charges against one of his officers, Captain Shee, Shee’s reply to Gaffany began, 
An attack upon the Character of any Individual let his Situation in
Life be what it may, is, & ought to be considered as a circumstance
of the most serious nature, "Good name in man or Woman, is the
immediate Jewel of our Souls." If this Hypothesis be true in it's
[sic] general sense, How much more forcibly must it appear when
applied to the Reputation of a Soldier, the Characteristick of whose
profession is Honour, Without which he may be justly looked upon
as a Body without a Soul, An object deserving the Scorn and
Reproach of every one.452
Of what value could the law be to officers if it could be used to damage their 
honor and their reputations in this way?  Already they had discovered themselves 
willing to die to protect their honor, and kill to protect their honor, and to inflict 
Kirke published the proceedings in 1772; Wall's crime was committed in 1782, and he was hanged for
it 1802.
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brutal violence, and to break the law to protect their honor. Is it any wonder that 
they would also use all the power that the court-martial placed in their hands to 
subvert the workings of the law in defense of their honor?  
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Chapter 7: The Supremacy of Honor
Even by the standards of a culture that celebrated violent masculinity and upheld
the principle that deadly force was acceptable if necessary to defend personal honor, 
the quarrel between Ensign William Mair and Ensign Thomas Milward Smith, both of 
the 60th Regiment of Foot, had spun wildly out of control.  
The conflict had started while the regiment was stationed in Jamaica in 1777.  In 
the presence of several other officers, Smith had told a barkeeper to “give my 
Compliments to Mr. Mair and tell him he is a damned Coward.”  Once Mair had heard
the remark, Mair sent Smith “a Challenge in writing to fight with Pistols and meet 
that Evening at six o’clock at the horse course.”453  But that meeting resulted in not a
duel, but a violent argument over the conditions under which the men sought to 
duel.  When the negotiations about the terms of the duel were revealed in court, it 
could not be doubted that the participants were not so much concerned with 
upholding gentlemanly honor as with trying to murder each other.  Each man had 
been determined to fight the duel with the weapons he thought had the best chance 
of inflicting a fatal wound upon the other party.    
Smith then caused further embarrassment when he blatantly violated the cultural
standard that assumed that an officer need not be supervised when under arrest, 
because his word of honor was sufficient to bind him.  When the officers’ 
commander, Captain Spiesmacher, had heard of the dispute, he had confined both 
men to their quarters.  Ensign Smith, Spiesmacher said, had “leave to go out to 
dinner,” but was required to be back in his quarters by the evening.  But a few days 
later, Smith was seen at a tavern two hours after he was supposed to be in his 
453.WO 71/54, 75-77.
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quarters, “in a dispute with one Mr. Eberall [about] which of the two, Lord Chatham 
or Lord Mansfield was the better Orator.”  This quarrel about the speechmaking 
abilities of the two politicians then escalated into a general mêlée in the tavern, in 
which Smith was “extreamly abusive” and “Challenged almost every body in the 
house to fight with him.”454 
But the final straw occurred the evening after the abortive duel, when Mair’s 
second, Lieutenant Palmer, and Ensign Smith were together on the parade, “in the 
dismissing of which,” reported one witness to this very public altercation, “Ensign 
Smith treated Lieutenant Palmer with disrespect, that Lieutenant Palmer 
reprimanded him for it in words arose between them, in the course of which dispute 
Lieutenant Palmer was heard to say ‘You puppy or you Rascall if you don't hold your 
Jaw I will Lather you.’” After another exchange of insults, both men drew their 
swords, fought, and were disarmed and rearmed themselves numerous times before 
they were finally separated, with Lieutenant Palmer wounded in several places, and 
both men were put under arrest.455 
All these events worked to undermine the military hierarchy and destroyed 
military discipline.  But examining the conflict between Mair, Smith, and Palmer and 
the way in which Captain Spiesmacher responded to it reveals how honor culture 
harmed the military, but also the difficulties the army had regulating it.  
Commanders had an interest in preventing quarrels, but their efforts were 
complicated by the complicity of army administrators in the masculine culture they 
found detrimental to the army.  Their high rank placed them at a remove from the 
mass of officers, but they were ultimately of the same class and occupation.  They 
had lived their lives within the midst of the culture of martial masculinity that they 
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now found so exasperating, and they found it difficult, if not impossible, to regulate 
it.  Upholding the honor-conscious masculinity of army officers meant allowing them 
to subvert the law and regulate themselves by the standards of gentlemanly 
behavior instead, even when it was detrimental to military and imperial interests.  
Whereas the previous chapter has focused on junior officers’ determination to uphold
the principles of honor culture even if it subverted the law, this chapter focuses on 
the effects of using honor culture, rather than the law, to govern officers’ behavior.  
This culture of masculine violence was a threat to military discipline, but the 
government capitulated instead of making real efforts to end it; tacitly they 
recognized that officers’ personal honor must necessarily trump military interests 
and the hierarchy. 
Captain Spiesmacher’s original arrest of Mair and Smith after he had heard about
the challenge to duel was the orthodox response of a commanding officer.  The 
Articles of War banned officers from dueling itself, but also prohibited the mere 
sending of a challenge to duel.456  But there his strict adherence to the terms of the 
law ended.  At the court-martial, he made it plain that he objected to the behavior of
the two ensigns not because they had planned to duel, but because they had wildly 
deviated from proper dueling behavior.  
This was not unusual behavior for an officer.  Not only did officers undermine the 
anti-dueling prescriptions of the Articles of War by declining to use the court-martial 
as a peaceful method for the settlement of their disputes, they subverted the charge 
of “behavior unbecoming” and the institution of the court-martial itself to uphold, 
strengthen, and encourage the practice of dueling.  When court-martial boards were 
faced with a case that might involve dueling, their concern was not to discover 
456.An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 156-158.
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whether a challenge had been issued or accepted or if a duel had taken place and to 
punish the participants according to the regulations set down by the Articles of War.  
To them, whether or not a duel or an invitation to duel had taken place was not 
important; what mattered was whether the participants had dueled improperly.  
Dueling had certain standards.  The participants might kill each other, yes, but no
one was to be killed dishonorably.  No one was even to be touched dishonorably.  
The rules of the duel stipulated that the participants were only to be assaulted in two
specific ways—by the blade of a sword or by the shot of a pistol.  Only these two 
methods, with their associations with battlefield combat, allowed violence but not 
dishonor to be inflicted upon the body of a gentleman.  Officers were censured for 
proposing any other means for settling disputes among themselves.  Ensign 
Fothergill, accused of lying by Lieutenant Mostyn and wanting “to have the 
Satisfaction of a Gentlemen,” told Mostyn that “he did not understand the use of a 
Sword but wo[ul]d either draw a Pistol or play at Handy Fisty with him.”  Mostyn 
frostily replied that to “fight handy Fisty” was “not a Gentlemanlike way of 
fighting.”457  
Similarly, when Ensign Somerville Murray was accused before a court martial of 
“behaving unbecoming the Character of an Officer and a Gentleman,” the complaint 
made against him was not that he had challenged another officer to duel, but that he
had challenged another officer to duel, and then suggested that the weapons to be 
used be their own fists rather than swords or pistols, the only weapons suitable for 
gentlemanly fighting.  He had further breeched propriety by calling at the quarters of
his opponent the next day with a mere sergeant in tow for his second, when all the 
unwritten rules of dueling insisted that all participants of a duel must be gentlemen, 
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and that, indeed, only gentlemen had a sufficiently refined sense of honor to 
understand the principles behind dueling.  His outraged opponent indignantly pointed
to this behavior as proof that Murray was no gentleman and ought to be dismissed 
from the army.458  
Mair and Smith did nothing so vulgar as proposing to settle their difference with a
fistfight.  But their argument about whether their duel ought to be fought with pistols
or swords betrayed a rather dishonorable concern with committing convenient 
homicide rather than establishing a reputation for manly courage.  Opponents of 
dueling who denounced the practice as the moral equivalent of murder were not 
exaggerating for effect.  Certainly there were men who were drawn into duels much 
against their will and against their inclination.  But other men deliberately provoked 
and actively sought duels, because for them the duel served as a de facto legal 
method of killing another man.  
Earlier historiography on dueling often notes its ritual nature and how one could 
refute accusations of cowardice merely by standing and “receiving fire,” even if both 
parties merely fired into the air.  However, this is more accurately a description of 
British dueling conventions of the early-to-mid-nineteenth century, when the practice
was in decline.  In the nineteenth century, when the duel was a dying practice, it 
was socially acceptable to accept a challenge and then fire into the air during the 
duel itself, thereby technically satisfying the requirement to shoot, but at the cost of 
turning the duel into something of a farce.459  
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Although many duels ended once the parties had exchanged fire—this being 
sufficient to prove the courage of both participants—the practice of confining the duel
to a single exchange of shots was by no means universal.460  It was not the case at 
all in most of military duels of the late eighteenth century, in which the participants 
were were expected to at least attempt to kill each other, and manipulating the 
circumstances of the duel to make it less lethal was not widespread and an open 
secret yet.  In fact, in this this earlier period honor codes insisted that the 
participants must at least give a credible display of deadly intent; “dumb-shooting or
firing in the air” was explicitly forbidden.461  
When the seconds negotiated the terms of the duel between Mair and Smith, 
they “agreed that Mr. Mair and Mr. Smith should each exchange two Shot with the 
Pistols and that if neither of them received a wound by the Pistol Shot that then they
should determine the matter with their Swords."462  By stipulating that the duel was 
not to end until at least one party was wounded, the participants specifically ensured
that the duel would not devolve into any relatively non-violent ritual exchange of 
inaccurate pistol fire.
The clear point of the engagement was not to discharge any accusations of 
cowardice by standing and receiving fire, but to actually wound at least one of the 
participants.  Before the duel, a witness reported that Smith “say’d that ‘with this 
good Sword (putting his hand to his Sword and then putting himself in a fencing 
posture) I will do for Mr. Mair if he were attended by twenty of his Country Men.’”463  
Smith was even more explicit on the dueling ground, according to the report of 
Mair’s second, Lieutenant Palmer: “Mr. Smith declared he would only fight [with 
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pistols] upon Condition that Mr. Mair would draw Swords afterward if no wound was 
received, that he came with a resolution (first drawing his Sword) to do Execution 
and pistols would not answer his purpose.”464  
Homicidal intentions among duelists were by no means universal, but many 
officers seem to have seen duels as an opportunity to kill.  The night before he was 
killed in a duel, one officer was heard to say that he had his opponent “now in his 
Clutches and he should not escape so easily as he thought."465  After a fight between 
Lieutenant Bird of the King’s Orange Rangers and his commanding officer, Lieutenant
Colonel John Bayard, which ended in Bird’s death, several witnesses claimed that 
Bird had deliberately provoked the fight, in which he had hit Bayard with a cane.  
Upset with Bayard for refusing him a leave of absence, Bird sought to revenge 
himself through a duel.  One officer reported that Bird had told him that “he [Bird] 
had repeatedly Challenged Col. Bayard, but never could get him to give him 
satisfaction, and that he was determined to Cane Col. Bayard, and oblige him to 
fight.”  Another said that Bird claimed that “the next time Col. Bayard insulted him, 
he would take a Cane in one hand and his Sword in the other, and Cane Col. Bayard 
at the point of his Sword and then he would be forced to fight him.”466
Ensign Mair suspected from Ensign Smith’s strange behavior regarding the initial 
alleged insult Mair had given to Smith that Smith was trying to provoke a duel.  After
Smith had found out that rumors were circulated through the regiment that Smith 
had allowed himself to be caned or horsewhipped by Mair, Smith had told another 
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man, in the presence of several other officers of the 60th, that Mair was a coward.  
Mair claimed that this was a violation of proper gentlemanly behavior: Smith should 
have either called upon Mair and given him a chance to explain that he had never 
actually claimed to have disgracefully assaulted Smith, "or at least he ought to have 
sent me a Challenge.”  The only way that Mair could “account for his behaviour on 
this occasion” was by speculating that because Smith 
was brought up in the Army from his infancy and thereby
supposed to know the Laws of dueling better than I confess I do,
or had an opportunity to do, he thereby wished or wanted to draw
the Challenge from me, from which it was his opinion, that he
would have the choice of weapons, and thereby avail himself of
that skill and knowledge he had of the Sword and which he knew
very well I professed I had no knowledge of.467  
Mair pointed to this as a further example of Smith’s poor character: “it is not to 
be thought that an Officer and a Gentleman would insist upon an undue advantage, a
Gentleman will always fight on equal terms.”  Smith had “often boasted that he was 
an expert Swordsman,” while Mair had “just come from the Study of Divinity” and, 
due to this “Sudden departure and change in Life” to a military career, “had little or 
no opportunity of Studying the polite accomplishments, particularly the use of the 
Sword.”468  It was considered bad form to insist on fighting with swords against an 
opponent who did not have the same skill level.469  
In the end, the duel didn’t happen—not because Mair and Smith thought better of
their homicidal intentions, but because each man was insistent on securing terms 
most favorable to himself for killing the other man, and could not come to an 
agreement on this point. Smith wanted to make sure that the duel was fought with 
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swords alone, or, as his second choice, to be started with a single exchange of 
pistols shots before proceeding to swords.  Mair refused to fight with swords at any 
point during the duel, citing his ignorance, and instead insisted on fighting 
exclusively with pistols.  But Mair made certain that all knew that his preference for 
pistols stemmed not from any attempt to mitigate the inherently hazardous 
conditions of a duel (pistol fire in this age was inaccurate enough that a single 
exchange of shots would quite possibly result in no wound to either party, unlike a 
sword fight), but merely from his desire to fight with weapons with which both he 
and Smith had similar levels of skill.  Mair declared that he would "fire as many 
Pistols with Mr. Smith as he pleased,” and that he was willing to exchange shots with
Smith “as long as there is Powder and Ball.”470   
Dueling provided numerous opportunities for officers’ status to be threatened, 
because of the contradictory demands of trying to channel passion and resentment 
into proper gentlemanly modes of expression.  It was not proper to be in an 
uncontrolled rage; one was to be resentful, yes, but coolly resentful.  One might be 
in a passion, but one was to make visible attempts to control it.  One did not let 
one’s resentment lead one into ungentlemanly behavior.   Allowing a duel to descend
into a brawl was a betrayal of one’s status as an officer and a gentleman.471  When 
Lieutenant Haines accused Ensign Townshend of “ungentlemanlike behavior” because
when Haines struck him, Townshend “did not draw his Sword but clench'd his fist, 
and attempted to strike him,” Townshend acknowledged that this was what he had in
fact done, but denied that this was an attempt to fight in a vulgar and 
ungentlemanlike way.  Rather, he claimed, he was not brawling, but had specifically 
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chosen not to draw his sword in order to assault Haines in a way that disgraced 
Haines’ body to the same degree that Haines had just disgraced his by hitting him 
with a riding switch: “Can it be wonder'd that I shou'd first wish to put the Can'd 
Townshend on a footing to obtain Satisfaction of the can'd Haines, on equal terms 
before I drew that Sword, which I allow to be the Weapon a Gentleman shou'd have 
recourse to.”472  Courts-martial faced a parade of cases like this one, featuring 
defendants who had shown themselves incapable of restraining their tempers long 
enough to even have a duel, with far worse consequences to the service.  
The abortive duel between Mair and Smith did not descend into a vulgar fistfight 
during the duel itself, but the next evening, as Captain Spiesmacher related, “fresh 
matter occurred which has involved another Officer in this Unhappy dispute”: the 
fist-and-sword-fight that broke out between Ensign Smith and Mair’s second, 
Lieutenant Palmer, on the regimental parade ground.  
The fight between Palmer and Smith was improper because it violated the 
conventions of fair play and appropriate weapons.  Corporal Strauss reported that 
after the initial insults, the two men stood around daring each other to draw swords, 
but neither did, until Palmer took "the Stick or Supple Jack that was in his hand and 
gave Ensign Smith two or three blows, upon Ensign Smith receiving the last blow his 
hatt fell off; and as he was picking it up he drew his Sword"; Palmer drew as well, 
and after "several passes at each other," Palmer's sword bent or broke.  Upon 
"seeing his Sword had failed him, he immediately turned from Ensign Smith and 
desired that he might be kept from him as his Sword had failed him, and was making
towards the Guard house, and was striving to straighten his Sword" when "Ensign 
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Smith's seeing Lieutenant Palmer's back to him, he advanced and ran Lieutenant 
Palmer into the back."473 
Palmer had violated the rules of gentlemanly combat by striking Mair with a 
“Stick or Supple Jack,” and Mair had behaved dishonorably when he tried to strike 
Palmer when he was disarmed and when his back was turned.  But the far worse 
violation committed by both men was indicated by Corporal Strauss’s eyewitness 
testimony: that he was in fact an eyewitness reflected damningly on Palmer and 
Smith’s behavior by having an altercation witnessed by enlisted soldiers.  One of the 
requirements of a proper duel, as was alluded to in the arrangements originally 
made by Mair and Smith, was a certain degree of privacy.  Duels usually took place 
in an isolated location at odd and early hours of the morning, not only to prevent 
interference from bystanders but also to prevent the lower orders from witnessing a 
display of the officer class as anything other than a united brotherhood. 
Furthermore, it prevented enlisted men from seeing an officer suffer shameful or 
dishonorable treatment should matters get out of hand.  Officers found it humiliating 
to be struck or insulted, but to have that treatment witnessed by their social inferiors
was utterly intolerable.  Major John Cotton was convicted of “using opprobrious 
Language and improper behavior towards Lieutenant Thomas Simpson of the same 
Regiment, tending to the breach of good Order and Military Discipline.”  Upon 
reviewing the proceedings, the king noted that Cotton’s behavior was especially bad 
because Cotton had called particular attention to it (instructing his listeners to “take 
notice that Lieut. Simpson is a Rascal and Scoundrel and that I call him so") and he 
had done it “at the head of the Battalion” in the presence of all of the men.  And the 
ridiculous origins of the dispute between the two men—Cotton’s servant had spotted 
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his own mislaid stockings on Simpson’s legs—further diminished the dignity of the 
officers before their men.474  Captain Dussaux claimed that being marched at the 
point of bayonets when under arrest was not only a violation of his sacred rights as 
an Englishman, but also scandalous because it had been done in full view of the 
enlisted soldiers of the regiment.  
Palmer and Smith’s fight had occurred directly after the regimental parade, when 
the majority of the enlisted men were present to witness it and observe the 
particular details of the officers’ poor behavior and name-calling.  Sergeant Jacob 
Kurtz reported that "Mr. Palmer say'd 'God damn the good for nothing rascal carry 
him to the Guard Room”; Private Atherton claimed that Palmer had called Smith "a 
puppy" and a “Rascal” and said “that if he did not hold his Jaw he would thrash him 
and then have him a one blow with his Stick."475  Corporal Peters related that after 
Smith was under arrest, he wanted to know if Palmer had been wounded.  Upon 
Peters telling him that he "did not know but that some of the Men had carried him to 
his Lodgings,” Smith “then say'd he wished he run the Yankee (meaning Mr. Palmer 
as I believe) through the Arse.”476 
Officers attempted to further reinforce their power and the authority of their 
position by drawing on the institutional power of the army, claiming that the assaults
and insults they had suffered required retribution not only because it insulted their 
personal honor as gentlemen, but because it also insulted their authority as officers, 
and by extension the authority of the army as a whole.  Captain Dussaux claimed 
that when enlisted men witnessed his treatment it was a “Subversion of the very 
foundation of Military Order and Discipline,” because it had the effect of “making an 
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Officer of the Rank of Captain appear in a contemptible and Humiliating light to the 
Soldiers.”477  
 When Lieutenant Glenie was reprimanded for disobeying Captain Aubrey’s 
orders, he complained that, whatever faults he may have committed, Aubrey had 
most unjustifiably undermined his authority with a public general order given out 
that might be interpreted as a reprimand of him for neglect of duty: "It appear'd to 
me, I must confess an Order, very extraordinary and equally personal.  It cou'd not 
possibly answer any one good End, but it had an Evident tendency to hurt the 
Service, as it shew'd clearly to every Person & Soldier in the place, that he wished as
far as in him lay, to exhibit the Engineer [i.e. Glenie] in as insignificant & 
contemptible a light as possible, on the most trivial & frivolous Pretences.  It 
render'd the Men themselves more negligent in discharging their duty, & more 
presumptuous in neglecting it.”478  
Major Drewe, defending himself from charges of neglecting his duty by not 
appearing at parades, as we have seen, claimed that Colonel Cockburn’s public 
disrespect of him was the true fault.  According to Drewe, he could hardly appear at 
a military parade if he was not treated with the deference due to him from his rank.  
Any neglect of duty on his part in not attending parades was completely overridden 
by Colonel Cockburn’s worse neglect of duty by treating him disrespectfully 
whenever he did attend.  A great many people heard Cockburn "at the Publick 
Parade, speak of me in a Manner tending to lessen my Authority, with the Officers, 
and Men,” Drewe claimed.  Not only had Cockburn given Drewe orders in an 
“unnecessarily loud” voice and “in a haughty, imperious and Overbearing Manner,” 
he had also publicly criticized Drewe: another witness heard Cockburn say “he was 
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sorry there should be such a Major to the 35th Regiment.”479  Actually, Drewe 
claimed, it was rather his duty not to show up to parades in those circumstances, 
“lest the Men in Particular should Observe any Disagreeable altercations, between 
the Lieut. Colonel and the Major,” which would have the sad consequence of “greatly 
Affect[ing] this Discipline of the Regiment.”480  Smith's defense statement made a 
similar claim: “even in civil Society there are various Modes of insulting a person, 
both in Public and private, but the Severest trial of a Man is by a Blow, this is the 
treatment of a Slave or of a Malefactor and he who is above the Rank of the lowest 
of Mankind or has any consciousness of his own welfare, ought in Justice to himself 
and the community require Satisfaction, because it is an Offence against Society, of 
which the Laws take Cognizance.”481     
When Lieutenant Berks and Captain Baudin began to quarrel on the parade 
ground, another officer highlighted the importance of concealing officers' disputes 
from outsiders and those of lower rank: "An altercation hereon arose, and several 
very high words passed...Perceiving the affair likely to take a Serious turn I turned to
Lieut. Col. Gould who was on Horseback and desired the meeting of Officers might 
Adjourn, as I saw several Soldiers and Strangers assembling near the place."482  And 
when the Berks and Baudin’s courts-martial were reviewed by the king and the 
Judge Advocate General, the latter reported that “His Majesty extremely disapproves
the reciprocal Conduct of Capt. Baudin & Lieut. Berks in suffering their Animousities 
to break forth in an open violation of good Order,” and demanded that the two 
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officers make “a mutual and public Apology” in order to rectify the “ill example 
thereby exhibited to the Soldiers.”483  
But Palmer and Smith’s fight was so scandalous because it not only undermined 
the military hierarchy, but also overturned it.  The enlisted men of the battalion not 
only witnessed the fight, but had to break it up, disarm the men (repeatedly), and 
confine them.  After Smith tried to stab Palmer in the back, Private Thomas Knox 
reported that “Matthew Keith and I immediately laid hold of Mr. Smith and Corporal 
Strouss came up and took his Sword from him.”  Private Matthew Keith reported that
he “laid hold of Mr. Smith and say'd 'Mr. Smith for god's sake moderate your 
passion.’”   Sergeant Kaston had to find Smith and “took him by the Arm and told 
him he must go with him to his Lodgings.”  During the subsequent outbreak of 
fighting, Corporal John Peters, the corporal of the guard that night, said that he saw 
Smith go “up to Mr. Palmer and made a lunge at him and say'd to Mr. Palmer, 'If you
speak one word Sir, you are a dead Man,’” requiring Peters to intervene physically.  
“I and one Landerkin immediately charged our Bayonets against Mr. Smith,” Peters 
reported, and Sergeant Kurtz "interfered and took Mr. Smith's Sword from him and 
took the Stick from Mr. Palmer.”  The enlisted men then “took him into the Barrack 
Yard as a Prisoner.”484  
This fight destroyed the illusion that officers were worthy of special status and 
privileges because they, unlike enlisted men, were able to moderate their tempers, 
behave rationally and virtuously, and to regulate themselves and others.  Palmer and
Smith had exposed their bodies to the forcible touch of their social inferiors, because 
their uncontrolled behavior had given the enlisted witnesses no other option for 
preventing them from killing each other.  In doing so, they put in jeopardy not only 
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their own privileged status, but also the status and reputation of the officer class as 
a whole.  Thus, Captain Spiesmacher felt obligated to prosecute all the officers who 
had been involved in the affray—not because they had participated in the illegal 
practice of dueling, but because they had violated the social rules that governed the 
practice of dueling.  
But the court martial did not limit itself to regulating acceptable dueling behavior.
It also asserted itself as an authority on what actions were too serious to be resolved
without a duel—in other words, it sanctioned officers not only for improper 
challenges and behavior, but also for not demanding satisfaction when they had 
been, in the courts’ opinion, grievously insulted.  Captain John McKinnon was 
discharged from the army after he was charged with “Suffering himself to be 
kicked…on a Parade, without properly resenting it.”  This public reception of a bodily 
assault from another officer, which McKinnon had neglected to respond to with a 
challenge or a demand for a formal and public apology, destroyed his ability to be 
perceived as a gentleman and his authority as an officer.485  Similarly, Captain Lowe 
was court-martialed after another officer had, in the presence of other officers and 
gentlemen, said to his face that he was “a dirty Dog and no Gentleman.”  Lowe did 
not respond properly, according to his brother officers; he merely “soon went away” 
and “never afterwards…shew’d any resentment at such Treatment.”486
In fact, officers’ actions reveal that to refuse to demand satisfaction for a slight to
one’s honor was a greater offense than to unlawfully challenge another officer to a 
duel.  Lieutenant Mark McGrath was arrested and tried for the crime of “suffering 
himself to be posted as a Coward by Mr. John McLaughlan.”  McLaughlan, acting as 
the company adjutant, had made an incorrect report, for which McGrath had rebuked
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him.  McLaughlan reacted angrily, claimed he was an injured party, and, in the 
customary fashion, sent other officers of the regiment with messages to McGrath 
insisting on an apology before the other officers.  But McGrath refused to make any 
apology, and “said that a Court martial must decide the difference” between the two 
of them.  McLaughlan “replied that was not the manner he wished to have it 
settled,”—by which he meant that he wanted to duel.  McLaughlan refused, and two 
weeks later McLaughlan was observed “putting up a Paper upon the Publick Post,” 
alleging that Lieutenant McGrath was a coward.  When the commanding officer of the
garrison, Captain Holmes, saw the paper, he immediately ordered the arrest of not 
only McLaughlan but also of McGrath.  Holmes was even explicit about his reasons—
McLaughlan, obviously, ought to be arrested for so publicly broadcasting his dispute 
in language calculated to provoke, but in his mind, McGrath, too, was at fault for 
“not accepting the Challenge and settling it in a private manner.”  
Lieutenant McGrath strongly objected to his arrest, but he did not do so by 
appealing to military law and claiming that he had done nothing wrong according to 
the Articles of War, and that all the fault was on McLaughlan’s side—he had been the
one to speak insolently to his superior, to issue a challenge to duel, and to publicly 
use provoking language impugning the reputation of an officer.  Rather, McGrath 
claimed, there was no possible way he could have, as the formal charge put it, 
“suffer[ed] himself to be posted as a Coward,” because the paper accusing him had 
been on display for all of three minutes before he had been arrested by Captain 
Holmes, and McGrath himself had never even seen it.  The quick arrest made it 
impossible to determine whether McGrath would have responded properly to this 
accusation of cowardice.  But McGrath further claimed that his refusal of duel was 
entirely proper and in no way an admission of cowardice, for the dispute concerned 
“a point of duty upon the Parade,” and therefore McLaughlan “had no business to 
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make a point of honour of it.”  Furthermore, McGrath testified, he was under no 
obligation to render unto McLaughlan the honor of deigning to duel with him, for 
although McLaughlan was acting as the company’s adjutant (normally a position 
given to one of the company’s junior officers), he was merely a sergeant major and 
therefore McGrath “could not look upon him as a Commissioned Officer” and, 
correspondingly, a gentleman.  Because it was perfectly acceptable for a gentleman 
to decline to duel with someone below his station (indeed, it would have been a 
betrayal of the solidarity and privileges of his class to have accepted), and because 
McGrath’s supposed insulting behavior did not actually impugn McLaughlin’s honor 
(and, in fact, McLaughlin’s lack of an officer’s commission suggested that he might 
not actually have any honor to impugn), McGrath was acquitted as soon as these 
facts were made known.  In fact, the court went so far as to claim not only did they 
“most Honorably Acquit him,” but added that “it is the farther opinion of this Court 
that the Conduct of Lt. McGrath on this occasion has been thoroughly consistent with
the Character of an Officer and Gentleman; Judging it proper at the same time to 
declare the whole Charge appears groundless false & malicious & that the Conduct of
Acting Adjutant McLaughlin is highly censurable tending to subvert all order, 
Subordination and military Discipline.487  
When Captain Spiesmacher was relating the disagreement between Ensign Mair 
and Ensign Smith, which within a few days had escalated to a plan to duel, he noted 
that the two men and their seconds had in fact met at the appointed dueling 
grounds, but “what passed…I am sorry to say was nothing but bad language.”  In 
other words, Captain Spiesmacher, who was the present commander and whose job 
it was to prevent quarrels and challenges between officers, reacted to the news that 
487.WO 71/96, 378-388.
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the duel had been prevented from occurring not with relief but with censure for the 
officers who had not dueled, but had merely met each other on the dueling grounds 
to exchange verbal insults instead of pistol fire.488  And Mair, faced with this 
disapproval, insisted that he had been prepared to fight: "I do declare to this Court 
and to the world, that I would have fought him as I told him on the Ground, 
according to the tenor of the Note, with Pistols, and that as long as there was 
Powder and Ball,” he claimed.489  Here, the open admission of an intent to duel, 
grossly contrary to the Articles of War, was considered clearly preferable to even 
being thought too afraid to fight a duel.  
A court-martial even more completely demonstrated its willingness to uphold the 
values of the officer class rather than the law when it convicted an officer of 
ungentlemanly conduct after he declined a challenge to duel.  When the case was 
sent back to England for review, the Judge Advocate General objected to the 
conviction: "I do not conceive that the sentence of a Court of Justice can at any rate 
be supported which awards a punishment for neglecting to seek a method of redress 
forbidden as well by the military as the common law."490  But this was the very limit 
of central administrators’ ability to interfere with officers’ ability to use military 
courts for their own purposes.  The Articles of War stipulated that the king or the 
commander-in-chief was to approve of all court martial verdicts and sentences.  This 
was supposed to provide some constraint on the power of the court-martial board, as
the commander could pardon the defendant, reduce the sentence, or point out errors
and order the court to correct them.  He could not, however, order them to change 
488.WO 71/54, p. 77.
489.WO 71/54, p. 128.
490.WO 81/11, Gould to Barrington, cited in Gilbert, "Law and Honour Among Eighteenth-Century British
Army Oﬃcers," 81.
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their verdict.491  With the king or commander having only the power to pardon those 
they thought were convicted unjustly, and having no power to punish a defendant 
that the court-martial refused to convict, control of the court-martial remained firmly
with officers.492  
But kings, military commanders, and government officials was also unable to 
effectively regulate honor culture because they themselves were also complicit in 
it.493  The position of the law was that a death occurring during a duel was clearly 
murder; however, royal pardons for those who killed during duels were routine in 
both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.494  And civilian courts also refused to 
adopt the view that killing a man in a duel was indistinguishable from homicide.  
Civilian jurors in the eighteenth century consistently proved unwilling to convict a 
man for killing in a duel, so long as both parties had behaved "honourably."495  There
is only one known execution of a man for killing another man in a duel—and this 
because it was done improperly, and in such a manner (specifically, without 
witnesses and without seconds) that made it impossible to determine if what had 
occurred was a death from dueling or a murder.  It did not conform to the norms of 
honor culture, and its secrecy associated the killer with the dishonorable assassin 
rather than the candid gentleman.496
491.Steppler, "British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of Regimental Courts Martial in the Later
Eighteenth Century," 871; Thomas Reide, A Treatise on the Duty of Infantry Oﬃcers and the Present
System of British Military Discipline (London, 1795), 94: “A court-martial is sometimes ordered to revise
its proceedings, particularly where the sentence is supposed not to be adequate to the crime or
evidence adduced, but this can only be done once, and the court may adhere to the original decision.”
492.See Odintz, 70-71, 497. for cases where oﬃcers used the court martial to excuse their peers in spite of
commanders’ disapproval and refused to change their verdicts when he protested.
493.Banks, 101.
494.Banks, 11-16, 23.
495.Banks, 141.
496.Banks, 133.
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This established practice of pardoning or acquitting duelists undermined 
government attempts to abolish the duel, but even more problematic was the fact 
that high-level government officials and army administrators dueled themselves.  
Lord Germain, the Secretary of State for America, participated in a duel in 1770, 
which originally stemmed from a charge that he had behaved as a coward during the
Battle of Minden. He was almost drawn into another in 1778.497  Colonial leaders, 
too, often put personal quarrels above their military or administrative duties, 
personally fighting in deadly duels even on the eve of battle.498  Admonitions to more
junior officers to put aside their differences for the greater good could not be very 
effective when men at the highest level of government routinely let their concerns 
about their individual honor to override national interest.499   
And when they were not dueling, they and other high ranking officers were often 
using their time and influence to settle quarrels among their subordinates.  Lord 
Amherst had to try to reconcile two officers willing to kill each other over hot words 
that broke into a fistfight; likewise, the altercation between Lieutenant Graydon and 
Lieutenant Scriven of the 60th is notable for the time that other officers of the 
regiment had to spend resolving the disputants’ quarrels over points of honor and 
investigating the conditions under which they would apologize to each other.  The 
perceived importance of personal honor in relation to military duty is further 
suggested by the fact that, after all these attempts at mediation, Lieutenant Graydon
then applied for leave from active military status so he could travel from Spanish 
497.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 170.
498.Banks, A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750-1850, 18, 100-101,
notes that “The island of Dominique was left without both a governor and a lieutenant governor in
1775, for the former had been shot by the latter
499.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 8.
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Town to Kingston to consult with a friend on the matter of whether he should 
apologize to Scriven, and was given it.500 
The immense social power of honor culture is indicated by the further language in
the Articles of War, which banned officers from "reproachful or provoking Speeches 
or Gestures"; sending challenges; carrying messages of challenges from one officer 
to another; and "knowingly and willingly suffer[ing] any Person whatsoever to go 
forth to fight a Duel.” Furthermore, it promised punishment not only those who 
fought duels, provoked duels, challenged others to duels, and failed to do their 
utmost to prevent duels, but also to officers who berated or shamed other officers 
who refused to duel.  “Whatsoever Officer or Soldier shall upbraid another for 
refusing a Challenge, shall himself be punished as a Challenger,” it declared, and 
attempted to remove by fiat the customary stigma that accrued to any officer who 
refused to duel: “We hereby acquit and discharge all Officers and Soldiers of any 
Disgrace, or Opinion of Disadvantage, which might arise from their having refused to
accept of Challenges, as they will have only acted in Obedience to Our Orders, and 
done their Duty as good Soldiers, who subject themselves to Discipline.”501  Yet the 
language used indicates why these prohibitions were so ineffective—with its 
emphasis on how obedient and subordinate those who refused challenges were, the 
Articles implicitly endorsed the view that an officer who dueled was displaying a 
manly independence to authority.  
Because officers who openly and flagrantly violated the law by dueling were often
acquitted, because officers who had the misfortune to be convicted were often 
pardoned, because there often was no further penalty for dueling other than the risk 
of death or injury during the duel itself, officers sneered at those who considered 
500.Lord Amherst as mediator: WO 71/54, p. 390; Graydon/Scriven: WO 71/60, p. 382.
501.An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 158, Section 7, Article 5.
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themselves bound by the spirit as well as the letter of the Articles of War.  In fact, 
the Articles of War made it more difficult for officers to oppose dueling, because it 
unambiguously forbade the practice, but the army rarely followed through on its 
threatened punishments.  Thus, to refrain from dueling could be interpreted as the 
act of a fool and a coward whose fear of the toothless threats of the Articles of War 
overrode his concern for his priceless and irreplaceable honor.  
The Articles of War praised officers who refused challenges in quite damning 
terms when it lauded them as “good Soldiers, who subject themselves to Discipline,” 
and it is not coincidental that officers used the terms of the Articles of War to accuse 
each other of unmanly and cowardly obedience when they referred to its strictures.  
In fact, the duel’s illegal nature gave further opportunities for officers to demonstrate
their superior masculinity, such as ridiculing those who neglected to act with the 
proper secrecy to ensure that the quarrel would not culminate in an actual duel.  
When Ensign Garrison told Ensign Leech that he “looked upon it as a mark of his 
Cowardice to call on him [to duel] in so public a place,” the implication was that a 
proper challenge to duel was delivered in private, and the only reason for delivering 
it so publicly was in the hope that other officers would observe it, and consider 
themselves forced to intervene.502  
The prohibitions of the Articles of War did not prevent dueling; at best it forced 
the duel to become a slightly underground activity, as officers tried to adhere to the 
letter of the law while blatantly violating its spirit.503   When Ensign Mair was tried for
sending a challenge, he admitted he had done so, but claimed that he tried “to avoid
as much as possible a literal breach of the Articles of War relative to Challenging, 
502.WO 71/84, 215-219.
503.WO 71/85, 9-24, for one of the rare instances when an oﬃcer actually cited the Articles of War as a
reason for his refusal to duel.
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and that as much as was consistent with my honor and Character.”504  Officers often 
tried to shield themselves from prosecution by issuing challenges orally to ensure 
that no written challenge could be presented as evidence at a court-martial, or they 
resorted to euphemisms and unclear language that implied, but did not state.  
Ensign Farrell, who was tried along with his opponent for dueling, testified as to the 
sort of language used to plan the duel:
a gentleman of the 92nd Regiment called on me and told me that
Mr. Cawley desired a meeting with me in half an hour at the
bottom of the Race Course. I asked him if he was his friend when
he said he was. I asked him if I was to meet Mr. Cawley with
Pistols, when he said Yes, I accordingly waited on the Gentleman
at the time appointed.505
It was a near-universal practice among officers to use the ambiguous term 
“friend”  rather than the unmistakable “second,” though this had dangers  of its own.
In the dispute between Lieutenant Colonel Bayard and Lieutenant McDonald of the 
King’s Orange Rangers, witnesses to the negotiations for a duel reported that neither
party had made public mention of “Weapons or Seconds.”  But Bayard had made his 
intentions quite clear when he gestured to Captain Johnston and said that “he had 
his friend then with him, on purpose to have satisfaction.”  (Unfortunately, this 
nebulous term, so useful for lending some slightly plausible deniability if the matter 
led to a court-martial, ended up misleading the proposed second himself.  Johnston’s
reply revealed that he had been under the impression that Bayard was using the 
term “friend” in its more traditional sense: Bayard had asked Johnston to come to 
this meeting as Bayard’s friend, and Johnston had assumed Bayard wanted him 
504.WO 71/54, p. 129.
505.WO 71/60, p. 368-369. The “gentleman of the 92nd,” Lieutenant Wells, refused to answer questions
about whether he had known about the challenge, claiming that “he could not reply to the Question
without criminating himself,” as he could theoretically have been prosecuted both for knowing about
the duel beforehand and doing nothing to stop it, and for actually relaying the challenge from Cawley
to Farrell.
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there to help settle the quarrel amicably.  Thus, when Bayard stated that he had 
brought Johnston as his friend, Johnston immediately disclaimed it, saying, “Yes 
Bayard, but not to go to the Field.”506)
Captain William Barry, who thought himself insulted by his commanding officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Doyle, responded to a message from Doyle by telling the 
messenger that he “did not know what business Col. Doyle could have with him,” 
and that “he would meet him at the back of the burnt Church in the Ruins.”  Barry 
was then told that a burnt church “was a very improper place to settle business in,” 
but that was precisely the point of Barry’s remark.  The only reason a gentleman 
would go to such a place would be to fight a duel, so Barry’s proposed meeting place
was a barely-veiled challenge to duel.507  
Honor culture undermined the military hierarchy, but attempts to disrupt it did so
as well.  Even the Articles of War, otherwise dedicated to strengthening and 
upholding the military hierarchy, was forced to interfere with the military hierarchy in
order discourage dueling, when it granted to all officers the “Power to part and quell 
all Quarrels, Frays, and Disorders," even if the quarrelers were of superior rank or 
belonged to another regiment.508 
More importantly, honor culture undermined the law.  The Articles of War banned
the rituals of dueling, yet these rituals often served to mitigate the damage caused 
by the duel, and a properly-conducted duel was less destructive to military order, 
honor, and human life than the uncontrolled brawl that might otherwise occur.  Thus,
even officers who opposed honor culture and the violence that sustained it often 
506.WO 71/92, 115-147.
507.WO 71/92, 295-318.
508.An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, 156-158. See WO 71/97, pp. 1-8 for a case in which a
lieutenant had to break up a fight between two captains, and put them into arrest, because no higher
ranking oﬃcer was present.
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found themselves violating the Articles of War as they tried to prevent or at least 
delay informal violence by channelling it to the formalized structure of the duel.  
The Articles of War banned dueling, but the supremacy of honor in officers’ 
conceptions of masculinity meant that officers dueled regardless of the practice’s 
legality; the fact that it was illegal did not stop them from dueling, but only served to
further convince them that the law operated in opposition to masculine virtue, and 
that breaking the law was often the necessary action of an honorable man.  
The crown’s response to a rash of duels and other quarrels that broke out among 
the officers stationed in Jamaica in 1782 suggests another consequence of the 
entrenched culture of violent defenses of honor.  The king and the Deputy Judge 
Advocate noted that “the Several Duels which have lately taken place in the Island of
Jamaica appear to have been occasioned by contentious and provoking Language, 
improper to be used by one Gentleman towards another.”  Therefore, they 
suggested, it would have
a Salutary effect if a special Order be issued as by His Majesty's
immediate Command, admonishing and strictly injoining all
Officers bearing His Majesty's Commission carefully to repress
inordinate animosities and expressly inhibiting under pain of His
Majesty's Severe displeasure any intemperate, reproachful, or
provoking Speeches from one officer towards, or respecting the
Character of another, as having a natural and obvious tendency to
the breach of good Order and highly detrimental to His Majesty's
Service.509
In other words, the crown’s solution to this outbreak of dueling was not to 
reiterate the prohibitions of the Articles of War and demand that officers refrain from
dueling, but rather that officers should stop doing things that caused other officers to
issue challenges to duel.  
509.WO 71/60, pp. 408-409.
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And what caused these duels?  One stemmed from an officer feeling personally 
offended when another officer confined the first officer’s personal servant for not 
attending drills.  Another started, as we have seen, when one officer, Captain 
Townshend, felt personally offended after another officer, Ensign McKenzie, threw a 
bottle at a black woman in his presence, challenged him on whether he had done it 
deliberately, and implied that he was a liar.  The officers' general appraisal of the 
affair was that McKenzie obviously had to refute the claim that he was a liar by 
issuing a challenge, so in prudence Townshend ought not to have made such a fuss 
about the circumstances of the bottle-throwing—which, after all, had not injured 
anyone that the officers considered important.  This altercation was also actually 
indirectly the cause of the third duel, which occurred after two officers had been seen
flourishing their swords in front Townshend’s house after he had been wounded in 
the second duel, which Townshend’s friends perceived as a mortal insult to the honor
of the convalescing officer.  
In essence, officers were being instructed that other officers’ abuse of their power
over enlisted soldiers or colonial civilians ought to be overlooked in order to preserve
harmony among the officer class.  The response of another officer on hearing the 
reason behind one of these quarrels was in keeping with the crown’s message: “if we
as Brother Officers did not look over trifles of this nature and be more obliging to 
each other,” he said, “there would be an end to all kind of Society and we should 
lead the most wretched lives imaginable."510  Casting “reflections” on other officers’ 
misbehavior, pointing out their abuse of enlisted soldiers or civilians, or expressing 
open disapproval of another officer was dangerous and unproductive.  
510.WO 71/60, p. 390.
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When officers’ personal honor was threatened, they were to act outside the law; 
when attending to the unimportant concerns of those not within the officer class, it 
was trivial and quarrelsome to question an officer’s treatment of them—and it could 
not be done except at the extreme cost of also calling into question the officer’s 
honor.  This was a culture that had strong incentives to uphold neither the 
supremacy of the rule of law nor a strict commitment to the welfare of civilians.  
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Chapter 8: Imperial Protectors? 
Major Robert Donkin, reflecting on “heroism” in a military treatise published 
during the Revolutionary War, was surprisingly unconcerned with the purely military 
side of this virtue.  The highest form of heroism, in his mind, was not a dashing 
cavalry charge through enemy lines, or an inspiring feat of battlefield bravery.  
Rather, he claimed not to have
read or heard of a nobler kind than that exhibited by the earl of
Peterborough at the siege of Barcelone in 1705...He flew
everywhere with his officers; found [his allies] the Germans and
Catalonians ransacking the houses of the principal inhabitants!
disperses them, and restores the plunder they had taken: meets
the duchess of Popoli in the hands of these Germans who were
going to dishonor her! and delivers her safe to her husband.511  
Note the proper targets of heroic protection in Donkin’s mind: the property of the
wealthy, and the honor of aristocratic women.  To be a hero was to be the defender 
of class and gender hierarchies, a protector of property and of upper-class women, 
who, by virtue of their status and gender, could not be perceived as threats to a 
military campaign or—more importantly, to the masculinity of individual officers. 
Thus, officers could come to the aid of such women, even if they were on the 
opposite sides of a war.  
This chapter examines how officers’ established ideas about masculinity, status, 
and the rule of law constrained how they could act as imperial protectors during the 
American War of Independence.  Officers’ affinity for the ideals of chivalry might 
have inclined them to act in a protective role to enhance their claims to masculine 
status in some cases, but the military tactics of the war, the increasing cultural 
divergence between the army and the colonists, and the leveling ideologies of the 
511.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 143-144.
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Revolution all worked to convince many British officers that the colonists were, in 
general, undeserving of protection.  
Roger Lamb, who had served as an enlisted soldier in the British Army in the 
Revolutionary War, expressed great annoyance that reports of atrocities committed 
by British troops had freely circulated in Britain during the war.  “It cannot be matter
of much surprize, that such reports were fabricated by the Americans to serve their 
own purposes,” he wrote, “but that they should obtain circulation and credence at 
home is truly astonishing.”512  The fact that they did—that Britons as well as 
Americans could readily believe that their army would would treat civilians in 
wartime with violence and brutality—suggests that the culture of the army was 
growing more distant from British culture as well as from that of the American 
colonies.513  
 Americans were increasingly uneasy about British rule not only because they 
associated it with corruption and tyranny, but also immorality.514  British soldiers 
were denounced for the danger they presented to American women (and relatedly, 
to the masculine and patriarchal identity of American men) because of their 
supposed sexual immorality. Anti-British propaganda contrasted virtuous American 
sexual propriety with the licentious, unrestrained, and shameless attitudes of British 
troops of all ranks towards sex.515  
The war itself made matters worse.  In occupied towns where no civil 
government existed, the army was free to impose its own norms, completely 
512.Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War From Its
Commencement to the Year 1783, 158.
513.Anderson, A People’s Army, 118.  
514.Robert M Calhoon and Robert M Weir, "The Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leigh", The William and
Mary Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1969): 47-74, on increasing American "feeling that Great Britain and her
servants were corrupt.”
515.Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape, 1765-1815," 861.
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disregarding civilian mores.  British military authorities had little interest in 
regulating the morality of the people when it did not adversely affect the army's 
needs.  Prostitution flourished, even more scandalous than before the British 
occupation because it was now open rather than hidden.516  Theaters, associated with
immorality and idleness in colonial America and barely tolerated before the war, now 
proliferated, a very popular entertainment among the gentlemen of the British 
military.517  And soldiers showed no inclination to be restrained by the dictates of 
religion.  Officers violated the Sabbath with bawdy entertainments and made few 
efforts to promote religion among their men.518  Americans (and well as German 
soldiers allied with the British) expressed horror at the irreligious behavior and 
blasphemous language commonly used by British soldiers.519  Americans in mortal 
dispute over loyalty to Great Britain could agree that British military leaders were far
too inclined to chase women and indulge in other luxurious vices, and Britons with 
widely differing views on the morality of the war itself were often unified in their 
condemnation of vices of high-ranking military officers.520 
Most importantly, among civilians in both Britain and America, the acceptability 
of violence was in decline, and violence was rapidly losing ground as an essential 
marker of masculinity.521  In particular, private violence to settle disputes rather than
516.Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York, 23, on the rise of
prostitution in occupied New York. Urban, Fusiliers : The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the
American Revolution, 10, on Boston.
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O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 136, on British oﬃcers' involvement in the theater and Burgoyne as a playwright in
occupied Boston, writing plays that mocked Congregationalists, performed in Faneuil Hall.
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having recourse to the law was becoming more problematic; it was less and less 
acceptable for people to claim that their high status made them above the law.  This 
was occurring in Britain itself, but even more so in North America.  In Britain, using 
one's position and influence to help relations was normal; the rise of revolutionary 
spirit in the thirteen colonies meant that men now gained status instead by publicly 
proclaiming their concern for the common good over enriching their relatives.522 
But some of the army’s vestigial practices made it hard to distinguish between 
legitimate privilege and immoral corruption.  Putting fictitious names on muster rolls 
was a common practice of Tudor proprietary soldiering.  The pay assigned to these 
non-existent soldiers could be used to pay for common regimental supplies, 
supplement the pay of officers, or provide pensions for the widows and orphans of 
the regiment’s soldiers.  In theory, this practice was banned in the early eighteenth 
century because it was too similar to the crime of submitting a false muster—putting 
fictitious names on muster rolls to pocket the pay the government would provide for 
them.523  Yet decades later, the practice continued with the approbation of the king 
himself, who ordered his officials “to allow upon the Muster-rolls of all the 
Regiments, Troops, and Companies, a Number of fictitious Names therein mentioned,
instead of private Men, in order to raise and settle a Fund of the Maintenance of such
Widows or Officers as are or shall be intitled to his Royal Bounty,” adding that in this 
case, “no Allowance of any such fictitious Name upon any Muster-roll shall be 
construed to be a false Muster.”524  
of asserting male status; later, it was not necessary to be violent to be a good man, and in fact might
hurt one's male status, as evangelical masculinity supported instead the virtues of domesticity and
restraint.
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The far clearer division between legitimate practices and corruption in America 
led to a growing American perception that the British, corrupted by aristocratic vices,
were unfit to rule.525  But British officers, who perceived a strict separation between 
their private and public lives, found this idea ridiculous.  Their authority certainly 
didn’t come from any conspicuous public virtue they might chance to display; their 
authority stemmed instead from something more intrinsic to their character—their 
status, acquired at birth, as gentlemen of honor.  This status was so connected with 
them personally that no vice (so long as it was not dishonorable vice) could remove 
that authority from them; indeed, the very fact of their authority and high social 
position allowed them to have an unregulated private life and indulge in private 
misbehavior, if they were so inclined.  Restraint, sobriety, refraining from violent 
outbursts—these were things that the unfortunate men at the lower end of the social
spectrum were forced to do; they were markers of their lack of masculine power.  An
officer, on the other hand, by virtue of his high rank and social position, could enjoy 
all the luxurious vice he pleased; it might perhaps reflect poorly on some aspects of 
his character, and lead him into some sad financial and personal woes, but to 
suggest that such behavior made him unfit to be an officer and a source of authority 
legitimate practice; mustering arrangements and the delays in receiving soldiers' pay often meant an
oﬃcer who acted with scrupulous honesty in reporting his numbers to the government would not have
enough money to support the regiment for the coming year.
525.Calhoon and Weir, "The Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leigh," 63; Royster, 3-24.
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was preposterous.526  Thus, when officers encountered colonial inhabitants, the two 
groups often had completely different ideas about legitimate sources of authority.  
The two groups also differed on the correct way to conduct a war.  The terrain of 
North America did not suit British ideals of warfare.  “The nature of the country was 
peculiarly favourable to defence,” one soldier wrote, with “many natural barriers of 
hills and mountains, intersected by rivers, and interspersed with trees, rocks, and 
precipices; several defiles, skirted by impenetrable woods, and majestic rivers, 
flowing with impetuous currents, which seemed to bid defiance to the invader.”527  
When rebel forces took full advantage of this defensive terrain, sheltering behind 
trees to pick off individual soldiers with rifles and negating the British army’s superior
battlefield discipline by fighting in wooded and mountainous areas, British soldiers 
reacted with contempt.528  These methods of fighting were “skulking,” and 
“cowardly”; their use of the rifle was not honorable—it was the tool of the assassin, 
not the brave soldier.529  The rifle was inhumane, barbaric, and the weapon of a 
coward.530 The rebel refusal to attack openly, to declare their hostile intentions 
526.Phyllis Deutsch, "Moral Trespass in Georgian London: Gaming, Gender, and Electoral Politics in the
Age of George III", The Historical Journal 39, no. 3 (1996): 637-656, notes the increasing popularity of
linking the right to rule with personal moral virtue. Carter, "British Masculinities on Trial in the Queen
Caroline Aﬀair of 1820," 258, 265, suggests that by the early nineteenth century, "private behaviour
had become as crucial to masculine reputation as it had long been to feminine reputation" as it
"became increasingly impossible for men who wished to be entrusted with public confidence in
political and civic life to openly diverge from contemporary ideals concerning private conduct. The
public man whose private life was in disarray undermined his reputation as a wise and judicious man,
diminished the currency of his word and damaged public trust in his overall competency to fulfill his
oﬃce or station."
527.Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War From Its
Commencement to the Year 1783, 63.
528.Wayne E. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 171-208; Lee, Crowds and Soldiers; John Shy, A People Numerous and
Armed, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 133-161.
529.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 134.
530.Starkey, "Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution," 13-15.
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before shooting, rather than firing without warning from a hidden position, was in 
the view of British troops a serious breech of proper masculine battlefield behavior.531
Officers took an exceedingly dim view of what they termed la petite guerre.  It 
was a form of warfare that was both cowardly and savage.  Officers disliked the 
"barbarous" nature of guerrilla warfare in America, and, after the rebels allied with 
France in 1778, were far more keen on fighting the French, who had undisputed 
status as a sovereign nation and adhered to the accepted norms of European 
warfare.532  “The rebellion now in America,” Donkin wrote, was sadly characterized by
the miseries of guerrilla warfare, not only because of the terrain, which favored 
defense, but from “the cowardliness of the rebels, who delight more in murdering 
from woods, walls and houses, that in shewing any genius or science in the art 
military.”533  (Donkin’s introduction mentioned that the profits from the sales of his 
book were to be used "to relieve and support the innocent children and widows of 
the valiant soldiers inhumanly and wantonly butchered" while "peaceably marching 
to and from Concord" on 19 April, 1775.534)
Officers’ rhetoric about “secret” and “Assassin-like” attacks on an officer’s 
reputation—in comparison to open, honest, and manly accusation—was reflected 
exactly when military positions rather than other officers’ reputations were being 
attacked.  They linked the bayonet charge with bravery, in contrast with the 
531.Stephen Conway, "The British Army, 'Military Europe,' and the American War of Independence",
William & Mary Quarterly 67, no. 1 (2010): 69-100.
532.Conway, "British Army Oﬃcers and the American War for Independence," 273; Lambart, A New
System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle, 275, suggested that enemies on the battlefield
could find common ground by their shared ideals of courageous military behavior.
533.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 223; Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only : The British
Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783, 128-129, describes enlisted feeling of British
superiority over the inferior military skill of the rebels, as well as outrage over their “unnatural rebellion.”
See also Lambart, A New System of Military Discipline, Founded Upon Principle, 251, who advised
oﬃcers to teach their men to despise their enemy: “The more that the private men can be brought to
hold their enemy in contempt, the more resolute they become.”
534.Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, iii.
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American penchant for fortifying defensive positions from which they could fire in 
relative safety. "Men of their bodily strength and even a coward may be their match 
in firing,” Burgoyne told his troops, “but the bayonet in the hands of the valiant is 
irresistible. The enemy, convinced of this, will place their whole dependence in 
entrenchments and rifle pieces. It will be our glory and our preservation to storm 
when possible."535
Because the rebels were using methods of fighting which they associated with 
cowardice but also savagery, British soldiers argued that colonists did not deserve 
the practices of “civilized” warfare.  Furthermore, the rebels were rebels; even 
commanders who were acclaimed for their compassion and advocated for the 
humane treatment of enemy soldiers often maintained that these guidelines only 
applied to those participating in “legitimate” wars between sovereigns.536  But 
rebellion was a criminal act, and those in rebellion against legitimate authority had 
forfeited any right to protection.537 
This was a common view among military and legal theorists of the eighteenth 
century, and soldiers who were tried for various crimes against civilians proposed 
similar justifications for their behavior.  Three men who were “employed in recruiting
for different provincial Corps in His Majesty’s Service” were accused of breaking into 
the house of William Seton, a New York merchant, in the middle of the night and 
stealing furniture, guns, money, silverware, and variety of clothing, including the 
handkerchief that Seton was carrying at the time and the hat on his head.  When the
535.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 218.
536.Stephen Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary
War", William and Mary Quarterly: Third Series 43, no. 3 (1986): pp. 381-407.
537.Stephen Conway, "The Great Mischief Complain'd Of": Reflections on the Misconduct of British
Soldiers in the Revolutionary War", William and Mary Quarterly: Third Series 47, no. 3 (1990): pp.
370-390.
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men were charged with the crime, all three men acknowledged that they had robbed 
Seton’s house, and they had “never made a secret of what they had done,” because 
“Mr. Seton was reputed to be a notorious rebel.”  Therefore, they claimed, they 
thought that the pillaging of his house was “a meritorious act in favour of the King 
and Government.”538  Though this defense was not accepted by the court, some 
measure of its general popularity among the soldiers is indicated by the orders 
General Howe had to issue informing the members of his army that a person’s open 
statement of disdain for British authority did not render him an acceptable target for 
theft.539  
But methods of abusing civilians could closely resemble actions that were 
considered legitimate acts of war.  When some soldiers of all ranks maintained that 
plundering enemy civilians was a soldiers’ natural right, they were referring to the 
taking of civilians’ property for their own personal use.540  In theory, this was 
supposed to be easily distinguished from the legitimate seizure and destruction of 
rebel property by the institution of the army, or the requisitioning of supplies for the 
use of the army.  However, the distinction was far more difficult to uphold in 
practice, especially because of the custom of distributing prize money after the 
successful capture of enemy property.  Furthermore, many British officers believed 
that plundering and burning the colonists’ property would be an effective method for 
reconciling them to British rule by demonstrating the might of the crown’s forces and
538.WO 71/83, pp. 220-227.
539.Fourteenth Foot Orderly Book, 5904/175, National Army Museum, cited in Conway, "The Great
Mischief Complain'd Of": Reflections on the Misconduct of British Soldiers in the Revolutionary War,"
379. Also, WO 71/91, pp. 154-200: the defendant’s statement justifying his robberies: “being out of the
Line often under the Sanction of General Clinton to distress the Rebels; the Encouragement given
them has induced me to go greater lengths than Government might think proper to countenance; tho’
in fact these people that has been distressed, are as great Rebels, & as ill wishers of His Majesty’s
Government, as any we ever plundered out of the Lines, by permission of His Excellency the
Commander in Chief.”
540.Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781," 3.
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the price they would pay for continued resistance.  Even those who favored a 
conciliatory stance advocated for their views not on the grounds that taking colonists’
property was immoral or illegal according to the rules of war, but that it was impolitic
and would alienate their support for the crown.541  Similarly, assaults on civilians 
resembled too closely the soldiers’ actual battlefield behavior.  The tactics of guerrilla
warfare and the use of rifles by the rebelling colonists led to a desire for retaliation 
against these enemies, who did not clearly identify themselves as combatants, and 
made it easier to justify attacks on civilians.542  These practices belied claims that 
legitimate targets for violence were to be found only on a designated field of 
battle.543  
Captain John Campbell of the Corps of Engineers was charged with “beating and 
offering to send to the Guard Mr. Joseph Tweedy, a Gentleman of the Town of 
Newport; for Persisting he was right in what he had done; and for Declaring, let the 
Consequences be what they will, under the like Provocation, he would beat him 
again.”  Campbell’s defense statement claimed that Tweedy was merely 
masquerading as a gentleman, that he was “in fact the son of a Transported Convict,
an inveterate Rebel, and himself notoriously reprobated.”  He claimed that Tweedy 
was connected “to a Man, engaged in the heat of Rebellion,” and was only in 
Newport to protect this rebel’s property.  Campbell praised “His Majesty’s most 
Clement intentions of recalling his deluded American subjects, to a proper sense of 
their real Interest, and Duty,” but suggested that Tweedy was pretending to be a 
loyal subject and that his complaint was merely an example of attempts by 
541.Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War,"
542.Starkey, "Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution," 13;
Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War," 398.
Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 136-137.
543.Conway, "The Great Mischief Complain'd Of": Reflections on the Misconduct of British Soldiers in the
Revolutionary War," 377.
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“atroceous Rebels to endulge their Rancour, and throw a die against the Honor and 
fortune of his [the King’s] most approved servants whilst they themselves risque 
nothing.”  He warned against allowing “such Complainants” the ability to “with 
Impunity give Officers the trouble of sitting Courts Martial” as it would soon “prove 
an incessant source of dangerous accusations against the very worthiest 
Characters.”544  Campbell was proposing that the rule of law had little place in this 
war; it was a threat to officers trying to subdue the rebellion and allowing American 
civilians access to courts, even military courts, was making officers vulnerable to the 
twisted designs of rebels intent on distressing them.  
Yet the rule of law and a conciliatory attitude towards American civilians had 
advocates as well.  There was a widespread belief by both officers and civilians that 
assault, theft, and rape by an occupying army was merely one of the usual costs of 
war borne by a civilian population.545  But the presence of loyalists, and the fact that 
the British saw the Revolutionary War as a rebellion by their own people rather than 
war against a foreign enemy, complicated the situation, as British officers and 
officials disagreed on whether the colonists would be more likely to reconcile 
themselves to British rule if treated mildly or if terrorized into submission.546  
544.WO 71/84, p. 159-177; for a similar case, see WO 71/88, pp. 16-29: Accused of abusing and arresting
Thomas Royse, an inhabitant of New York, without cause, Lieutenant Pritchard claimed that his
actions were justified because of Royse’s “insolent manner” and because “Royse had been one of
those who were Guilty of carrying people about upon Rails for their attachment to Government, and
used to have many private meetings of suspicious people at his house.”
545.See Stephen Conway, “‘The Great Mischief Complain'd of’: Reflections on the Misconduct of British
Soldiers in the Revolutionary War,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jul., 1990), pp. 370-390.
Conway, Military-civilian Crime and the British Army in North America, 1775-1781, 34-35, on civilian
losses as “the Unavoidable Circumstances of War."
546.The diverse views of British oﬃcers are explored by Stephen Conway in “To Subdue America,” pp.
381-407. Joseph S. Tidermann, in “Patriots by Default: Queen’s County, New York, and the British
Army, 1776-1783,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 35-63,
argues that the presence of the British army in New York throughout the war gradually turned the
inhabitants, initially indiﬀerent to independence, into strong supporters of the patriot cause through
their misbehavior and abuse of authority. Conway supports this view somewhat, suggesting that
oﬃcers in America had considerable autonomy, allowing oﬃcers who adopted a more severe
approach to circumvent the conciliatory approaches favored by Howe and Clinton (pp. 400-401).
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Therefore, officers subscribed to a range of views on how seriously they should 
attempt to prevent wartime crimes.  Some thought that the army should act 
decisively to curb plundering and pillaging by soldiers, while other officers led raids 
of the countryside and appropriated civilian property for themselves.547  
Some officers thought that the only way to win the war was to regain the loyalty 
of the American colonists.  Imagining that the colonists had been unhappily deluded 
by republican demagogues, they believed that if the army could enforce law and 
order in the areas that it occupied, and treat colonists with kindness and 
consideration, the Americans would soon perceive the benefits of being under British 
rule, and abandon the rebel cause.548  But naturally plundering civilian property and 
abusing civilians more generally would not cause anyone treated so to like the British
any better, and loyalists whose property was damaged or confiscated might turn 
against the British.549  Commanders issued orders exhorting troops to respect the 
property of the inhabitants and to give them no “Annoyance.”  General Howe’s 
orders called for officers to extend greater amounts of control over their soldiers, “as
the Present Licentious behaviour of the troops is a Disgrace to the Country they 
belong to.”550  He condemned theft and marauding, and threatened to hang soldiers 
caught plundering without trial.  
But although commanders favoring reconciliation often issued orders of this sort, 
the majority of soldiers were of a different opinion.551  Enlisted soldiers argued for 
547.Stephen Conway, “‘The Great Mischief Complain'd of’: Reflections on the Misconduct of British
Soldiers in the Revolutionary War,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jul., 1990), pp. 386-388.
548.Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War," 391.
549.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 116, on plunder as a problem for the British, alienating Loyalists as soldiers did not
distinguish between them and supporters of the revolutionaries.
550.General Orders, September 6, 1776, in the Orderly Book of the British Regiment of Foot Guards.
551.Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War," 386,
suggests both Howe and Clinton sought to win the approval of colonists by refraining from plundering
or other 'uncivilized' methods, directing that “the peaceable Inhabitants are not on any Account
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the legitimacy of plunder, and their officers were often also of the opinion that the 
rebelling colonists deserved whatever distresses the army inflicted upon them.552  
Despite commanders' high-minded and humanitarian orders, officers' desire for 
harshness often prevailed on the ground, as the junior officers were far more able to 
direct the actual treatment of civilians in practice than the high-level commanders.553
Officers insisted that proper behavior towards civilians in Britain necessarily 
differed from proper behavior overseas; it was ridiculous to have the same 
standards--it would make imperial governance impossible.  Imperial warfare 
provided an opportunity to use different military norms and disregard the laws of war
adhered to in Europe; indeed, many Britons held the idea that disputes in colonial 
zones necessarily had to be settled, ultimately, with violence, rather than the law.554 
Rebels and savage people were treated differently from European regular troops; the
developing standards of legal and illegal warfare were thought to apply only to 
regulars.555  And before the war, the civilian inhabitants of Britain to some extent 
agreed.556  
But Americans rejected this view; they made the appeal that their colonies were 
not like other colonies, and they refused to play the role of the imperial Other, citing 
their kinship ties with and cultural similarities to the inhabitants of the metropole.  
molested in Person or Property.”
552.Conway, Military-civilian Crime and the British Army in North America, 1775-1781, 86-87; Conway,
"British Army Oﬃcers and the American War for Independence," 266, disputes the widespread but
unexamined view that many British army oﬃcers opposed serving in the American War of
Independence and refused to serve there, and argues that British oﬃcers, on the whole, were not
ambivalent about the war and thought that the rebels deserved war rather than appeasement.
553.Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War," 405,
382.
554.Eliga H Gould, "Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, Circa
1772", The William and Mary Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2003): 471-510.
555.Starkey, "Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution," 12.
556.Gould, "Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, Circa 1772,"
483, 509-510.
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Loyalists insisted that they were Britons and deserved the same rights and 
protections as the citizens who lived in Britain itself; the rebels insisted that they had
been Britons, deserved the same rights and protections as other Britons, and were 
rightfully rebelling against Britain because they had been denied these rights.  The 
inability to easily distinguish loyalists from rebels caused further headaches for 
soldiers wishing to punish the rebels but placate the loyalists, and colonists took full 
advantage of this difficulty.557
American forces also weakened the ability of the British army to justify their poor
behavior because they partially adopted the conventions of European warfare.  The 
American War of Independence did not degenerate into unrestrained savagery 
because in addition to their militia and guerrilla forces, the rebels also decided to 
establish the Continental Army on a British model and fight according to European 
convention—thus restraining the ability of the British to use the tactics of terror they 
had used in the '45 rebellion in Scotland.  When faced with an enemy fighting 
according the rules of “civilized” warfare, officers and soldiers who used tactics fit 
only for “savage” opponents were harshly criticized for their inhumanity by their own
countrymen.558  British soldiers seem to have clearly wanted to characterize their 
American counterparts as unprofessional rebels and not part of the larger European 
military community.559  But when they were faced with an enemy that consciously 
modeled its organization and behavior on their own standards, and which proposed 
557.Todd W Braisted, "Refugees & Others: Loyalist Families in the American War for Independence", The
Brigade Dispatch XXVI, no. 4 (1996): 2-7.
558.Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781," The author also refutes the popular conception of 18th-c. warfare as somehow
more "civilized" and "restrained" than modern warfare, and argues that a slightly higher standard of
behavior might have prevailed when compared to the 17th-century religious wars and the 19th-century
Napoleonic Wars, but only in European warfare between established states; warfare against those
considered "savages", whether they were non-European populations or Scottish rebels, was
characterized by unrestrained brutality and terror.
559. Conway, "The British Army, 'Military Europe,' and the American War of Independence, 71.
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to keep discipline in its ranks by the wholesale plagiarism of the British Articles of 
War, (the Continental Articles of War had almost no alterations other than the 
deletion of references to the King), the British could not deviate from their rules for 
war without attracting criticism from their own people.560
The tendency of Britons to be critical of the army’s behavior to colonists, as well 
as some officers’ genuine distaste for brutality to civilians, meant that officers 
sometimes sought to play the role of imperial protectors.  The failure of the British to
act as proper protectors, and their arbitrary and tyrannical rule, were general themes
of patriot propaganda.561  And officers in particular were often targeted by these 
works, as circulating reports of officers’ misbehavior undermined the legitimacy of 
British rule and officers’ role as authorities who could be counted on to restrain the 
baser passions of enlisted soldiers.562  Thus, British officers found value in refuting 
these allegations by using military courts to both give the appearance of their 
respect for the rule of law and to conspicuously display their behavior as imperial 
protectors.  
Although the court-martial was a tool for controlling the internal affairs of the 
army, as we have seen, it could also be used to publicly control and demonstrate 
control of the behavior of their troops.  Formally trying those accused of crimes 
against civilians had several advantages.  Summary justice had an appearance of the
exercise of arbitrary and capricious power, which in the political climate of North 
America, had become inextricably linked with tyranny.  On the other hand, when 
560.Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in
America, 1755-1781," 10.
561.Eustace, Passion Is the Gale : Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 466, on
patriot writings characterizing the British as unfit parents unworthy of the loyalty and obedience of their
American children. Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape,
1765-1815," 859, on the usefulness of rape stories as anti-British propaganda.
562.Conway, Military-civilian Crime and the British Army in North America, 1775-1781, 42.
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colonists were allowed to confront their assailants at a court-martial, they could be 
reassured by its resemblance to a civilian court.  
By using these military courts, the British army could publicly proclaim its 
respect for the rule of law and counteract patriot propaganda depicting the British as 
unfit rulers by showing that they took crime against civilians seriously.  Furthermore,
these courts enhanced British authority: if civilians used them to seek redress for 
their grievances, they were implicitly publicly acknowledging and accepting the 
authority of the British, and thereby legitimizing their rule in North America.  
But civilians would hardly see military courts as an option if the courts 
themselves shielded members of the military from justice.  Therefore, if the army 
was to successfully make the transition from classifying assaults on civilians or their 
property as legitimate acts of war or the unfortunate but inevitable consequences of 
war to crimes that ought to be prosecuted, officers had to demonstrate a willingness 
to prosecute other members of the British military community for crimes, to assist 
civilians with negotiating the intricacies of military law, and to actually convict 
accused soldiers brought before the court.  This transition required the cooperation 
of members of the British forces in prosecuting other members of the same group.  
There was often no outside authority which could adjudicate these cases, and the 
British military had the responsibility of jailing, charging, trying, convicting, and 
punishing all offenders.  Assaults, rapes and thefts could not be prosecuted as crimes
unless members of the British military community acted at every stage of the 
proceeding, from the initial criminal investigation to the carrying out of the sentence.
Inertia and inaction played a significant role in the treatment of crimes against 
civilians.  The default was for these crimes to be ignored; inattention at any stage 
doomed the process.  Convicting soldiers for abusing civilians required people willing 
to disregard group loyalty to the army at every stage.  The long chain of events from
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the initial apprehension of the suspect to the administration of the sentence meant 
that there were numerous opportunities to disrupt the proceedings.  Soldiers could 
turn a blind eye to crimes committed by their comrades; officers could refuse to 
assist the civilians who appealed to them for aid; soldiers stationed at the guard 
house could allow the prisoner to escape; the commanding officer could release the 
prisoner on his own authority instead of ordering him to be tried563; the Deputy 
Judge Advocate could hinder the prosecution by not exerting himself to arrange for 
the presence of all the necessary witnesses; the court martial board could acquit the 
defendant in the face of flagrant evidence against him; and soldiers and officers with 
influence could use their connections to make sure that the sentence was never 
carried out.  The process could also be interrupted without any person’s active 
intervention simply by the exigencies of war.  After the British were forced to 
evacuate Boston in March 1776, Ensign James Foxon of the 10th Regiment of Foot, 
accused of plundering a house in Boston, had to be tried in Nova Scotia the next 
month, without any witnesses who had remained in Boston.564 
When the war itself did not make trying cases impossible, the initial step, 
apprehending the suspects, often required the direct efforts of British officers, who 
often had to personally chase down suspects when civilians complained to them.  
When a Long Island civilian was robbed and murdered by a party of soldiers one 
night, two Captains were ordered to wait on the beach for hours until daybreak to 
intercept them.565  When Elizabeth Johnstone appealed to Donald McIntire for aid 
after she was raped by two soldiers, McIntire, surgeon to the 43rd regiment, took 
563.e.g. WO 71/86, pp. 155-158: three female camp followers were confined for plundering, but by the
time of the trial, one had been “released by order of Genl. Knyphausen.”
564.WO 71/82, pp. 292-302.
565.WO 71/93, pp. 185-189.
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charge and ordered her servants to restrain one of the men and “ran himself after 
the other man.”566   
Welbore Doyle, a lieutenant in the 55th Regiment of Foot who was staying at the 
house of Joshua Loring, a resident of New York, awoke one night thinking he had 
heard a noise in the cellar.  He alerted Loring, and both men went in search of 
soldiers to assist them.  Then they entered the cellar, “and after searching a good 
while for   people, they found two soldiers in an inward Cellar,” who were “beastly 
drunk” after having consumed a good portion of the wine in Loring’s cellar.  They 
apprehended the two men, who were then “conducted both to the main Guard.”  The
two men told the sergeant on duty that they would return in the morning to “send a 
crime against the prisoners,”—make out a formal complaint of the crime with which 
they desired the prisoners to be charged. 567 
Even when officers did not have to personally chase down suspects and conduct 
them to the guard house, they could be called upon to assist in the investigation of 
crimes committed by soldiers in other ways, such as assembling their men so the 
victims could examine them and determine whether any of them were seen at the 
scene of the crime.568  When Hannah Dray of Long Island complained to Colonel 
Tarleton about the soldiers who had broken into her home, stolen numerous articles, 
raped her mother-in-law, and tried to set the house on fire, Tarleton offered his men 
a monetary reward for information concerning the crime, at which one of the soldiers
involved confessed and named his accomplices.569
After a soldier was accused of a crime, he was customarily kept in the guard 
house until a court martial could be assembled to try him.  (An officer was generally 
566.WO 71/82, p. 413.
567.WO 71/83 pp. 41-48.
568.e.g. WO 71/95, pp. 294-304.
569.WO 71/90, pp. 376-383.
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allowed the privilege of being confined to his own quarters.)  Keeping the accused in 
confinement actually required a number of people of varying ranks to cooperate in 
this goal.  Prisoners could be released inadvertently when the guard was changed, or
through the active intervention of officers, or through the collusion of the non-
commissioned officers and enlisted men who actually supervised the prisoners for 
most of the day.  When Loring returned to the guard house to charge the soldiers 
whom they had found drunk in his cellar, “he found to his great surprize, that they 
were both dismissed.”  The captain on duty that night had sent them back to their 
own unit two hours later, and Loring had to go to another guard house, persuade the
corporal there to “let him see all the men” on duty there, and pick out the suspects 
again.  
If the suspects were to be kept in confinement, they had to officially be charged 
with a crime.  As seen by Loring’s return to the guard house the morning after he 
and some soldiers had apprehended the men who had broken into his house, the 
responsibility for this lay with the victim; there was no duty on the part of the 
military to provide legal assistance in choosing the charges and writing them with the
proper legal language, a practice that might hinder military officers who wanted to 
proosecute for crimes committed against them as well as civilians.  
The 88th’s Surgeon, James Barton, was arrested for disrespecting Doctor John 
Hunter, his immediate superior, as well as a major.  On the spot, "A Crime was wrote
by Dr. Hunter sign'd and address'd to the Commanding officer...and given to 
Lieutenant French [the officer tasked the arrest] to be presented with the Prisoner."  
After being told a few days later “that no Crime had been given in against him 
[Barton],” Hunter “used the freedom to consult with General Garth upon this 
occasion,” and ended up charging Barton with another crime that he had not 
referenced the first time, and the result seems to have been two different sets of 
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charges leveled against Barton.  Barton protested at his court-martial that he had 
been told about one set of charges earlier, only to found out at his court-martial that
he would be tried for the other set.  
Both incidents suggest that while complaining parties might appear to write out 
the charges against the defendant without the advantage of any particular legal 
knowledge, in practice there were opportunities for consultation with those with 
more knowledge.  Hunter admitted that his unfamiliarity with military law led him to 
seek the advice of the general when he thought he had an opportunity to re-do his 
listing of Barton’s crimes, while Loring’s decision to return in the morning to give in a
crime rather than writing one on the spot, as seems to have been more normal, 
suggests he might have wanted the opportunity to learn how best to charge his 
prisoners—though in this case, his delay also meant that the captain of the guard 
released his prisoners before he could return, thinking that they had committed no 
crime except being drunk in public.  
Many female victims especially appear to have had the benefit of advice from 
someone knowledgable about the intricacies of military law.  For example, Catherine 
Stone and Isabel Mitchell, unmarried women, seem to have been advised by an 
officer to charge their assailants with robbery rather than rape.  This was done on 
the flimsiest of pretexts—a cloak had incidentally been carried away by one of the 
rapists—but allowed them to avoid the intrusive personal questioning customarily 
done by the court to a woman prosecuting a man for rape.  Without such cooperation
and informal assistance of members of the British military community, many victims 
of crime would not have been able to prosecute.  
The women who complained of having been raped by British soldiers tended to 
be those who had reason to expect a sympathetic hearing by the British officers who 
comprised the members of the court-martial.  Many of the victims had formal or 
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informal ties to the army or to Britain, and were Loyalists—not surprising as the 
trials were primarily concentrated in New York City, which was occupied by the 
British Army for the majority of the war, and thus became a haven for Loyalists 
fleeing there from other parts of the North American Colonies.  Catherine Stone and 
Isabel Mitchell were servants of Mrs. Douglas, the wife of a British Lieutenant, and 
lived in their house.570  Other women bringing rape accusations before the court may 
also have had the help of British officers with whom they were acquainted, and who 
advocated on their behalf and helped them prepare their cases for trial.  Elizabeth 
Johnstone apparently knew the surgeon Donald McIntire, who testified for the 
prosecution at the trial of the men she accused; he testified that he had called at her
house earlier in the day.  Hannah Dray might have been socially acquainted with 
Colonel Banastre Tarleton; normally rather cavalier about the depredations of 
soldiers under his command, Tarleton nevertheless personally visited her house to 
inspect the damage after the robbery and rape, and furthermore offered a “Reward 
for the discovery of the Party concerned,” after which one of the soldiers who had 
participated in the robbery but not the rape confessed and named his accomplices.571
Though officers were often ambivalent about whether colonial women—in the 
abstract—were worth protecting, when faced with specific appeals from women they 
knew, they leapt into the role of the heroic champion of a woman in distress.  The 
gentle treatment of women and the defense of their virtue were part of the chivalric 
ideal that appealed to many officers.572  A woman appealing to an officer for 
assistance after being raped gave him an opportunity to display his status as a 
legitimate patriarch and masculine protector, especially valuable in a political climate
570.WO 71/85, p. 208.
571.WO 71/90, pp. 377-383.
572.Cohen, "’Manners’ Make the Man: Politeness, Chivalry, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1750–
1830," 329.
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that regularly used the rhetoric of rape to characterize the perceived relationship 
between Britain and the American colonies, and circulated stories of British soldiers 
as rapists in order to argue that the British were abusive and unfit rulers of the 
colonies.573  
The court-martial provided a useful forum for displaying their authority, initiative,
and bravery, which they could contrast with the timid responses of civilian men.  
When Lieutenant Robert Douglas, a Royal Artillery officer stationed in Philadelphia, 
learned that his maidservant Catherine Stone had been raped by a soldier and two 
other men connected with the army, he testified that he immediately went in search 
of her.  Douglas noted that she had first tried to run away from her assailants and 
take refuge in a civilian’s house.  (Catherine Stone testified that she “screamed out 
and made all the resistance she could, but nobody came to her assistance,” despite 
the fact that she briefly escaped from her captors and knocked at the door of a 
house, but that “the owner would not let her stay there,” and her captors dragged 
her away again.)  But when Douglas had tried to locate her there, the inhabitants 
“acknowledged that a Woman had come there in a good deal of distress, but that 
they were afraid; as they were frequently alarmed with riots, that she was some 
disorderly woman, & they might get themselves into a scrape, they therefore insisted
upon her quitting the house immediately.”574  By referring to Catherine Stone in such
terms, they may have been trying to discredit her claims of being raped.  Lieutenant 
Douglas, in contrast, presented himself as recognizing Catherine Stone’s right to 
protection from sexual assault.  
573.Block, "Rape Without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape, 1765-1815"; see also
O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 150-151, on Jane McCrea, who was killed by Indian allies of the British while she was
supposed to be under the protection of her fiancee, a loyalist oﬃcer, which fueled American
propaganda claiming that the British were unsuitable protectors.
574.WO 71/85, pp. 203, 206.
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Another officer claimed that Catherine Stone had run up to him screaming for 
help and covered with blood, and that he had assisted her. Lieutenant William Green,
the officer whom Catherine Stone appealed to for assistance after she escaped her 
captors, testified that when he had earlier that night “heard a female voice cry 
Murder,” he went to the door and attempted to ascertain if anyone needed 
assistance, but was foiled by the darkness of the night.  That he had made such an 
attempt was in stark contrast to the civilians who turned a desperate Catherine 
Stone out of their house.  William Green also testified that Catherine Stone “came 
running up to him and taking hold of him cry'd out, for God's sake, Sir, save me, 
save me; that upon asking her what was the Matter, she said that she had been very
ill used by three Men & beged that he would see her home as she was afraid to go 
alone.”575  And Lieutenant Douglas was instrumental in identifying the culprits and 
testifying before the court.  After Catherine Stone and Isabel Mitchel told him about 
the assaults, he took careful note of their descriptions of their attackers and 
apparently had likely suspects apprehended and brought before him some days later,
by which method he eventually identified the defendants.576  
Officers also portrayed themselves as the legitimate authorities to whom 
women could turn for redress and assistance by apprehending the culprit.  Donald 
McIntire, a surgeon, testified that after Elizabeth Johnstone appealed to her for aid, 
he took charge and ordered the servants to restrain one of the men, John Dunn, and 
“ran himself after the other man,” apprehended him, and had them both conducted 
to their commanding officer.  Colonel Robinson testified that when he saw Elizabeth 
Loundberry come out of her house looking distressed, “he went to her, and asked 
what was the matter.”  Upon learning of the rape and ascertaining who committed 
575.WO 71/85, p. 205.
576.WO 71/85, pp. 206-207.
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the act, he “desired the Orderly Serjeant attending General Vaughan, to take them 
prisoners.”  Women appear to have accepted the view that officers represented a 
higher standard of behavior as well: Elizabeth Johnstone told the court that when 
(the aptly named) Private John Lusty expressed his intentions of raping her, “she 
told him that if he did not let her alone, that she would tell his officers of him, upon 
which he said, damn you and the officers too.”577 
But the scarcity of these cases suggests that while officers took advantage of 
opportunities to portray themselves favorably when avenging injury done to their 
acquaintances when such opportunities presented themselves, they made no 
systematic efforts to prevent sexual assaults of civilian women.  All of the cases 
prosecuted unambiguously fit the stereotypical pattern of the ideal rape case in the 
English Common Law tradition: an unexpected and violent act, often committed in 
conjunction with another crime (usually assault or robbery), perpetrated by a 
stranger to the victim, where there was absolutely no presumption of the defendant 
having any sort of legitimate sexual access to the woman.  
All were crimes of extreme violence and included outrageous details which could 
have easily taken their place among patriot propaganda about British atrocities.   
Sergeant Boswell tore apart Elizabeth Loundberry’s house and dragged her to the 
bed, threw her on it, and raped her while she was attempting to hold on to a baby in 
her arms.578  Bartholomew McDonough raped Phebe Coe’s disabled daughter, and 
then he and two associates attacked, held down, and took turns raping Phebe Coe 
herself when she attempt to intervene and protect her daughter.579  Elizabeth 
Johnstone testified that two soldiers, John Dunn and John Lusty, had broken into her
577.WO 71/88, p. 526; WO 71/82, p. 413.
578.WO 71/88, p. 525.
579.WO 71/86, pp. 200-206.
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house while intoxicated; that as she was at her spinning wheel, they grabbed her 
and threw her on the bed and each held her down as the other raped her, in the 
presence of her four-year-old daughter.580  Thus, these cases were brought to trial 
not because they were representative, but because they were exceptional.  They 
were shocking crimes that demanded redress, and, from a legal point of view, they 
were very strong, unambiguous cases with multiple witnesses.  They were the ideal 
cases for an officer seeking to make a public display of protective masculinity to lend
his assistance to, and the fact that the only rape cases for which detailed records 
survive are these exceptionally violent ones suggests that British officers were not 
interested in assisting in the prosecution of more ambiguous or less “serious” sexual 
assaults, or in making any more systematic effort to prosecute rape cases, which 
would not have given them the same opportunities for imperial display.  
 In general, successful prosecutions exploited tensions between soldiers of 
differing statuses.  In order to get to the stage of a verdict, civilians prosecuting 
soldiers had to have the cooperation of members of the British army at numerous 
points.  But even after they had successfully brought the case to trial, they still had 
to rely on the court martial board to actually convict the defendant.  British military 
courts and American civilians seeking redress for crimes had interests that only 
occasionally overlapped, and it is at this juncture that convictions occurred.  
Enlisted soldiers were at an obvious disadvantage because a British court martial 
board was comprised exclusively of officers, who were much less willing to convict a 
defendant who came from their own ranks.581  Suggestions that soldiers’ assaults and
plundering were undermining the authority structure of the army and appealing to 
580.WO 71/82, p. 413. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, in “Wheels, Looms, and the Gender Division of Labor in
Eighteenth-Century New England,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January, 1998), 21,
notes that household spinning was a particular source of feminine pride and status.  
581.Peter Way, "Class and the Common Soldier in the Seven Years' War", Labor History 44, no. 4 (2003):
455-481, on the creation of class identity among enlisted soldiers.
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the paternalistic feelings of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers 
helped civilians make the case that abuses of civilians should be considered crimes.  
Social differences between the accused and their judges, and the officers’ desire to 
reinforce those differences, helped women gain convictions.  This was perhaps due to
officers’ insecurity for their own authority; officers had considerable difficulty 
enforcing orders against plundering and marauding.
But more importantly, officers’ willingness to convict enlisted defendants, and 
their willingness to assist women prosecuting for rape at every step of the process, 
was not merely because the victims were often personally known to them and 
because crimes were egregious and undermined officer authority.  Rather, officers’ 
behavior in these cases was an outgrowth of an existing cultural standard in the 
British army: Officers had already established their right to regulate the sexual 
behavior of enlisted men as part of a larger process of denying them the privileges 
that they would usually enjoy as adult men.  
In the public view, these rape cases were crimes.  But examined from within the 
workings of the internal social relationships of the army, officers intervention in the 
rape of civilian women by enlisted soldiers functioned similarly to, and had the same 
goal as, their interventions in the marriages and sexual relationships of enlisted 
soldiers examined in the second chapter.  That is, all of these interventions were 
only tangentially related to protection or oppression of the involved women 
themselves; rather, they served to display the class-based power of officers to 
regulate and interfere with enlisted expressions of masculinity.  
The independence of the court from both their military superiors and from the 
law itself allowed these rape cases to serve as displays of officers power.  The only 
officer present who was required to have any legal training was the Deputy Judge 
Advocate, and while he was called upon by the court to clarify legal matters upon the
248
court’s request, the court was  under no obligation to follow his guidelines and his 
opinions on proper legal procedure could be overruled by the court.  Furthermore, he
had no vote and had no power to overturn the verdict of the board even if it was not 
in accordance with the law.  Thus, a victim who had a weak case but who had gained
the sympathy of members of the court martial board might gain a conviction, while a
victim who had a more substantial case but who was accusing a defendant of high 
status or who was known by reputation to the court might find the defendant 
acquitted despite the evidence presented.  
For American civilians British military courts were not dispensers of justice, but 
occasional dispensers of the appearance of justice.  Outraged civilians could extract 
very satisfactory outcomes from these courts when the prosecution of crimes done to
them allowed officers to present themselves favorably to the court and to the world, 
or to uphold their status and reputation as upper-class gentlemen.  But within the 
context of the American War of Independence, this was not the usual occurrence; it 
was far more common for officers to ignore civilian complaints, on the grounds that 
by rebelling, they had forfeited any claim to protection, or that the confiscation of 
property by the army was merely an inevitable burden of war that civilians must 
bear.  And ultimately this business of portraying themselves as imperial protectors 
was a side note for officers.  While appeals for individuals in need of aid allowed 
officers to play this masculine role, the winning of the war itself took precedence, 
because the loss of honor to be suffered from neglecting to protect a distressed 
civilian was entirely negligible compared to the loss of honor that would accrue to 
them from being defeated in battle by the enemy soldiers that they had denounced 
as skulking, unmanly cowards.  Thus, they were willing to abandon the honor to be 
gained from playing the imperial protector role whenever it conflicted with the need 
to seek wartime victory.
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Conclusion: No Surrender
The officers’ need for victory in battle was the logical outgrowth of their culture of
manly honor.  An officer could not submit to insult or interpersonal violence without 
losing honor, and the tactics of the rebels resembled too much the dishonorable 
assaults that an officer could not endure.  Thus, the skulking way of war adopted by 
many fighting on the rebels’ side was not just a hated military tactic, but a personal 
insult that could only be rectified by the utter crushing of the rebellion.  
Some officers might have had the idea that their Revolutionary War duties 
included upholding law and order, protecting the property and bodies of defenseless 
civilians, and generally acting to protect American colonists from the ravages of war. 
This, they thought, would end the unnatural rebellion of the colonists and win them 
back to loyalty to the mother country.  But some officers had the exact opposite 
view—what would convince the colonists was not kindness and conciliation but wrath
and destruction.  With their fields destroyed and livestock stolen, American colonists 
might learn that defying the British had consequences, and their fear of being 
terrorized by republican revolutionaries might be replaced with a salutary fear of 
British power.582  If winning the war took primacy, and destroying civilian property 
and distressing the inhabitants was the way to win it, then officers were quite willing 
to embrace these tactics, or, even more easily, simply refuse to take any action to 
prevent abuses.583 
582.Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War," 400.
583.Conway, "The Great Mischief Complain'd Of": Reflections on the Misconduct of British Soldiers in the
Revolutionary War," 387; see also Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Oﬃcers and the
Conduct of the Revolutionary War," 405, on the emotional needs of the enlisted; oﬃcers could not or
would not prevent their men from taking vengeance on people who had fought them using
dishonorable tactics.
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This understanding of how to gain loyalty was exactly what their previous 
experience running an army had taught them.  Loyalty was won through coercion—
there might be a role for love and kindness, but only when allied to a strategy of 
instilling fear.  Thus, it is not surprising that officers as well as enlisted soldiers were 
dissatisfied at orders to act in a conciliatory manner and refrain from antagonizing 
the populace.  Captain Payne clearly resented orders aimed at not escalating 
tensions with disaffected civilians in the volatile years of 1774 and 1775, reacting 
angrily to orders to march the companies of his regiment with the bayonets unfixed 
in order to appear less threatening to the crowd.584  
Officers’ experience in the army did not incline them to conciliation; the enemy’s 
treatment of them was perceived as an insult, and their code of masculinity insisted 
that the only possible responses to an insult were violent retaliation or the 
permanent loss of all honor.  Conciliation was dishonorable; it was the equivalent of 
being insulted and patiently suffering the insult.  It was not the soldier’s way, and 
they did not think it was a real man’s way.  The military conception of masculinity 
was too bound up in the ability to effectively deliver violence.  
Thus, the army’s insistence on retaining the violent military masculinity that 
allowed them to continue to fight the War of American Independence made it 
impossible for them to actually win that war.  Their reliance on violence as the most 
fundamental marker of masculinity inclined the army to prefer offense to defense, to 
attack and seek battle rather than withdraw and wait, and—most importantly—
demanded that they seek victory in battle at all costs.  Thus, they were far less 
resilient than their opponents.  “We fight, get beat, rise and fight again,” the 
Continental General Nathanael Greene claimed after his troops were defeated at the 
584.WO 71/82, p. 158.
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Battle of Hobkirk’s Hill.585  This attitude would have been impossible for the British 
army to adopt.  To accept defeat—to willingly embrace defeat in pursuit of larger 
goals—was unthinkable to them.  
Military historians suggest that British commanders often went on the offensive 
even when the risks were high and the gains were uncertain because they believed 
that they could not even allow their troops to appear to retreat, fearing an increase 
in rebellious feeling from scornful civilian observers.586  Furthermore, they also 
adhered to military doctrines emphasizing attack, destroying the enemy’s army, and 
capturing key enemy cities.587   They were hampered by both their adherence to 
European military principles and their need for victory.  
However, British generals’ pattern of gaining tactical victories that were 
nevertheless costly strategic defeats was not due a lack of intelligence, or insight, or 
adaptability.  Rather, adopting tactics that might have brought a greater chance of 
success had an enormous cultural cost.  After building up the myth of the brave 
British fighting openly, in contrast to the cowardly rebels hiding behind defensive 
works, the British commanders would have more trouble advocating a defensive 
strategy, or one in which they avoided battle.  And the officers' culture, with its 
emphasis on honor, violence, and action—and the need to retaliate against attacks 
on one's honor and reputation—might have made it psychologically impossible to 
hold to a defensive strategy.  For British commanders, victory on the battlefield was 
nearly the sole criterion necessary for winning the war, and they consistently 
585.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 268.
586.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only : The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 27.
587.Charles Heaton, "The Failure of Enlightenment Military Doctrine in Revolutionary America: The
Piedmont Campaign and the Fate of the British Army in the Lower South," The North Carolina
Historical Review 87, no. 2 (2010): 127-157.
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disregarded other goals in order to seek this type of victory.588  In their unwillingness
to abandon certain cultural ideals about masculinity, and their preference for direct 
action and obvious victory, they were aided by the king himself, who favored 
commanders who advocated daring, high-risk strategies instead of those who 
advocated caution and defense.589  
But war also made Britain’s military masculinity vulnerable; defeat called into 
question the value and correctness of soldiers’ masculinity.590  Indulgence in luxury 
was linked to military defeat not only in America, but in Britain itself.  Howe was 
criticized in Britain for settling down comfortably in occupied Philadelphia instead of 
engaging in vigorous military campaigns, and other commanders faced similar 
criticisms.591  These criticisms made officers even more sensitive to defeat, and more
eager to risk all for victory.  
This desire for victory at all costs meant the ideas about the law were always 
secondary concerns.  When officers thought that particularly egregious crimes 
against civilians needed a public example of punishment to sway the population to 
their side, they readily subverted the course of justice to punish the guilty (so long 
as it did not violate the army’s class hierarchy).  When they thought abusing civilians
would help, they did that, too.  Both of these tactics might form part of the army’s 
strategy for dealing with civilians.  But dealing with civilians was not the army’s main
588.Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America,
1775-1783, 23.
589.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 30.
590.John Tosh, "Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender," in Masculinities in Politics and War :
Gendering Modern History, ed. Stefan Dudnik, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2004), 49, suggests that unless military and civilian codes of masculinity
bear at least some resemblance to each other, a military will not be perceived positively, and will not
be able to attract recruits, thus making it impossible "for the state to have secure control over the
means of violence."
591.Stead, "Contemporary Responses in Print to the American Campaigns of the Howe Brothers,"
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business; they could not conceive of any victory that might occur without the army’s 
violence.  
Therefore they were determined to fight to the end, and at the end they were still
capable and willing to fight.  Here, too, the army retained the sympathy of their king 
if not their countrymen.  Even after his ministers had become disillusioned and 
despaired of victory in America, the king urged them to press on rather than "suffer 
his dominions to be dismembered."592  The king and the army both refused to accept 
defeat, but they were outnumbered by the rest of the country, who sought peace.  
Ultimately, ideas of manly honor and the norms of violence that developed to govern
officers’ culture made the British army an effective fighting force in battle, but 
damaged its ability to function as an army of occupation among people who could 
not be made into unrelated, alien subjects of their dominion.  Their culture made 
them ever more eager to seek violence, fueled by both professional pride and a 
desire for personal vengeance, and the types of people who could call upon them to 
act as imperial protectors without threatening their fragile masculine honor grew 
ever smaller.  
Officers’ vigorous defence of their violent, arbitrary, class-based masculine 
privilege had constrained the ways that they could interact with Britain’s imperial 
subjects—especially when those subjects could make their own claims to imperial 
protection.  Their default method of conflict resolution was violent coercion, and in 
their hyper-masculine environment violence soon became their only honorable option
for numerous social interactions.  But the fact that their culture of violence severely 
limited their options as imperial actors seemed to cause them little concern.  
Ultimately this study reveals how marginal the idea of imperial effectiveness was for 
592.O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate
of the Empire, 36.
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the imperial army; it remained more concerned with preserving its internal social 
dynamics.  Thus, unwilling to give up its violent foundations, even to preserve the 
empire, the imperial army withdrew from the lost American colonies and sought 
instead distant lands where their violence might win them new empires.  
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